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Chapter One . Intuitive Appeal and Ubiquity of 'Levels'
Chapter  One:  The  Intuitive  Appeal  and  Ubiquity  of 
'Levels of Organization'
1.1 Introduction 
References  to  the  scientific  concept  of  levels  of  organization1 are  ubiquitous  in  both 
philosophy and the biological sciences. The image of the world that the concept evokes posits  
a vertically stratified structure in which the entities and processes of nature are connected 
together  into  a  graduated  continuity:  The  things  found  at  one  horizontal  slice  of  reality 
somehow 'make up' or 'are continuous with' the things found at the next slice, and so on. This 
continuity is often depicted as extending from the basic elementary entities and processes of 
physics all the way through the biosphere. This image in its complete or abridged form is 
present  in  the  vast  majority  textbooks  of  the  biological  sciences,  introductory  as  well  as 
advanced, and serves to summarize the basic construal of the natural world whose particular 
workings scientists seek to uncover by explanation (see also Lobo 2008). Philosophers in turn 
readily cite this image of the world as a self-evident observation in which to cast some of the 
biggest questions of our time. Questions concerning the reducibility of natural phenomena to 
lower-levels of organization (Wimsatt 1976; Burian and Stout 1995; Sarkar 1992; 1998, esp. 
53-60;  Craver  2007a,  Ch.  7;  Bechtel  2008,  143-48;  Brigandt  and  Love  2010),  whether 
'emergent'  phenomena exist (McLaughlin 1992; Emmeche et al. 1997; Kim 1999; Stephan 
1999a; Korn 2005; Theurer 2014), and the nature of causation outside of physics (Malaterre 
2011; Love 2012; Ellis  2012; Hoffmann-Kolss 2014; Franklin-Hall  forthcoming) are three 
well-established areas  of  philosophical  discussion that  make heavy use of  the  concept  of 
levels of organization. 
1 In what follows, the term <levels of organization> refers to things (levels) posited by a certain claim, even if  
their existence is tentative or hypothetical. When the term <levels> appears without qualifier in the text (e.g.,  
of organization or of reality), it will refer to <levels of organization> unless otherwise noted in the text. The 
term <'levels  of  organization'>  (with  scare  quotes)  refers  to  the  concept  of  levels  of  organization  as  a 
theoretical notion discussed by philosophers and scientists.
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Despite  this  ubiquity,  the  usage  of  the  concept  of  levels  of  organization  in  science  and 
philosophy is governed mostly by its intuitive appeal, whose justification is often taken as 
self-evident.  As such,  the term's  precise character  and significance  is  rarely developed in 
detail.  The philosopher William Wimsatt,  one of the pioneering scholars that has devoted 
serious effort to analyzing the concept of levels, observes this as well, saying: “The notion of 
a compositional level of organization is presupposed but left unanalyzed by virtually all extant 
analyses  of  inter-level  reduction  and  emergence”  (1994  [2007],  203).  Talk  of  levels  of 
organization in the philosophical literature is quickly replaced or used interchangeably with a 
range of other distinct ideas. For instance, 'levels' is used as a shorthand reference to, e.g., a 
systematic  dependence  between  certain  properties  related  by  supervenience  or  realization 
(respectively, Kim 1998, 1999; Aizawa and Gillet 2009), an epistemic ordering of scientific 
knowledge or disciplines  (Oppenheim and Putnam 1958;  Waters  2010),  as an ontological 
thesis about the structure of the world (Oppenheim and Putnam 1958; McLaughlin 1992, 50; 
Churchland and Sejnowski 1992, 9, 15; Wimsatt 1994[2007], 201-202), or as a combination 
of several uses (Oppenheim and Putnam 1958; Mayr 1982, 65; Craver 2007a, 170-171). The 
looseness with which ‘levels’ are used has already called for some to eliminate the term from 
science (Guttman 1976), and at least minimize its usage in philosophy (Potochnik and McGill  
2012; Eronen 2013).
More  problematically,  philosophers  who refer  to  levels  of  organization  often claim to be 
simply importing the term as it is used in science (e.g., Kim 2002, 2; Rueger and McGill 
2010, 379; Potochnik and McGill 2012, 120). However, the number of sustained analyses 
dedicated  to  analyzing how the concept  of levels  of  organization  is  used in  science (and 
particularly  biology)  is  vanishingly  small.  Apart  from a  small  number  of  survey  articles 
detailing  a  number  of  issues  arising  from the  usage  of  'levels  of  organization'  (Wimsatt 
1994[2007]; Kim 2002; Craver 2007a, ch. 5), the concept itself has received almost no direct 
attention  in  this  regard.  This  is  beginning to  change.2 The  philosopher  Markus I.  Eronen 
2 Indeed,  the speed at  which this is  changing continues to  gain momentum. Since the submission of  this  
dissertation in summer 2014, a number of articles have been published that address 'levels of organization' in 
a manner parallel to the analysis here. In particular, David M. Kaplan has published a recent (2015) paper 
that calls specific attention to the lack of scholarly analysis on the concept of levels of organization (rather 
than other cognates of the term 'levels'). Kaplan, however, also goes further than other mere calls for attention 
by providing a useful summary of the concept in a number of explanatory accounts in philosophy, including 
the  Hempel  and  Oppenheim's  D-N  account,  Oppenheim  and  Putnam's  account  of  microreduction, 
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(2013; 2014) has recently published two insightful papers on the levels concept, and Alan 
Love (2012), along with Ingo Brigandt (Brigandt and Love 2012), also offer an interesting 
analysis  of  the  scientific  use  of  ‘levels’  in  the  context  of  questions  about  causation  and 
pluralistic  explanation,  respectively.  Other  authors,  including  those  mentioned  above, 
mentioned above (Rueger and McGivern 2010; Potochnik and McGill 2012), also point out 
the lack of such sustained analysis of 'levels' as an impetus for their respective treatments of 
the concept. Nonetheless the character and significance of the levels concept remains largely 
an open question.
1.2 Analyzing 'Levels of Organization' in Biological Science
The task taken up in this dissertation will not be to take a position in any one of the particular  
debates in which levels play a role (e.g., reduction, emergence, and causation). Instead, this 
dissertation will analyze the concept of levels as it is used in the biological sciences. More 
specifically,  this  endeavor  will  entail  explicating3 the  character and  significance of  the 
concept of 'levels of organization' for explanation in the biological sciences. By ‘character’ is 
meant,  very  roughly,  what scientists  take  to  the  term  ‘levels’  to  mean.  The  two  terms 
‘character’ and ‘meaning’ are not interchangeable, however. ‘Meaning’ is a more specialized 
term in philosophy, and is traditionally used to express the semantic content of a word or 
mechanistic explanation, and even contrasting the levels concept with Marr's “levels of analysis” framework.  
Likewise, Carl Craver has in a new (2015) paper also revisited the levels concept, and builds on his (2007a, 
Ch.5) analysis of levels by clarifying further his 'defining questions' approach to understanding levels (ibid.; 
see Chapter 2 for more details), and contextualizing his own mechanistic conception of levels among the  
many cognates of the levels concept. These two papers come as a particular surprise, given the lack of such 
papers during the duration of this dissertation's writing, and indeed given the silence on the issue of the levels  
concept in philosophy generally. Another area of philosophy where the levels concept has continued to 'run  
rampant' since the submission of this dissertation is the discussion of issues pertaining to non-fundamental  
causation (particularly top-down causation, higher-level causation, and causation in biology generally). Here, 
two recent papers (i.e. Hoffmann-Kolss 2014; Franklin-Hall 2014) have thematized levels of organization, 
albeit  indirectly,  in  their  arguments  against  attempts  to  articulate  higher-level  causation  (especially  in 
biology).  The contributions offered in the analysis of this dissertation is proving to be, if nothing else, a  
timely choice in topic.
3 The term “explicate” here is not meant to evoke any commitment to certain technical uses of the word that 
are sometimes used in philosophy (such as in the sense developed by Rudolf Carnap (1950, 3). Rather, what  
is meant by the term here is closer to the normal English use of the word, i.e. to make the meaning of the  
concept clearer. What this precisely entails will be explained presently.
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concept in relation to a thing to which that word or concept refers. Instead, by seeking to 
understanding the character of the levels concept, the analysis that will be offered here will 
strive to uncover specific features of semantic content attributed by scientists to the concept as 
a tool used to aid in explaining phenomena. Concurrently, by 'significance' is meant, roughly, 
why the concept of levels is used. The ‘significance’ of the levels concept encompasses the 
purposes that are attributed to the concept by scientists who use the term to apply certain ideas 
in working to explain biological phenomena.
The analysis  here will  show that  the concept  of ‘levels  of organization’  in the biological 
exhibits a fragmentary character across different instances of scientific usage. This means that 
though the concept is capable of clarity precision in given instances,  it  displays  a modest 
semantic incommensurability across these given instances, which needs to be addressed.4 That 
is, there are differences in the characterizations of what levels are in given instances such that 
no singular, common standard is available to compare and contrast all instances of usage of 
the levels concept. Instead, the semantic content that comprises the character of the levels 
concept in given instances is determined in a contextualized way, i.e., from the perspective of 
the researcher using the levels concept (cf. McClamrock 1991). This perspective encompasses 
a point of view from within a scientific discipline in which that researcher has been trained or 
is making their particular claim involving the levels concept (see Section 1.2.2 and Chapter 4 
for more details on how this is specified). 
This  contextualized  approach to  determining  the content  of  a  scientific  concept  stands  in 
contrast to another attitude concerning how to understand the character of a concept, i.e. a 
comprehensive  approach.  A  comprehensive  approach  entails  searching  for  an  exhaustive, 
singular conception of that concept (here ‘levels’) for all instances of its usage. This often 
manifests itself in the search for the  essence of the concept in question. The ‘essence’ of a 
concept refers to a feature or set of features that are taken to fundamentally or necessarily 
designate  what  that  concept  is  (Robertson  and  Atkins  2013).  The  distinction  between 
4 See Chapter 4 for a closer specification of what is meant by “incommensurability” between usages of the  
levels  concept.  Here  'incommensurability'  will  be  understood  in  the  more  mundane  sense  of  “local  
incommensurability” (Kuhn 1982, 670-71), rather than the stronger sense of the term that imply, e.g., mutual  
intranslatability of impossibility of ever comparing the content of respective claims.
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contextualized and comprehensive approaches to conceptualizing levels (and particularly its 
character)  will  be  important  for  the  analysis  offered  here.  In  particular,  two  other 
philosophical accounts of ‘levels of organization’ in scientific usage, which will be central to 
developing  the  main  theses  of  this  dissertation,  represent  polarized  positions  on  how  to 
approach analyzing the character of the levels concept (see Chapter 2). One, the layer-cake 
account, posits a comprehensive conception of ‘levels’, and represents the classical manner in 
which philosophers typically explicate the levels concept. Another, the mechanistic account, 
posits  a radically contextualized conception of ‘levels’  that  rejects  any general  import  for 
‘levels’  can  be  extrapolated  from single  instances  of  usage.  The  contextualized  (but  not 
radically so) ‘fragmentary’ account that will be developed and defended here is someplace in 
between these two accounts. 
At the same time, the analysis here will also show that the levels concept exhibits a minimally 
unified significance across the instances of its usage. More specifically, it will be argued that 
another feature of concept usage of science, that concept’s epistemic goal, allows for a more 
unified (but not comprehensively so) conception of levels to be developed. This aspect of 
importance  attached  to  a  concept's  'epistemic  goal'  has  recently  been  developed  by Ingo 
Brigandt (2010; 2012) specifically for the purpose of analyzing concepts in the biological 
sciences that appear to display unavoidable, modestly, i.e. “local” incommensurable variation 
in their semantic content (see especially Chapter 4). An epistemic goal comprises a set of 
epistemic values, which motivate the usage of the concept in question. Unlike other elements 
that comprise a concept’s  character,  an epistemic goal is not a component  of a concept’s 
semantic  content, but rather a feature of how a concept is  used by scientists. The epistemic 
goal  motivating  the  use  of  the  levels  concept  is  to  structure  explanatory  problems that 
biologists  engage  in  their  research.  Explanatory  problems  include  issues  that  belong  to 
constructing explanations for biological phenomenon. These issues may comprise questions 
concerning, e.g., what is required for an adequate explanation for the respective phenomenon, 
or more subtle issues regarding the basic characterization of the phenomenon as something for 
which an explanation is sought. The particular manner in which levels can aid in structuring 
these problems, and hence contribute to their solutions, is dependent on the specific way that 
‘levels’ are used in that instance of usage. These instances of usage will be contextualized in 
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claims involving levels, or ‘level claims’, which will be introduced in the next section, and 
discussed in depth in the later chapters of this dissertation.
1.2.1 Level Claims
Identifying the kinds of claims in which ‘levels’ appear is important, as they serve as a sort of 
token markers expressing a more overarching understanding of levels. There are two general 
types of claims in which levels typically appear, namely descriptive and hypothetical claims. 
Both of these types of claims are closely connected to the significance of the levels concept in 
biology, i.e. the epistemic goal motivating the use of the levels concept. First, ‘levels’ can be 
used as a descriptive term made in  a  descriptive claim about  a  particular  system. In this 
capacity 'levels of organization' attributes organizational features to a system for the purpose 
of characterizing what a particular system is. These types of level-claims correspond to what 
William Wimsatt (1974[2007], ch. 9) calls k-decompositions.  According to Wimsatt, using 
‘levels’ is  closely tied  to  dealing  with  the  complexity that  a  biological  phenomenon  can 
exhibit, which can interfere with scientific attempts to successfully explain that phenomenon. 
The use  of  ‘levels’ is  for  this  reason is  often  built  into  the  way that  scientists  basically 
describe, and basically approach describing, that phenomenon (cf. Burian and Trout 1995). 
For instance, take the visual system of the fruit fly (see Figure 1.1). A number of distinct  
biological disciplines may be involved in detailing how the insect visual system works, e.g., 
(neuro-)  physiology,  (neuro-)  anatomy,  electrophysiology,  and  even  evolutionary  biology. 
These level-bound disciplinary perspectives many characterize any given biological system in 
a  number  of  non-overlapping  ways  (cf.  Winther  2011,  particularly  Winther's  notion  of 
“partitioning”). Furthermore, each of these disciplinary perspectives may even be interested in 
explaining  the  same phenomena,  such  as  how sensory information  is  extracted  from the 
external  world  by  the  nervous  system,  how  different  cells  process  specific  types  of 
information, and how the visual system mediates flight behavior of insects. However, each of 
these disciplines will possess very different sets of criteria for how to differentiate the system 
in  question  into  a  set  of  relevant  structures  believed  to  be  relevant  for  explaining  the 
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respective phenomenon (Lewontin and Levins 2007, 151-2; Love 2008; Winther 2011, 401). 
Using  these  various  list  of  criteria,  different  descriptions  will  be  offered  for  any  given 
biological system, like the insect visual system, each of which corresponds to one or another 
disciplinary perspective (cf. Lewontin et al. 1984, 276-7). 
Figure 1.1 Different overlapping k-decompositions of a complex biological system. A number of disciplinary 
perspectives (T)n  each view one and the same system (here the visual system of the fruit fly), and construct their  
own description of the system (k-decompositions, or K(T)n), resulting in multiple ways of differentiating that 
system into parts relevant for the respective perspective. Figure taken from Wimsatt (1974[2007]).
Wimsatt  characterizes  this  state  of  affairs  in  biology  concerning  such  “descriptional 
complexity” as a “conceptual morass”: 
11
Chapter One . Intuitive Appeal and Ubiquity of 'Levels'
“In biology, at least, the picture is further complicated by another factor – that different 
theoretical perspectives are not nearly as well individuated as in the physical sciences. 
Thus,  anatomical,  physiological,  developmental,  and  biochemical  criteria,  not  to 
mention  paleontological  information  and  inferences  of  phylogenetic  relations  and 
homologies,  all  interact  with  criteria  of  evolutionary  significance  in  the  analysis  of 
organisms  into  functional  systems  and  subsystems.  This  borrowing  of  criteria  for 
individuation of parts from different and diverse theoretical perspectives is one of the 
factors which make functional organization in general and biology in particular such a 
conceptual morass at times” (Wimsatt 1974, 72).
Roughly, this means that applying the term 'levels of organization' will comprise a package of 
both epistemic and ontological information nested in a disciplinary perspective. What exactly 
belongs to this 'package' is determined in a contextual manner. This information results, firstly 
and most importantly, in a description of the system that differentiates that system into its  
partitioned units. However, since these claims are made from the perspective of a particular 
scientific discipline, the description that is offered is also accompanied, often implicitly, by 
both (1) a set of criteria that specifies why the system is differentiated in that way, and (2) a 
set of methods and techniques that directly inform the description of the system that is given. 
Multiple  k-decompositions  are  often  available  for  certain  biological  systems  if  they  are 
investigated from different disciplinary perspectives. These different level-claims may or may 
not result in a similar rendering of the structure and significance of a system for a given case 
of  explanation  in  science,  and ascertaining  the  similarities  and differences  between these 
descriptions is often an issue of substantial discussion in historical biological research (see 
especially Chapter 5).
Second,  ‘levels’ can  be  used  as  an  operationalized  term within  a  hypothetical  claim that 
postulates a more effective means of searching for a solution to a given explanatory problem. 
The term 'levels' is operationalized in these cases by an implicit descriptive k-decomposition 
and  by a  normative  prescription  to  direct  research  efforts  towards  the  content  of  the  k-
decomposition, i.e. how a system should be studied. The “hypothetical” status of these claims 
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captures  the  tentative  nature  of  these  kinds  of  level-claims  as  suggestions,  rather  than 
concretely explicative  claim-statements,  about  a  phenomenon for  which  an explanation  is 
being sought. Another way to summarize this form of level claims is to consider these claims 
as heuristic procedures that designate reasoning patterns that scientists use to orient scientific 
investigation from one discipline to one another, and to nature as well. These types of level-
claims  correspond  to  what  Lindley  Darden  (1991,  253)  calls  “strategies”  in  scientific 
reasoning. 
“If phenomena to be explained can be put into a hierarchy, a way of producing new 
ideas (in order to explain the phenomena) is to form hypotheses about the behavior of 
entities and processes at a different level of organization. If other fields have studied 
that level, then the interlevel relation may also be an interfield relation. Thus,...using 
interrelations...includes using interlevel relation[s] when a body of knowledge exists at 
the appropriate level. If no other appropriate level is known to exist, however, then the 
strategy  “move  to  another  level”  is  less  like  the  interrelations  strategy;  the  latter 
postulates a relation between known information. Phenomena may point to the existence 
of an as yet unexplored level, often at a lower level of organization” (ibid.).
In  this  capacity,  'levels  of  organization'  fulfill  two  roles  for  scientific  reasoning  used  to 
structure explanatory problems: (1) they represent sources of insight to which scientists are 
directed in  their  investigation of  a  particular  problem (cf.  ibid.,  9),  and (2)  they offer  an 
opportunity to change the change or modify the problem that is being asked. Understanding 
what these roles mean in a concrete case will depend on the way that levels are understood in 
that case, but both will exploit the “package deal” of epistemic and ontological information 
(described above) that the concept of levels offers. In this way, levels can offer insight into 
problems  by postulating,  e.g.,  new structures  and  investigative  techniques  with  which  to 
investigate a phenomenon. Similarly,  by moving “up” or “down” a level,  this  can offer a 
straightforward  means  of  generalizing  or  specializing  the  scope  of  the  problem it  treats, 
depending on what is deemed appropriate for that case (cf. ibid., 4.).
Both of these kinds of claims, and their importance for understanding the significance of the 
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levels concept, will be discussed in depth in the final two chapters of this dissertation.
1.2.2 Wimsatt’s Characterization of Levels 
Grasping the character and significance of 'levels of organization' in science is a daunting task 
due to the wide variation it exhibits across its instances of usage (see especially Section 1.4; 
Chapter 4). One approach, pursued by Carl Craver, analyzes the levels concept by answering 
three “defining questions” that together articulate the basic meaning ‘level’ in a given instance 
(Craver 2007a, 171-172)5. The first defining question pertains to the types of things make up 
levels  in  the  first  place. The second defining question  concerns  specifying  the  inter-level 
relation by which things at putatively different levels are related to one another. The third 
defining  question  concerns  specifying  how a  particular  item is  placed  at  the  same level. 
Though  Craver's  defining  questions  are  useful  for  clarifying  the  meaning  of  levels  in  a  
particular instance, it leaves completely open the question concerning what the character and 
significance of levels in science generally.6 
A more  faithful  attempt  to  characterize  ‘levels  of organization’  as  it  appears  in  scientific 
usage  is  offered  by  Wimsatt  (1974;  1976;  1994[2007]).  The  analysis  offered  in  this 
dissertation  is  best  seen  as  an  attempt  to  offer  a  more  in-depth  analysis  of  Wimsatt’s 
characterization of levels, which, though insightful and innovative in its own right, is not very 
clear. Though Wimsatt analyzes levels as a feature of the world, Wimsatt also emphasizes the 
significance  of  the  concept  for  scientific  efforts  to  construct  explanation.  He  offers  the 
following characterization for 'levels':
“[L]evels of organization are a deep, non-arbitrary, and extremely important feature of 
the ontological architecture of our natural world, and almost certainly of any world that 
could produce,  and be inhabited  by,  intelligent  beings.  (This  gives  levels  an almost 
5 See also Kaplan 2015 and Craver 2015, both of whom refer to the “defining questions” approach in their new 
survey articles to understanding levels.
6 Indeed,  this  approach  to  grasping  the  task  of  analyzing  the  levels  concept  seems  to  favor  a  strongly 
contextualized perspective for conceptualizing levels, which is Craver endorses in his mechanistic conception 
of levels (see Section 2.3; cf. Craver 2015).
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Kantian flavor.)  Levels and other modes of organization cannot be taken for granted,  
but  demand  characterization  and  analysis.  If  I  am  right,  compositional  levels  of 
organization are the simplest general and large-scale structures for the organization of 
matter.  They  are  constituted  by  families  of  entities  usually  of  comparable  size  and 
dynamical properties, which characteristically interact primarily with one another, and 
which, taken together, give an apparent rough closure over a range of phenomena and 
regularities.” (1994[2007], 203-4, emphasis modified)
This dense passage introduces a number of distinct characteristics of levels of organization. 
The second sentence  of  the  passage  is  particularly  noteworthy as  it  highlights  ‘levels  of 
organization’ as a proper subject of analysis, detached from an embedding debate. The levels 
concept, Wimsatt is saying, needs to be analyzed in terms of its inherent usefulness in science 
as  communicating  simultaneously  several  ideas  about  how  the  world  is  structured  (i.e. 
detached  from other  philosophical  debates),  and  how  this  structure  of  the  world  in  turn 
influences the way that science is organized around it.  Wimsatt  continues this passage by 
expressing skepticism for  the viability  of  traditional  conceptual  analysis  in  philosophy in 
capturing scientific usage of the levels concept, saying:
“For anyone who still believes in 'necessary and sufficient conditions' style analyses, I 
note at least five qualifiers in this sentence – all apparently necessary – that would be 
difficult  at  best  to  deal  with,  and  the  referents  of  these  qualifiers  are  also  often 
disturbingly general, and correspondingly unclear. Note also, that I said that levels 'are 
constituted  by,'  not  'are  defined  in  terms  of.'  Definitional  language  is  notoriously  
unhelpful  in  contexts  like  these.  Broad-stroke  characterizations,  focused  with  
qualifications and illuminated with examples, are more useful.” (ibid. emphasis added)
This dissertation will take Wimsatt's idea here to heart: that a serious analysis of levels will 
have to be engaged by investigating the scientific contexts of usage in which the concept 
seems to play such a prominent role. In this spirit, instead of focusing on classical components 
of semantic content to gain insight into the concept of levels of organization, e.g. meaning and 
reference, this dissertation will seek to gain insight into other special features of semantic 
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content that are more relevant to the scientific usage of ‘levels’, which belong to the character 
and significance of the levels concept. These features, which include e.g. the scope of level 
usage, definitional criteria, mode of presentation, and the epistemic goal of a concept, will be 
detailed below in Section 1.4 (see also Chapter 4).
1.3 Initial Distinctions
The term 'levels' without further qualifier is, on its own, “multiply ambiguous” (Craver 2007a, 
163). What exactly does this mean? There are many terms and ideas that are related to, or 
even derivative  of,  the term 'levels of organization'.  While  some of these offer important 
insight into how scientists investigate and explain nature using the levels concept, others are 
only erroneously related to 'levels of organization' and therefore not useful for this analysis. 
This  requires  a  few  caveats  regarding  terminology  in  order  to  avoid  confusion  in  what 
follows. 
As mentioned above, the term 'levels of organization' as used in the biological sciences can 
encompass  both  ontological  and  epistemological  connotations.  These  connotations  are 
sometimes expressed using slightly different terminology,  despite falling under the related 
umbrella term 'levels (of organization)'. Intuitively, a single 'level of organization' is taken to 
minimally refer to a set of structures and processes within a natural system that share similar 
features, such as their size, the types and magnitude of forces that govern their interactions, or 
a  compositional  relation  to  a  common  whole  to  which  these  things  belong.  Multiple 
organizational levels are hierarchical in the sense that the structures and processes found at 
one  particular  level  are  organized  together  as  subordinate  elements  to  the  structures  and 
processes found at higher levels, and in turn are superordinate to the more basic structures and 
processes organized together at lower levels (for more on hierarchical structures see section 
1.5 below; cf. Simon 1962; Wimsatt 1976).
At least  two further  notions  of 'levels'  are  also widely used in  the literature,  and will  be 
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implicitly  considered  here:  'levels  of  analysis'7 and  'levels  of  explanation'.  Both  of  these 
notions will be taken as epistemic cognates of 'levels of organization' because they rely in a 
non-trivial way on the hierarchical organization in their domains of inquiry postulated by the 
ontologically-leaning  understanding  of  'levels  of  organization'.8 This  is  based  on  three 
observations. Firstly, areas of biological research are often demarcated in terms of the level of 
organization that they investigate,  and correspondingly fall  under a certain connotation of 
'level'.9 For instance, 'levels of analysis' are typified by a collection of investigative techniques 
and methods  that  are  heavily  associated  with  the  structures  and processes  occurring  at  a 
particular altitude of the levels of organization that constitute a particular phenomenon (cf. 
Craver  2007a,  Ch.  5,  Sect.  2;  Richardson  and  Stephan 2007).  Neuroscience  is  a 
multidisciplinary field of biology that exhibits this quite well.  Molecular neuroscience, for 
example,  investigates  phenomena  like  mechanisms  of  neurotransmitter-mediated  signaling 
between synapses, or of biochemical cascades resulting from ion channel behavior. Research 
in this discipline hence focuses on stereotypical types of structures located a particular (or 
localized set) organizational level of the nervous system, i.e. synapses, receptors, axons, and 
other sub-neuronal structures. The investigations of these molecular researchers of the brain 
use specialized techniques such as gene knock-out studies and pharmacological interventions 
to analyze, e.g., the role of a specific protein within a biochemical cascade of interest. Such 
techniques are of little  use in investigating phenomena involving structures and processes 
observed at a different level of organization, such as electrophysiological response properties 
of a single neuron, or interpreting the significance of an fMRI image study, which observes 
entire brain regions.
Relatedly,  generalizations  formulated  by these  levels  of  analysis  that  are  used to  explain 
biological phenomena also resemble the hierarchical structure postulated by the levels image 
of the world, if only via their association with the structures and processes that designate an 
altitude in the hierarchy of organizational levels, whose terms appear in said generalizations. 
7 An important exception to what is meant by 'levels of analysis' is discussed in Section 1.2.1.
8 McCauley's  (1998)  analysis  of  higher-  and  lower-level  approaches  to  investigating models  of  cognition 
exemplifies this point as an implicit understanding of underlying the levels concept. See also McCauley and  
Bechtel 2001, who implement this further in their “heuristic identity theory”.
9 The extent to which this kind of demarcation of disciplines holds is very shaky, and will be taken up several  
times in this dissertation. See especially Chapter 2 and Chapter 3.
17
Chapter One . Intuitive Appeal and Ubiquity of 'Levels'
Generalizations  formulated  using,  e.g.,  single-cell  electrophysiological  recordings  are 
procured to explain a phenomenon characterized at a corresponding level of organization, like 
direction-selective response properties of a particular neuron to a specific input stimulus that 
the organism encounters in an experimental setup. Such generalizations may simultaneously 
be utilized in the explanation of phenomena occurring at different organizational levels, such 
as  whole-organism  behavior,  which  is  observed  at  the  level  of  the  whole  organism. 
Generalizations originating from one altitude among organizational levels that constitute a 
system, especially in the construction of a multi-level explanation, that are nonetheless related 
to one another via offering insights into a phenomenon investigated at many levels represent 
“levels of explanation” (Brooks 2010; cf. Craver 2001; Potochnik 2010).
Levels  of  'analysis'  or 'explanation'  are  clearly epistemic  in  their  import,  with the  former 
covering methodological or perspectival information about a particular phenomenon and the 
latter  covering explanatory information about a particular  phenomenon.  Nonetheless,  even 
these distinct meanings are made in relation to a set of natural items, which are postulated by 
the organizational variety of levels. For this reason, in what follows each of these particular 
terms will be taken as designating a different mode of application of an overarching concept – 
that of 'levels of organization'.
A consequence of this caveat is that the concept of levels is used to refer to several distinct 
(methodological,  explanatory,  ontological)  aspects  of  a  phenomenon,  possibly 
simultaneously.  Though probably unintentional,  scientific  usage of  'levels  of organization' 
seems to exploit this openness of the levels concept (see Section 1.4; Chapter 4). As will be 
seen, the levels concept can be made clear in any specific circumstance, but there remains the 
question  of  whether  the  concept  carries  any overarching  significance  across  the  different 
instances of its usage.
1.3.1 Erroneous Concepts of Levels
Other uses of the term 'levels' are easily discarded as erroneous to any understanding of 'levels 
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of organization',  such as when referring to a degree or magnitude  of something (level  of 
calcium, level of activity, level of occurrences). Another unrelated 'levels' term is 'levels of 
processing', which refers to a set of usually processes that underlie a particular activity. This 
form of usage is frequently found in the neurosciences (see also Craver 2007a, Ch. 5, Sect. 
3.2.1), and refers to a sequence of processes that tracks information dispersal between areas of 
the brain. 
One particularly troublesome usage of the term 'level' in philosophical discussions conflates 
the  term  'levels  of  organization'  with  David  Marr's  (1982[2010])  notion  of  “levels  of 
analysis”, which is a key element to his “tri-level” program for computational neuroscience. 
This  conflation  deserves  special  comment  due  to  the  influence  of  Marr's  program in  the 
philosophy of mind, where this erroneous association is particularly rampant (see especially 
Kim  2002,  1-2;  Pylyshyn  1984).  Marr's  program  was  meant  as  a  unifying  conceptual 
framework  for  cognitive  neuroscience  that  advocated  treating  nervous  systems  as 
computational (that is, information-processing) devices. Within this program, three distinct 
“levels of analysis”10 demarcate how any given cognitive function can be analyzed. These 
included  the  level  of  computation,  level  of  algorithm,  and  level  of  implementation.  The 
“computational level” refers to  what  and  why  a cognitive system does what it does, and is 
typically described in abstract, mathematical terms pertaining to information processing. This 
was considered by Marr to be of primary importance to explaining neural phenomena. The 
“algorithmic level” pertains to the implementation of the computation-theoretical in terms of a 
representational input-output model. The final “implementional level” concerns detailing how 
the former two “levels” are realized by the physical “hardware” of the system that houses 
them. 
Two assumptions underlie Marr's framework, which make it clear that his notion of 'level' is 
completely different than the 'level of organization'  variety.  Firstly,  each iteration of these 
10 This sense of 'levels of analysis' is very different from the cognate sense of organizational levels discussed  
above. Though the syntax used to describe both of these senses of the term is identical, researchers who use 
them  typically  do  not  confuse  their  specific  meaning.  Marr,  for  instance,  chose  this  designation  and 
articulated its particular meaning without mentioning other possible meanings. Confusions between Marrian 
analytic “levels” and 'levels of organization' in the biological sciences are committed most frequently by 
philosophers of mind. Though analyzing the frequency, and impact, of this conflation would be interesting, it  
lies beyond the scope of this thesis.
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“levels” each refer to one and the same system as a whole, which precludes the hierarchical 
ordering of natural  systems and subsystems that comes along with references to  levels  of  
organization (particular  levels  of  organization,  though  related  into  a  whole,  designate 
completely different structures and processes, which are contextualized  within   that whole). 
Marr's  different  analytical  “levels”,  on the  other  hand,  are  simply  three  different  (though 
complementary) ways of describing a given system at a single level of organization. Given 
this alone it seems more prudent to call these Marrian entities “dimensions of analysis” rather 
than “levels of analysis”. Secondly, Marr's framework is strongly motivated by the claim that 
neural phenomena are best explained by abstracting away from their physical implementation. 
The physical “hardware” of the realizing system housing the computational programming is 
instead best characterized in a substrate-neutral fashion. Indeed, Marr envisioned his tri-level 
framework as replacing empirical-based, 'wet-biological' explanations in neuroscience:
[G]one [are] any explanation[s] in terms of neurons – except as a way of implementing 
a method. And present is a clear understanding of what has to be computed, how it is 
done,  the  physical  assumptions  on  which  the  method  is  based,  and  some  kind  of 
analysis  of  algorithms that  are  capable  of  carrying  it  out  (Marr  1982,  18;  emphasis 
modified). 
This leads to what McClamrock (1991) refers to as the “de-contextualization” of a system 
from its natural setting (1991, 188). Abstracting away from the physical details, as Marr's 
framework does, is contrary to how scientific claims invoke 'levels of organization', which 
aim to do the exact opposite: to contextualize a phenomenon to a set of different structures 
and processes that  constitute  its  workings in  nature.  This  is  best  seen by looking at  how 
scientists themselves depict levels.
1.4 Depictions of Levels in Biological Textbooks
In order to better grasp the subject of analysis of this dissertation, a short sketch of how levels  
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are  depicted  in  science  is  necessary.  Probably  the  most  familiar  depictions  of  levels  of 
organization  in  the biological  sciences  are  found in the many textbooks available  for the 
biological sciences.11 This widespread use of the levels concept is a straightforward way of 
substantiating the ubiquity of the concept, given its presence in the large majority of textbooks 
of  all  degrees  of  specialization,  whether  for  undergraduate  introductory  courses  or  for 
advanced graduate or postgraduate uses.12 Moreover, looking at textbook depictions of levels 
offers a preliminary explanation for the ubiquity of the levels concept: Scientists take levels to 
be capable of expressing a wide range of important ideas concerning how phenomena are 
explained in biology. 
Some  examples  of  general  textbooks  for  the  biological  sciences  include  Reece  et  al.'s 
Campbell Biology, and Sadava et al.'s  Life: The Science of Biology (both now in their ninth 
editions), which are most often used in introductory undergraduate courses at universities. 
These textbooks utilize levels of organization as a fundamental motif, usually in its opening 
pages, to conceptualize both important features of the biological world and how to study it. 
Furthermore, they often portray the same number and identity of organizational levels. These 
include  (in  descending  order):  the biosphere,  ecosystems,  communities,  populations, 
organisms, organs (and sometimes organ systems), tissues, cells, organelles, and molecules. 
For  instance,  Reece  et  al.'s  series  Campbell  Biology,  one  of  the  principal  introductory 
textbooks for college undergraduates, prominently features the hierarchical view of the world 
in the major themes of biology (see 1.4.2 below). Their depiction of, and comments about, the 
levels concept will be used to structure the rest of this section. Their depiction of levels is 
given in figure 1.2. 
11 It first it may be asked: Why would textbooks be an important insight into scientific practice? They are, after 
all,  'merely'  introductory  in  content  and  presentation,  and  hardly  display  the  specialized,  professional 
knowledge found in research articles. Textbooks are used to convey a basic and foundational understanding 
of what constitutes a particular branch of science.  The information that is conveyed is a mixture of both 
theoretical and practical knowledge, and is instrumental  in forming a researcher's  initial contact with the 
body of knowledge attached to a particular branch of science or a specific discipline of that branch. For this 
reason, textbooks offer a special kind of insight into what science “is”, or at least is taken to be, by students ,  
aspiring scientists and established researchers. In this capacity, textbooks should be seen as scientific tools 
whose influence is present from the beginning a person's scientific education through one's specialization and 
accreditation as a researcher in their own right.
12 Some may disagree with this observation (cf. Eronen 2014). Substantiating this observation in detail will not  
be  pursued  in  this  dissertation.  A more  in-depth  substantiation of  the  presence  of  the  levels  concept  in 
scientific literature nevertheless represents an important follow-up study to be carried out at a later time.
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Figure 1.2 (a – above; b – below) Levels of organization as depicted in Reece et al. (2010). See text for details.  
Image taken from Reece et al 2010, 3).
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Reece et al.'s application of the levels concept, however, is decidedly open to interpretation. 
They introduce levels with the following passage: 
“The  study of life extends from the microscopic  scale of the molecules and cells that 
make up organisms to the global scale of the entire planet. We can divide this enormous 
range into different  levels of biological organization” (Reece et al. 2010, 3; emphasis 
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added). 
The highlighted terms and phrases in this passage reflect several features frequently attributed 
to the levels concept, which help to highlight what elements belong to the character of 'levels' 
in any given instance, and what kinds of things the levels concept is used for. What quickly 
becomes  apparent  is  the  number  of  distinct  ways  that  levels  are  characterized  in  these 
depictions; i.e. there are different ways that the character of ‘levels’ can be specified. This 
openness in the way that levels are characterized in these textbooks shows that the levels 
concept represents the package deal of sorts mentioned above: That is, ‘levels can be taken as 
meaning several different things, sometimes simultaneously.
1.4.1 The Character of 'Levels' in Biological Science
The above passage from Reece et  al.  (2010) points  to a number  of elements  that  present 
themselves as comprising the character of the levels concept as given by various conceptions 
of the term. Three important elements include the scope of the conception, the definitional 
criteria used to identify levels, and the mode in which the concept is presented.
Scope of 'Levels'
The  first  notable  element  of  the  character  of  the  levels  concept  mentioned  in  the  above 
passage is the scope to which levels are applied in nature. ‘Levels’ typically extend to nature 
in either a global scope or a local scope. Global conceptions of levels are said to extend to the 
entirety of nature, and thereby encompass all natural phenomena. Reece et al.’s depiction of 
levels in Figure 1.2 is hence global, as it “extends from the microscopic scale of the molecules 
and cells  that  make  up organisms  to  the  global  scale  of  the  entire  planet”  (ibid.).  Local 
conceptions of levels in contrast extend only to a limited part of nature, where this extension 
is determined in a contextualized manner. One clear example of local levels is found in the 
structure  of  proteins,  which  are  composed  of  four  well-defined  levels  of  organization 
(primary,  secondary, tertiary and quaternary). The locality of these levels is made clear by 
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Alan  Love  (2012)  who  discusses  protein  structure  as  an  exemplary  case  of  levels  of 
organization:
“The hierarchical representation of four structural layers of organization is applicable to 
proteins and nucleic acids. This categorization of hierarchical organization is extremely 
robust  and  well  established  empirically.  But  it  quickly  loses  its  significance  when 
applied across the spectrum of biological macromolecules. In this sense, the 'levels of 
structural  organization'  are  localized  to  a  particular  domain  of  inquiry (proteins  and 
nucleic acids) and not reified into a nominalized designation (the tertiary structural level 
of biological macromolecules)” (Love 2012, 117).
Global and local conceptions of levels are often taken to be mutually exclusive of one another 
(see, e.g., Craver 2007a, 191; Potochnik and McGill 2012), though the extent to which this is 
justified will be taken up in later chapters.
Definitional Criteria
The  passage  from  Reece  et  al.  (2010)  simultaneously  refers  to  two  distinct  definitional  
criteria with  which  to  identify  levels  and  distinguish  them from one  another:  scale and 
composition. Scale, i.e. size scale13, is used at the beginning and the end of the passage to 
identify constituents that designate three distinct levels (molecules, cells, and the biosphere), 
while  another  level  (organism)  is  clearly  identified  in  terms  of  two  compositional  parts 
belonging  to  distinct  levels  (again,  molecules  and  cells).  These  two different  criteria  are 
typically used to specify the interlevel relations in a hierarchical layout of levels. These are 
illustrated above in Figure 1.3. The first,  composition (Figure 1.3a),  specifies  a particular 
element of a system (for instance, a muscle cell) as being a part of an embedding whole (such 
as a heart). This way of characterizing interlevel relations is central for the main philosophical 
accounts of levels, which will be discussed in Chapter 2. 
13 The quality of size for the scale criterion here is directly implied by the terms “microscopic” and “global”.  
Size need not be the only quality designated by the scale criterion, and indeed could instead be an indicator  
for another quality, such as temporal scale, magnitudinal scale 
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Figure 1.3 Two definitional criteria for levels. (a) A set of organizational levels demarcated by composition. In  
these types of representations, level identity, including the properties and entities that belong to a particular level, 
is defined in terms of a thing's parthood in an overall system. Figure taken from Craver 2007a, 194. (b) A set of 
levels  (here,  the  levels  of  the  nervous  system)  demarcated  by  scale.  Figure  taken  from  Churchland  and 
Sejnowski 1992, 9.
The second criterion often used to define levels in scientific cases is scale, particularly size 
scale (Figure 1.3b). This way of demarcating levels offers an extremely accessible means of 
representing  biological  systems,  which  some  of  the  several  intuitive  features  of  the 
hierarchical ordering that levels are often taken to express. For instance, it captures nicely the 
idea different organizational levels manifest different types of causal relations, and that these 
causal relations are exercised by typical kinds of entities.
Reece et al. shift between these two criteria in their descriptions of the major levels in biology 
depicted above in Figure 1.2. There, for instance, ecosystems “consist of all the living things 
in a particular area”, but also designate the components of another (higher) level, as “[a]ll of 
Earth's ecosystems combined  make up  the biosphere. Likewise, organs are identified as “a 
body part consisting of two or more tissues” (Figure 1.2b), organelles comprise “the various 
functional  components  that  make  up  cells”,  and  the  constituent  of  the  bottommost 
organizational level in biology, molecules, are defined as a “chemical structure consisting of  
two or more small chemical units called atoms” (ibid; emphasis modified). In each of these 
instances  the  referenced  levels  (biosphere,  ecosystems,  organs,  organelles,  molecules)  are 
identified in terms of their internal composition, or their role in their compositional relation to 
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a (whole) object at another (higher) level. However, scale is also used, simultaneously with 
composition, to characterize different levels of organization. Regarding tissues, Reece et al. 
say that “our next  scale change [downward from organs] to see a leaf's tissues requires a 
microscope...At this  scale, we can also see that each tissue has a cellular structure”14 (ibid. 
emphasis added). Molecules are similarly identified interchangeably with the scale criterion: 
“Our last scale change vaults us into a chloroplast for a view of life at the molecular level” 
(ibid; emphasis added).
Figure 1.4 Levels of organization in Solomon et al. (2010). See Text for Details. Image taken from Solomon et  
al. 2010, 6.
14 This is also the first mention in Reece et al.'s depiction of levels that cites a particular scientific instrument in  
tandem with identifying and characterizing a discrete level of organization.
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Solomon et al.'s (2011) Biology, one of the competitors to Reece et al.'s  Campbell  series in 
the introductory college textbook market, likewise introduce levels of organization as a basic 
motif of the biological world, saying that “[w]hether we study a single organism or the world 
of life as a whole, we can identify a hierarchy of biological organization” (2011, 6; emphasis 
added). Their depiction of levels is shown in figure 1.4.
Unlike Reece et al.  (2010), Solomon et al.  only mention a compositional interpretation of 
organizational levels. Each level is defined as either “being made up of” or “consisting of” 
things located at its lower adjacent level (Solomon et al. 2011, 6). Despite this appearance of 
offering a univocal, generalized definition of levels of organization, Solomon et al.'s series of 
textbooks backfires as an attempt to clarify the meaning of levels of organization. Choosing 
only one definitional criterion for identifying levels does not entail that the levels concept 
they  articulate  is  any clearer  than  in  other  contexts  that  that  utilize  several  criteria.  For 
instance, there is no clarification for how the part-whole relation that holds between levels (in 
virtue of composition) could be specified in order to hold generally across all levels for all  
biological phenomena.
Mode of Presentation
Another element that makes up the character of the levels concept in biology is the mode in 
which the concept is presented, i.e. that which the concept is taken to express. Looking again 
at the emphasized phrases in the above passage, the text strongly implies both an epistemic 
and an  ontological mode in which levels of organization are presented.  Though the level-
bound  entities  in  the  passage  (cells,  molecules,  organisms,  biosphere)  are  identified  an 
undeniably ontological way (i.e. are posited as natural entities in the world), the “study of 
life”, i.e. the science of biology, is strongly implied to emulate the hierarchical layout of the 
natural world in some way. This becomes clear by looking at how Reece et al. embed several 
implicatory  claims  into  the  passage  that  the  disciplinary  structure  of  biology  follows the 
hierarchical structure of life. For them, “[t]he study of life extends from” the lowest levels of 
the  living  world  to  the  highest  ones”  (Reece  et  al.  2010,  3).  This  seems  to  imply 
interdependence between the study of life and the “enormous range” of  natural phenomena 
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(molecules, cells up to the biosphere) divided into “levels of biological organization”. That is, 
the disciplinary structure of biology (epistemic)  appears to mimic (ontological)  biological  
organization.  Ernst  Mayr  (1982)  observes  this  trend  in  introductory  characterizations  of 
biology, saying:
“The formation of constitutive hierarchies is one of the most basic properties of living 
organisms. At each level there are different problems, different questions to be asked, 
and different theories to be formulated. Each of these levels has given rise to a separate  
branch  of  biology:  molecules  to  molecular  biology,  cells  to  cytology,  tissues  to 
histology, and so forth, up to biogeography and the study of ecosystems. Traditionally,  
the recognition of these hierarchical levels has been one of the ways of subdividing  
biology into fields. To which particular level an investigator will turn, depends on his 
interests.” (Mayr 1982, 65)
This point should not be overemphasized, as positing a strong correspondence between nature 
and science is extremely problematic (Section 2.2.4; Section 3.2). Indeed, Reece et al. (2010) 
subsequently resists  dividing biology itself  along  well-defined  disciplinary boundaries  that 
follow levels, and chooses rather to describe the study of biological phenomena from a more 
ecumenical perspective throughout the book. Nonetheless, the dual presence of ontological 
and epistemic modes attached to levels is continuously seen in the interspersing of names of 
textbook's chapters and units with terms that continuously shift between these ontological and 
epistemic connotations introduced by the discussion of the organizational levels of nature.15 
This open treatment of global levels is recapitulated in other general textbooks as well. Like 
Reece et al., Sadava et al.'s (2008) Life: The Science of Biology implies a dual ontological-
epistemological mode of applying levels of organization by stating that “[b]iology is studied 
at many levels of organization” (2008, 8, emphasis added). Like Solomon et al., on the other 
hand, levels are defined by Sadava et al. exclusively by their compositional relations between 
15 The chapter structure in the textbook's table of contents illustrates this to a small degree. For instance, some 
chapters are labeled according to the natural phenomena that are described (metabolism, the nervous system, 
the cell, photosynthesis), while others chapters and units are introduced with terms referring to the scientific  
discipline that investigates some areas of the biological world (genetics, “the chemistry of life”, ecology).
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objects at lower levels, as the presence of phrases like “consists of” and “made of” once again 
make an overwhelming appearance.16
The conception of levels of organization found in general textbooks exhibits an extremely 
open character. This is visible in the criteria by which levels are characterized, and in the 
modes in which levels are applied.17 
1.4.2 The Significance of 'Levels' in Biological Science
General  textbooks  like  Reece  et  al.  (2010)  rely substantially  on  the  concept  of  levels  of 
organization  to articulate the “major  themes”  of investigation and explanation in  biology. 
Campbell Biology is exemplary on this point, and their preamble to introducing levels clearly 
sets out such a task for the levels concept:
“A better approach [rather simply than memorizing facts] is to take a more active role 
by connecting the many things you learn to a set of themes that pervade all of biology . 
Focusing  on  a  few  big  ideas—ways  of  thinking  about  life  that  will  still  hold  true  
decades from now—will help you organize and make sense of all the information you’ll  
encounter as you study biology” (Reece et al. 2010, 3).
Looking again at their textbook depictions of levels illustrated in Figure 1.2, the shifting of 
definitional criteria by which levels are identified and demarcated from each other clearly 
16 Their depiction of levels is illustrated in Sadava et al. 2008, 8.
17 This survey of the biological textbook literature is at best preliminary, and represents another point of follow-
up analysis to be pursued at a later time. For one thing, the epistemic significance of biological textbooks has 
not adequately been established in regards to other kinds of scientific texts such as original research articles, 
reviews, commentary, or other kinds of manuals. Moreover, the diversity of scientific textbook literature has  
only been touched on here; though the term 'textbook' seems to provoke distrust in philosophers for being 
'merely introductory', textbooks are available for all degrees of specialization and experience in the sciences. 
Indeed, textbooks (both advanced and general) are routinely available in laboratories and scientific work 
spaces as references for researchers of all degrees of competence. Finally, discipline-specificity of textbooks 
represents another aspect in need of investigation, since, among reasons, although there are many issues that 
are  treated  in  various  different  textbooks  (such  as  protein  folding,  natural  selection,  and  oxidative 
phosphorylation), these different textbooks themselves can vary starkly in their treatment of the respective  
issue.  Each  of  these  aspects  of  textbooks  as  kinds  of  scientific  textbooks  bears  directly  on  questions 
concerning the character and significance of the levels concept.
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resists saying too much concerning the particular character of levels. Instead of committing to 
one particular,  comprehensive understanding of how 'levels' can exhaustively structure the 
world, the purpose of 'levels' in this and similar passages is to introduce in a basic fashion 
how problems of biological phenomena are constructed. The features of biological systems 
that biologists investigate are too nuanced to be captured by accounts that seek to offer a 
comprehensive conception of levels. Such features include “emergent” properties, pluralistic 
approaches  to  explanation,  and  the  perspective-embedment  of  biological  explanation. 
Ironically, this conceptual openness will also be the reason why philosophical conceptions of 
levels will not be sufficient to aid in constructing actual scientific explanations, as will be 
seen later (see Chapter 4, Chapter 5).
“Emergent” Properties
The  first  major  theme  of  biology  introduced  by  levels  is  the  widespread  presence  of 
“emergent”, or rather,  holistic  properties in nature.18 This means that certain properties are 
manifested only by things located at a particular level, but not at other levels. This idea con be 
expressed using different definitional criteria for characterizing levels: “Emergent” can, on 
the one hand, comprise properties that are possessed by some things that are treated as whole, 
which are not by the parts out of which it is composed (McLaughlin 1992; Stephan 1999b). 
At the same time, it can also refer to properties that are simply 'located' at a particular levels,  
such  as  explanatory  properties  possessed  by  the  generalizations,  laws,  or  models  that 
encompass the  Regardless of the specific conception of levels one has, the existence of these 
holistic properties does not mean that lower levels are not relevant to understanding such 
behavior in biological systems, as the following passage makes clear:
18 Emergence remains a contentious issue in philosophy (McLaughlin 1992; Kim 1999; Stephan 1999a, 1999b; 
Theurer 2014). However, the term “emergent” here in fact expresses a much more innocuous conception of  
emergence, at least in philosophical sense of the word. In particular, the term here expresses only a “weak”  
form emergence that claims only the existence, and significance, of systemic properties, and is perfectly 
compatible with a materialistic universe (Stephan 1999b, 50). “Strong” emergence, on the other hand, asserts 
in addition the inability,  in principle,  to reduce the emergent property in question to the behavior  of its  
constituents. That is, it is impossible (in principle) to account for the property in question by looking at the  
constituents of the system that manifests this property. Strongly emergent remains controversial, because it 
seems to violate the basic premise of materialism. For this reason, strong emergence goes much further in 
that it is also a metaphysical thesis, rather than only an epistemic one in the case of weak emergence. The 
term ‘holistic’ is preferable for exactly this reason.
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“[E]mergent [i.e.  holistic]  properties  are  due to the arrangement and interactions of  
parts as complexity increases. For example, although photosynthesis occurs in an intact 
chloroplast, it will not take place in a disorganized test-tube mixture of chlorophyll and 
other chloroplast molecules...Emergent [i.e. holistic] properties are not unique to life. A 
box of bicycle parts won’t take you anywhere, but if they are arranged in a certain way,  
you can pedal to your chosen destination. And while the graphite in a pencil “lead” and 
the  diamond  in  a  wedding  ring  are  both  pure  carbon,  they  have  very  different 
appearances  and properties  due to  the different  arrangements  of their  carbon atoms. 
Both of these examples point out the importance of arrangement.  Compared to such 
nonliving examples, however, the unrivaled complexity of biological systems makes the  
emergent [i.e. holistic] properties of life especially challenging to study.” (Reece et al. 
2010, 3)19
The issues that holistic properties present to the study of biological phenomena demarcate 
decidedly different  sets  of  questions  than  those engaged by philosophers  who investigate 
emergence.  In  particular,  this  passage  articulates  several  aspects  of  how  systems  are 
conceptualized  as  explanatory  objects  of  biology.  This  passage  also  contains  orienting 
comments that contextualize such properties in natural systems, understood hierarchically, as 
biological. Specifically, the possession of holistic properties by non-natural artifacts (like the 
bicycle  in the above passage) make clear that  (1) biological systems are not ontologically 
distinct from non-living systems, (2) the organization displayed in these systems possess a 
higher degree of complexity that distinguishes them decisively from non-living systems. 
Pluralistic Approaches to Explanation
'Levels of organization'  are used additionally to endorse a pluralist approach to explaining 
19 Comparable statements to emergence are easily found in other textbooks as well. For instance, Solomon et al.  
(2010) also speaks of these holistic properties, also under the guise of emergence, saying: “[t]he whole is  
more  than  the  sum  of  its  parts.  Each  level  has  emergent  properties  [highlighted  as  a  key  term], 
characteristics not found at lower levels” (6; see also Reece et al. 2012, 3; Korn 2005). Ecological textbooks 
are especially rife with references to both levels and emergence.
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biological phenomena. Reductionist and non-reductionist explanatory approaches20 are often 
not  sufficient  by  themselves  (at  least  in  the  biological  sciences)  to  account  for  the 
phenomenon for which an explanation is being sought (Brooks 2010, Ch.2). This creates a 
problem for working biologists, who are typically faced with either looking at lower levels 
(reductionist) or higher levels (non-reductionist) to find an adequate explanation for biological 
phenomena. Reece et al. express this as a basic dilemma facing all biologists:
“Because the properties of life emerge from complex organization, scientists seeking to 
understand biological systems confront a dilemma. On the one hand, we cannot fully 
explain a higher level of order by breaking it down into its parts. A dissected animal no 
longer  functions;  a  cell  reduced  to  its  chemical  ingredients  is  no  longer  a  cell. 
Disrupting a living system interferes with its functioning. On the other hand, something 
as  complex  as  an  organism  or  a  cell  cannot  be  analyzed  without  taking  it 
apart....Biologists must balance the reductionist strategy with the larger-scale, holistic21 
objective of understanding emergent properties—how the parts of cells, organisms, and 
higher levels of order, such as ecosystems, work together.” (Reece et al. 2010, 3)
Instead  of  choosing  either  a  reductionist  or  non-reductionist  approach  to  explaining  a 
phenomenon,  biologists  need  to  instead  consider  how these  approaches  can  concurrently 
contribute to constructing more adequate explanations. Both reductionist and non-reductionist 
approaches are useful in their own way, even if they are not sufficient by themselves.22 
Perspective-Embedment of Biological Explanation
A third major issue that is broached by 'levels' in biology is the need to contextualize the 
perspective  from  which  one  constructs  descriptive,  explanatory  statements,  or  even  the 
20 Roughly,  seeking  to  construct  explanations  by  attending  to  either,  respectively,  only  the  lower-level 
components of a given phenomenon, or only to the higher level at which that phenomenon is found.
21 The use of “holistic” here lends support to the claim made above about how “emergent” is understood in  
these textbooks.
22 Pluralistic explanations are also of interest to philosophers in constructing an alternative to reductionistic and 
anti-reductionistic explanations (see, e.g., Mitchell 2003; Brigandt 2013; Brooks 2010).
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problems that  scientists  investigate  (cf.  Love and Brigandt 2012). Though levels  typically 
demarcate different kinds of things along its ranks such as ecosystems, organisms, molecules, 
it must also be taken into account that the phenomenon one seeks to explain is embedded 
among other natural systems whose workings flow into one another. The concept of levels is 
aids one in articulating this embedment. In particular, it reinforces the fact that the selection of 
a particular system as the basis for investigating and explaining a given phenomenon as a 
choice that is made by scientists. Once again, Reece et al.: 
“A system is simply a combination of components that function together.  A biologist  
can study a system at any level of organization. A single leaf cell can be considered a 
system, as can a frog, an ant colony, or a desert ecosystem. To understand how such 
systems work, it is not enough to have a “parts list,” even a complete one.  Realizing  
this,  many researchers  are now complementing  the reductionist  approach with  new  
strategies  for  studying  whole  systems.  This  change  in  perspective is  analogous  to 
moving from ground level on a street corner, where you can observe local traffic, to a 
helicopter high above a city.” (Reece et al. 2010, 3)
The importance of this theme becomes especially clear when combined with the other themes 
discussed above. Namely,  when nature is represented in the fashion communicated by the 
levels concept,  the different features that make a given phenomenon (and its  explanation) 
biological present together a bundle of commitments that portray how explanations should be 
conceptualized (Brooks 2014).
1.5 The Concept of Hierarchy
One feature that probably all23 conceptions of 'levels of organization' share with one another is 
23 Quantifying the extent to which the levels concept designates a hierarchical structure (“all” or “most if not 
all”  conceptions  of  levels)  is  not  going  to  be  dealt  with  here.  Three  reasons  for  this  avoidance:  First, 
formalistic “definitional language” of this kind is exactly the way in which philosophical analysis of science  
can lose its way when looking at concepts like this (i.e. Wimsatt  1994[2007], 203-4; see above). Second, 
looking at the importance of hierarchy theory in the context of understanding levels is far too large a topic to 
open up here (unfortunately). This will have to wait for another day for now. Third, looking at hierarchies 
seen as a formal term is a red herring for understanding levels in science anyway (see Section 1.5.1 below)
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that  they  share  a  hierarchical  structure.  A  hierarchy  is  an  arrangement  of  items  that  is 
stratified  into  interrelated  subsystems  (usually  illustrated  vertically),  which  can  in  turn 
themselves  be  further  divided  into  further  subsystems  (Simon  1962[1996],  184).  The 
horizontal strata of this structure, or  ranks, denote subsystems that designate some value or 
quality that is being ordered by the hierarchical system to which it belongs.24 Level ranks in a 
hierarchy are stratified in relation to one another as superordinate or subordinate, i.e. 'higher' 
or 'lower', depending on what value or quality specifies the ordering criterion. Taken strictly, 
a  'hierarchy'  is  a  formal  term with  no  immediate  ontological  or  epistemic  commitments. 
Rather, it is simply a means of ordering sets of real or abstract things according to an inter-
relatable feature they possess.
A hierarchy can be more characterized in formal terms as a partially ordered set (see Figure 
1.5),  meaning  that  a  hierarchy  is  a  system  composed  of  elements  ordered  into  an 
antisymmetric,  reflexive,  and transitive relationship (See Figure 1.5b). In other words, the 
elements of some hierarchical system S may themselves include subsets of elements. So, the 
elements {a,b,c} that compose S may of course have numerous individuals within them, i.e. 
{{a1,a2}{b1,b2}{c1,c2}}.
Hierarchical  structures  highlight  several  of  the  intuitive  characteristics  of  levels  of 
organization  depicted in  Section  1.4.  Consider  an ecosystem in terms  of  a  hierarchically-
structured  system.  Firstly,  ecosystems  (S)  'are  made  of',  or  'contain'25 within  them 
communities  (a),  communities  contain  populations  (b),  and  populations  are  made  of 
individuals  (c).  This  can  be  rewritten  as  a  successive  subsumption  of  subsets  that  is 
characterized by the overall set S: { Ecosystems { Community { Populations { Individuals } } 
} }. This list of sets is reflexive, since each rank is reiterated at the next higher rank. That is,  
individuals compose not only populations, but communities and ecosystems as well. It is also 
anti-symmetric,  since populations are not composed of ecosystems (or communities). This 
24  Once this value or quality is  defined, these ranks can be demarcated into 'levels' when a population of 
elements manifesting these values can be quantified. 'Levels' in this neutral sense (i.e. not 'of organization')is 
nothing  more  than  a  population  of  individual  elements  that  correspond  to  a  specific  position  within  a 
hierarchy. 
25 These scare-quoted terms are meant only to leave room open to articulating the criteria by which levels are 
defined as composition-based or scale-based.
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means that the ordering relation that holds for this hierarchy (composition) is unidirectional. 
Finally,  it  is  also transitive,  because communities share the same compositional  hierarchy 
with ecosystems in relation to individual.
Hierarchical systems comprise a range of structural types (see Figure 1.6), depending on how 
each  rank  within  the  hierarchy  is  related  to  the  next  (Simon  1962[1996],  186).  Simon 
distinguishes three kinds of branching structures among hierarchical systems. The first kind 
involves a linear hierarchy, where there is no branching between ranks. Ranks are related, as 
the  name implies,  linearly  via  a  single  connection.  One example  of  a  linear  hierarchy is 
depicted in the scala naturae, or great chain of being, which purported to rank the grades of 
perfection from inferior non-living inanimate  matter  through humans  to superior religious 
entities.  The second kind of branching structure involves a  branching hierarchy, in which 
there are at least two degrees of branching between ranks. The component subsystems of a 
branching  hierarchy  designate  distinct  subsystems  that  differ  from  one  another.  These 
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Figure 1.5 A hierarchy illustrated as a partially ordered set. In Figure 1.5a,  One set (A) and it’s two subsets (B 
and C) are given. In Figure 1.5b, this system is arranged into a hierarchy, meaning it is a partially ordered set. 
The structure in 1.5b is reflexive, because everything within it belongs to the overall set A; it is transitive, 
because B is a subset of A and C is a subset of B, hence C is a subset of A; and it is antisymmetrical, because B 
is a subset of A (and C is a subset of A), but not vice versa. One further note: This figure depicts a nested 
hierarchy, meaning that the subsets that constitute the hierarchy, meaning that each subset is a subset of the 
overarching set above it. This contrasts to a control hierarchy (not depicted here, which has bracket structure 
like a genealogical tree), which orders, or rather sorts, its elements according to some classificatory scheme 
(Salthe 1985, 9-10). Control hierarchies may be nested, but need not be, which leaves as an open question to 
what extent both of these kinds of hierarchies are distinct. 
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subsystems may do different things, or at least designate different features that prohibit their 
co-variance in one single subsystem.26
Figure 1.6 Types of Branching Structures in Hierarchies. See text for details.
An important question concerning the use of hierarchical structures as the basis for levels of 
organization  concerns  the  content  of  the  constituents  that  the  hierarchy  is  expected  to 
represent. Hierarchical structures, by themselves, are nothing more than a formal means of 
representing particular qualities that can be ranked into a partially ordered set. But  what a 
hierarchical  structure  relates  and how  these  things  are  related  remain  undefined  by  the 
application of  only  a  formal hierarchy. These things need to be specified by the context in 
which it is applied. 'Levels of organization', on the other hand, designates a hierarchy whose 
elements comprise material entities or their features, or processes that populate the natural 
world. Hence, specifying further the hierarchical structure of 'levels' is done by clarifying how 
one understands the character of the levels concept (Section 1.4.1).
1.5.1 'Hierarchy' Does Not Exhaust 'Levels of Organization'
Though a hierarchical structure may be possessed by most if not all conceptions of levels of 
organization, the notion of a ‘hierarchy’ does not exhaust the concept of ‘levels’. Nonetheless, 
formal-based  approaches  focusing  on  hierarchies  are  sometimes  taken  to  be  exhaustive, 
26 A third kind of branching structure, which will not be relevant in this dissertation, is a flat hierarchy. These 
kinds of hierarchies can have an indefinite to infinite number of lower-ranking elements. Allotropic forms of 
carbon such as graphite or diamonds constitute flat hierarchies, because the carbon atoms populate the first  
rank of their compositional hierarchies may span indefinitely. Likewise, samples of gas also constitute flat 
hierarchies,  since  the  number  of  constituent  gas  molecules  the  make  up  the  subordinate  rank  may be 
indefinite (cf. Aizawa and Gillet 2009).
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exclusively sufficient, or otherwise privileged27 in defining levels of organization in biology 
(Woodger 1929, ##; 1952; Bunge 1960, 1977b; Bossort et al. 1977; Kim 2002; Salthe 1985; 
2009). Claims to this effect are typically statements of principle (Bossort et al.  1977; Salthe 
2009) and/or responses to general criticisms of the levels concept, in particular the immense 
ambiguity  that  is  attributed  to  it  (e.g.,  Bunge  1960;  Bossort  et  al.  1997;  Kim 2002;  cf. 
concerning  ambiguity  Craver  2007a  163;  Potochnik  and  McGill  1012,  126).  However, 
interpretations of levels that depend exclusively (or at least very heavily) on being explicable 
in  the  formalizable,  set-theoretic  terms  of  partially  ordered  sets  fail  to  illuminate  how 
scientists themselves conceive of levels (Section 1.3), and how organizational levels are used 
to aid scientists in analyzing and explaining complex phenomena (Section 1.4 and Section 
1.5). This is problematic for several reasons. For one thing, it casts doubt on the legitimacy of 
the levels concept itself. To the extent that 'levels of organization' is directly translatable (and 
hence replaceable) to formally-defined set-theoretic terms (fleshed out perhaps by adding a 
few more assumptions concerning the types of relations its usage promotes), this leaves little 
motivation for acknowledging the concept's purported merit in contributing anything of its 
own to scientific investigation. Some are willing to bite this bullet (e.g., Kim 2002, 1-2), but 
this would mean abandoning the term 'levels of organization' as anything but a stand-in term 
for  the  purposes  it  is  supposedly  meant  to  fill.  Nonetheless,  formalistic  approaches  to 
explicating the levels concept leaves little room for the more particular aspects of scientists' 
particular interests in the usage of levels of organization in science (see especially Chapter 4).
Two further difficulties arise from focusing too heavily on formalistic conceptions of levels of 
organization.  First,  formalistic  conceptions  offer  no  account  of  the  typical  things  that 
biologists wish to sort using levels of organization,  nor how they are taken to be related. 
Hierarchical  structures  can  organize  many  things  into  a  stratified,  level-like  framework, 
encompassing both material and abstract content. Trophic levels in ecology, which rank the 
positions of organisms in the food chain, focus on abstract features concerning the energy 
consumption of many types of organisms that populate ecosystems. Likewise, corporations 
also rank individual people into a hierarchy based on abstract features based on, e.g., worker-
27 This is especially the case in the General Systems Theory literature,  and in particular Hierarchy Theory, 
which, as mentioned above, unfortunately goes beyond the scope of the topics treated in this thesis. Another  
day.
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boss  relationships  within  that  business,  which  in  turn  are  elucidated  by  further  abstract 
properties of those individuals such as power or control imposed on them in virtue of their 
membership to the system in question. On the other hand, material objects are also said to be 
divided into levels. Tissues and cells are both material things, and the interlevel relation that  
holds between them is taken to be an objective feature of the naturally occurring systems that 
biology studies. Stepping out of hierarchy theory,  such abstract and material systems have 
very little in common with one another in terms of what motivates the particular scientific 
endeavors  in  analyzing  them  as  hierarchically  organized.28 Similarly,  the  “making up” or 
“composing”  relations  between  the  subsystems  and  the  whole  system  will  be  decisively 
different  between  varieties  of  cases.  Secondly,  formalistic  conceptions  of  hierarchical 
structures cannot distinguish between different uses of the levels concept. The two common 
forms  of  hierarchical  organization  in  biology  include  explanatory  part-whole  analysis  of 
biological systems, and in classification schemes (Mayr 1982, 65; Grene 1987, 505). Though 
in both cases the tasks that scientists are undertaking are aided by implementing hierarchies to 
rank  certain  features,  classification  and  explanation  remain  radically  different  epistemic 
enterprises.  Formal  criteria  for articulating hierarchies,  and hence levels,  may hold across 
such  different  projects,  but  there  must  be  some  way  of  distinguishing  such  tasks  within 
scientific practice, and more importantly the distinct issues that these tasks address (see Grene 
1974). 
In effect, reliance on formal-based approaches privilege formal philosophical approaches that 
emphasize conceptual  analysis,  which,  for the reasons just mentioned,  are not suitable  for 
analyzing issues associated with the levels concept. Such claims reveal a bias in the usage of 
the  levels  concept  towards  reducing  the  issues  uncovered  here  to  a  simple  question  of 
necessary and sufficient conditions; an issue, not surprisingly, best addressed using formal, 
analytic  approaches.  Formal-based  approaches,  by  themselves,  are  not  fruitful  for 
understanding levels in biology, given the host of non-formal factors that motivate the use of 
levels in scientific practice. 
28 The complexity of the respective systems is one feature that does justify abstracting away from the particular 
features of different kinds of systems, and analyzing their general, formal-based commonalities. Nonetheless, 
the extent to which complexity itself  will  hold generally over many different  types of systems,  and the 
sciences that investigate them, cannot be answered a priori. In fact, complexity is one of the central features 
that make 'levels of organization', rather than simply 'hierarchy', attractive in the first place.
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More particularly, and ultimately, it can be said that given the issues introduced above, this 
dissertation  is  engaged  in  an  entirely  different  approach  to  explicating  the  character  and 
significance  of  the  levels  concept.  The  primary  distinguishing point  between the  account 
offered here, and those of a more formalistic variety, can articulated in terms of methodology 
and in terms of the substantive issues that this works seeks to take up. Speaking first to the 
latter,  it  seems sufficiently clear that 'levels of organization'  refers to a specific cluster of 
distinct ideas and practices concerning biological phenomena and the status of biology itself 
as a natural science, which cannot be captured by formalistic treatments of levels (Chapter 4 
& 5; see also Grene 1974). Methodologically speaking, the interests motivating the analysis to 
follow diverge from what can, at quick glance, be taken up with the increasingly formal-based 
frameworks found in e.g. conceptual analysis. Instead, the issues addressed here will be taken 
up, specifically, in terms of an analytical project of analyzing biological concepts on the basis 
of their usage (Chapter 4), and in a 'synthetic' project that explicitly attempts to incorporate 
the rich but mostly forgotten (or ignored!) history of the concept's usage in biology in the 
twentieth century. It is a primary commitment here (by stipulation, not in-principle) the two 
cannot,  or at least  should not, be separated.  In other words, and both methodological  and 
analytically, 'levels' has a life of its own, prior to and ultimately outside of, studies of 'mere'  
hierarchies.29  
1.6 The Structure of This Dissertation
The rest of this dissertation will be distributed into four chapters. Chapter 2 will offer an 
exegesis of the two most prominent conceptions of levels in philosophy. One of these, offered 
the layer-cake account of levels, was developed by Paul Oppenheim and Hilary Putnam in 
their  famous  (1958)  paper  defending  the  unity  of  science.  Their  conception  of  levels  is 
29 This is not to say that an analysis of the notion of 'hierarchy' would not offer significant contributions to the  
study of levels: indeed some of the intellectual forebearers of this dissertation (particularly Simon, and the 
authors of Pattee 1973) were instrumental in formulating the ideas articulated here. The point being made 
here is  more  the  demarcation of  the  project  laid out  here,  in  this  dissertation,  which  brings  with it  the 
requisite boundaries of space, time, and effort (see especially footnotes 23 & 27 above).
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comprehensive  in  that  they  sought  to  offer  a  singular  account  by  which  to  capture  all  
instances  of ‘levels’ in  science.  Moreover,  it  will  be argued that  the conception of levels 
emerging from the layer-cake account is in fact the default conception of levels in science, 
due to its widespread use by philosophers in the latter half of the 20th century.  The other 
conception, offered in the mechanistic account of levels, is a rather new conception that was 
developed recently in the New Mechanist movement in the philosophy of science,  and in 
particular by Carl Craver (2007a). This conception of levels follows highly contextualized 
approach to conceptualizing levels, and largely rejects  the layer-cake account as a widely 
inaccurate conception of what levels are and how they are used in science. 
In Chapter 3, a number of criticisms levied against the levels concept by philosophers and 
scientists  will  be  discussed.  As  it  turns  out,  there  is  a  growing  skepticism regarding  the 
viability of the levels concept to perform any of the tasks that are often attributed to it. This 
levels skepticism, it will be argued, is in fact a result of the celebrity status of the layer-cake 
account, which itself is deeply problematic and designates the actual target of criticism by 
levels skeptics. Seen in this way, the criticisms of the levels skeptics turn out to be legitimate 
and sound, but fail to undermine the levels concept in general. 
Chapter 4 will present an alternative account of levels, in which it will be argued that the 
levels  concept  exhibits  a  fragmentary  character  due  to  the  modest  incommensurability 
between particular instances of its usage. The fragments of the levels concept, i.e. the specific 
features that comprise the character of ‘levels’ within a particular instance document quite 
well the ‘package deal’ that the levels concept represents in biology. It will be further argued 
that despite this fragmentary character the levels concept exhibits a remarkably conserved 
significance across its instances of usage due to the well-defined epistemic goal that motivates 
the concept’s usage, i.e. to structure explanatory problems in biology. This account will be 
complemented by a detailed case study in biological research by turning to the construction of 
the explanation  for  oxidative phosphorylation  by the chemiosmotic  hypothesis  offered by 
Peter Mitchell.
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Finally, Chapter 5 will argue that the levels concept as it is used in contemporary biological 
research can be traced back to historical efforts of a group of researchers in biology during the 
opening decades of the 20th century known as  organicism.  The organicists, in particular a 
group centered in Cambridge known as the Theoretical Biology Club, are the ones responsible 
for developing and applying the levels concept as it is known today. This analysis will provide 
further  justification  for  the  fragmentary  account  of  levels  developed  in  Chapter  4.  In 
particular, it will be revealed that the two insights offered by the fragmentary account, the 
fragmentary character of the levels concept and its overarching epistemic goal, are in fact 
products  of  the  active  development  of  the  levels  concept  of  the  organicists  working  in 
Cambridge. Moreover, a distinct account of levels was even developed out of the organicists’ 
efforts,  though  it  remains  largely  unknown  in  philosophy,  and  largely  forgotten  in 
contemporary biology. This account, known as the integrative account, strongly resembles the 
fragmentary account, but due to the embedment of the former in debates present in biology at  
the time (especially the mechanist-vitalist dispute) the extent of this resemblance will be left 
as a historical observation that deserves further attention in the future. 
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Chapter Two: Philosophical Conceptions of Levels
2.1 Introduction
In philosophy, two conceptions of levels of organization are especially prominent. One of 
these conceptions stems from Oppenheim and Putnam (1958). This conception, known as the 
“layer-cake” or “pancake” account of levels, is rarely explicitly defended as such in writing, 
but  continues  to  exert  considerable influence in  philosophical  discussions.  The layer-cake 
account of levels is characterized by its global scope, as well as (at least historically) by its  
association with the so-called unity of science thesis. This association has had far-reaching 
consequences for the concept of levels of organization. The other prominent conception of 
levels in philosophy stems from recent accounts of mechanistic explanation, particularly from 
Craver (2007a; 2007b; 2015), William Bechtel (w/ Craver 2007; 2008), and more recently by 
David Kaplan (2015). This account,  which will  here be called the mechanistic account of 
levels, defends a contextualized conception of levels that centers on defining what constitutes 
parthood within  an explanatory mechanism. The mechanistic  account  of  levels  rejects  all 
generalizability of claims involving levels to any overarching framework, and instead takes a 
particular level stratification to hold only in relation to a specific mechanism whose parts are 
distributed across different levels. Both the layer-cake and the mechanistic accounts of levels 
are  defined  in  terms  of  compositional  part-whole  relations,  though  the  way  that  each 
respective account understands these relations is significantly different.
2.2 The Layer-Cake Account of Levels
The  “layer-cake”  account  of  levels  was  first  articulated  by  Paul  Oppenheim  and  Hilary 
Putnam (1958) in their defense of the Unity of Science. This account of levels was developed 
to serve as a basis for articulating the micro-reduction relation by which the different branches 
of science reduce to one another as they move toward this Unity (Oppenheim and Putnam 
1958,  9).  This  contextualization  of  the  layer-cake  account  of  levels  in  Oppenheim  and 
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Putnam's larger project makes separating the two a subtle and complicated task. For one thing, 
without qualification, the “layer-cake account” can refer to both the account of levels, or to 
(several  related)  accounts  of  reductionism  or  anti-reductionism  developed  later  by  other 
philosophers, both of which link back to Oppenheim and Putnam's original publication.30 This 
point will be returned to below.
A further  point  of  complication  concerns  the  extent  of  the  layer-cake's  presence  in  the 
philosophical literature. Exhaustively quantifying this presence in great detail would be both 
tedious and tangential31.  Nonetheless,  it  is  a  valid observation that  the layer-cake account 
widely  persists  in  the  philosophical  literature  as  the  default  conception  of  levels  of 
organization,  and  so  will  be  discussed  below  (see  Section  2.2.5;  Section  3.3).  This  is 
particularly clear in the successor debates surrounding reductionism and anti-reductionism 
since the second half of the twentieth century (see especially Nagel 1961, ch. 11; Fodor 1972, 
113;  Kitcher  1984,  370-373;  Churchland  and  Sejnowski  1992,  9,  15-17)32.  Despite  this 
widespread, if  often tacit,  acceptance of the layer-cake account,  Oppenheim and Putnam's 
original (1958) paper remains the clearest articulation of the layer-cake account of levels, and 
so this section will focus on their developmental comments.
For Oppenheim and Putnam, the Unity of Science is an ideal state of science that would be 
realized when all the laws of science are reduced the laws of a single discipline (ibid. 4). The 
“layer-cake” moniker of their levels account has become a pejorative term for philosophers 
over time, due to the notorious problems identified in their argument for the Unity of Science, 
and their notion of micro-reduction. These problems have been well-documented elsewhere 
(see, for instance, Fodor 1974; Craver 2007a, ch.7), and do not deserved to be re-hashed here. 
Instead, this section will be solely concerned with the structure of the account of levels of 
organization  arising  out  of  this  historical  source,  and  its  continued  influence  in  the 
30 In the text that follows “layer-cake account” will refer to the layer-cake account  of levels  unless otherwise 
noted.
31 In Chapter 3 the presence of the layer-cake account in the nascent levels skepticism will be documented.
32 The  layer-cake  account  of  levels  is  also  prominent  in  other  philosophical  debates,  particularly  that  of 
emergence and non-fundamental causality. The account is used in a very similar manner as here, and for this  
reason can for now simply be noted here.
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philosophical  literature.  As a  further  exegetical  note,  Oppenheim and Putnam constructed 
their account of levels as a means of explicating their account of microreduction, which itself 
was used to explicate and defend their Unity of Science thesis (see especially Section 2.2.4 
below). Hence, though their account of levels can be (and has been) extracted from these 
other two ideas, it is in this context that Oppenheim and Putnam articulate their conception of  
levels.
The  layer-cake  account  of  levels  is  illustrated  below  in  Figure  2.1.  In  Oppenheim  and 
Putnam's original (1958) paper, six different levels were postulated, but this list was left open
Figure 2.1 The layer-cake account of levels. See Text for Details.
with regard to what an exhaustive list of levels would look like.33 The account is comprised of 
several characteristic features, all of which require short clarification. Subsequent references 
to the layer-cake model,  both in reductionist  and anti-reductionist  contexts,  have repeated 
these  features,  either  in  a  modified  form or  for  the  purpose  of  criticizing  them (Waters 
33 Compiling an exhaustive list was not in their interest anyway, since the realization of Unity of Science would  
effectively eliminate all other scientific disciplines except for the most fundamental.
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2010).These features include34:
1.)  Global  scope    and  comprehensive  character  :  The  scope of  the  account  is  unabashedly 
global, and is meant, strictly, to hold for all phenomena of the natural world. The account is 
also comprehensive, meaning that they took the structure of the world it postulated to hold a 
priori, i.e. before further empirical discoveries, for all instances where one could talk of levels 
(cf. Rueger and McGivern 2010, 381-2).
2.)  Stepwise compositional continuity: All natural phenomena in the world are connected to 
each other via part-whole relations, and are exemplified stepwise at each level. Conversely, if 
something is a part of something, then it belongs to a level.
3.)  Linearity of levels strata: Furthermore, the depiction of levels in the layer-cake account 
exhibits a non-branching hierarchical structure.
4.) Correspondence thesis: Each level designates a strong correspondence between a group of 
natural  objects  that  together  designate  that  particular  level's  rank,  and  a  core  scientific 
discipline that investigates, and explains, these phenomena.
2.2.1 Global Scope and Comprehensive Character
The scope of the layer-cake account encompasses the whole of nature. This is made clear by 
Oppenheim and Putnam in their characterization of the basic meaning of the Unity of Science 
thesis, for which their levels account is meant to present structure (1958, 3-4). Furthermore, 
the  character  of  their  account  is  comprehensive.  That  is,  their  conception  of  levels  of 
organization  is  meant  to  encompass  an  exhaustive  treatment  of  not  only  what  levels  of 
organization are in all instances, rather also how the things in the world that have not yet been 
discovered or described fits into its schema.
34 Of these features, stepwise compositional continuity and the correspondence thesis are the most “defining” 
characteristics of the layer-cake account (and, not coincidentally, the features most criticized of the account).  
Conversely, the presence of any two of these features are (definitely) sufficient for identifying any particular 
treatment of levels to be categorized as belonging to the “layer-cake” variety. In fact, the presence of any one 
of these feature (with the exception of linearity) is probably also sufficient to identify a conception as “layer-
cake”.
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2.2.2 Stepwise Compositional Continuity 
In  addition  to  its  universal  scope,  the  layer-cake  account  claims  that  a  compositional  
continuity  exists  in  all  natural  phenomena  from the  subatomic  to  the  cosmological.  This 
means that all natural phenomena are related to each other by cumulative part-whole relations 
that are reiterated at each level. Additionally, and peculiar to the layer-cake account, there is a 
further condition that this compositional continuity of the world is structured in a  stepwise 
fashion. This means that all of the so-called proper parts of a given whole at any given level 
Ln are located  exclusively at the adjacent lower level of organization (Ln-1). This additional 
claim that the compositional continuity of the world is structured in a stepwise fashion is the 
source for the “layer-cake” moniker of the account.
Oppenheim  and  Putnam  considered  stepwise compositional  continuity  of  levels  of 
organization to be “an essential feature” of their reductionist-based argument for their Unity 
of Science thesis. Specifically, they utilize part-whole relations in their articulation of what a 
micro-reduction is, saying that “the objects in the universe of discourse of B2 [the reduced 
branch of science] are wholes which possess a decomposition into proper parts all of which  
belong to the universe of discourse of B1  [the reducing branch of science]” (Oppenheim and 
Putnam 1958, 6, emphasis added). This point is then repeated as a defining condition of a 
level, saying: “Anything of a given level except the lowest must possess a decomposition into  
things belonging to the next lower level” (ibid. 9, emphasis added). These passages highlight 
stepwise compositional  continuity as  probably the  most  important  defining feature  of  the 
layer-cake  account:  The  different  levels  of  organization  (summarized  by  their  respective 
scientific  branch  Bn when  speaking  of  micro-reduction),  which  together  represent  all  the 
natural entities that populate the world, lie stacked on top of one another, demarcated by their 
respective universes of discourse. 
This feature of the layer-cake account has three important implications that will be returned to 
later, particularly as points of criticism in the nascent skeptical arguments against the viability 
of the levels concept (see Chapter 3). First, for any given whole, the parts that compose it 
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located at Ln-1 exhaustively compose that whole. Second, this holds for not only given wholes, 
but also for entire levels: The totality of things located at a particular level of organization can 
be exhaustively decomposed into parts that are exclusively located at the neighboring adjacent 
level. Consequently, the image of nature that emerges from this depiction of levels is one in 
which each rank of the levels hierarchy can be cleanly demarcated from the other, giving the 
appearance of a layered cake (especially in illustrations, see figure 2.2).
The third consequence of stepwise compositional continuity, which follows from the first two 
consequences,  is  that  each  level  of  organization  is  both  ontologically  necessary and 
epistemologically sufficient to account for other levels. Ontologically speaking, the existence 
Figure 2.2 The microreduction relations in the layer-cake account. The left side depicts part of the hierarchy of  
levels represented by the layer-cake account illustrated above in Figure 2.1. The right side depicts a particular  
hypothetical  microreduction  that  Oppenheim  and  Putnam  argue  is  supported  by  their  account.   This 
microreduction entails deriving a higher-level law (here, “Law 1 @ Ln”), which corresponds to one entity at that 
level (say, in-flight navigation of a flying insect), from a number of other laws (here “[Law 1 + Law 2 + Law3]  
@ Ln-1”), which correspond to a number of proper parts of the respective whole to which they belong. For the 
layer-cake account,  only the laws concerning each of these respective items matter, and, more importantly, these 
singular microreductions coalesce into a reduction of the entire level (and all of the entities in its universe of  
discourse. Hence, the branching structure of the hierarchy depicted in the image on the left can be misleading 
concerning the overall structure of levels of organization in the layer-cake account (see Section 2.2.3).
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of each level (and,  ipso facto, the things populating that level) depends necessarily on each 
level  below  it  (except  for  a  postulated  “fundamental”  level  that  bottoms-out  the  global 
hierarchy).  This is  a direct consequence of the claim that each level (and specifically the 
things  populating that  level)  is  exhaustively  composed of  things  at  the adjacently located 
lower level. Epistemologically speaking, the corresponding theory or theories that explain a 
particular level Ln-1 is in itself sufficient for reducing the theory or theories located at the level 
of interest (Ln). 
This, in turn, prohibits that levels can be “skipped”, either ontologically or epistemologically, 
and is also meant to hold in-principle.35 Oppenheim and Putnam specify:
“We maintain that each of our levels is necessary in the sense that it would be utopian to 
suppose that one might reduce all the major theories or a whole branch [of science] 
concerned with any one of our six levels to a theory concerned with a lower level, 
skipping  entirely the  immediately lower  level;  and  we maintain  that  our  levels  are 
sufficient in the sense that it would not be utopian to suppose that a major theory on any 
one of our levels might be directly reduced to the next lower level” (Oppenheim and 
Putnam 1958, 10, emphasis added).
Though the layer-cake account is vital for understanding theoretical reductionism (and anti-
reductionism),  it  should be noted that the primary condition that  Oppenheim and Putnam 
required  to  hold  for  their  account  of  micro-reduction  was  the  ability  of  one  scientific 
discipline (B1) to account for the content of another scientific discipline (B2), following the 
Kemeny-Oppenheim definition of reduction to which they subscribe.36 This is significant in 
that  stepwise  compositional  continuity  also  holds  between  the  scientific  disciplines 
corresponding to levels of organization37 highlights the conceptual distinctness of the account 
of levels that they develop from the rest of their Unity of Science project: Though levels of 
35 However, Oppenheim and Putnam do hold that levels may be skipped for the sake of convenience (ibid.).
36 Kemeny-Oppenheim  reduction  requires  that,  between  two  candidate  lower-  and  higher-level  theories, 
scientific theories T1 and T2 (respectively), the lower-level theory T1 can explain the same phenomena better 
than T2.This of course assumes that both theories attempt to explain the same set of observational data.
37 In virtue of the correspondence thesis, see below.
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organization, in virtue of the part-whole relations by which they are defined, are essential to 
understanding how reductionism will bring about the Unity of the Science,38 the structure of 
nature as represented by the levels concept in the layer-cake account is,  strictly speaking, 
postulated as an independent fact. In this way, reference to the layer-cake account is often 
treated both as a representation of the structure of the world and of the structure of science. 
Both of these ideas subsequently became entangled with the levels concept.
2.2.3 Linearity of Levels Strata
The layer-cake account of levels also exhibits a linear structure, with no branching between its 
strata. This is visible in both Figure 2.1 and Figure 2.2. The individual elements of each level 
of organization (i.e.  the entities that belong to, e.g.,  the “level of the cell”)  are allotted a 
specific place in the hierarchy of nature, and accounted for by a “natural law” that accounts 
for  that  element's  dynamics  and  behaviors.  So,  for  each  entity  in  nature,  an  exhaustive, 
lawlike statement can be given (at least for an ideally complete science). However, the picture 
is complicated by the observation that this seems to necessitate a branching structure between 
levels, since one whole is made of many parts. Nonetheless, the layer-cake account represents 
levels of organization in a linear manner (Oppenheim and Putnam 1958, 9; see also Craver 
2007a, 172-173). The reason for this is that the particular relations between specific parts and 
wholes are unimportant to Oppenheim and Putnam's conception of levels. Rather, what is 
important  is  the  overarching,  generalized  reductionist  relation  from  the  atomic  to  the 
cosmological, and the only way to capture such coarse-grained relations is to abstract away 
from the minute details of singular phenomena.
The linear structure of levels is a consequence of two aspects of the layer-cake account. The 
first is the account's stepwise compositional continuity feature, which, as just seen, separates 
levels into strictly demarcated part-whole relations that are represented in a stepwise fashion. 
The second aspect, mentioned briefly above, is the identification of levels with a specific 
38 This is accomplished by designating a “potential microreducer”, see Section 2.2.4.
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“universe of discourse”. The idea of a “universe of discourse” is meant to represent the total 
set of “things” that are studied by a given branch of science (ibid. 6). Oppenheim and Putnam 
referred to six different universes of discourse, which were illustrated above in figure 2.1.39 
These universes of discourse summarize the (lower-level) parts or the (higher-level) whole 
when then contrasted with their respective adjacent levels. 
In Figure 2.2 above, this image is juxtaposed to a hypothetical token case of microreduction 
(i.e. the left side), wherein a branching structure is present. However, this kind of branching is 
misleading as a representative observation of the layer-cake account. As mentioned above, the 
various organizational levels are meant to ultimately be represented as a singular sets, which 
constitute the different “universes of discourse” of each distinct level and its corresponding 
science  (see  Section  2.2.4).  Moreover,  given  the  stepwise  fashion  by  which  one  moves 
between  levels  in  the  layer-cake  account  with  microreductionist  framework  in  which 
Oppenheim and Putnam operate, this also excludes any significant branching between levels 
of organization. The universe of discourse to which a branch of science belongs is then used 
to identify the level to which it belongs. (ibid. 9)
Like compositional continuity, the linearity of the layer-cake account seems to be a corollary 
to the account of (micro-)reductionism that the account is meant to explicate. For the Unity of 
Science thesis to work, according to Oppenheim and Putnam, each universe of discourse, or 
rather each level of organization, must be reducible to the next without “skipping” any of the 
intermediate levels (see above).  This epistemic necessity of each level,  represented in the 
account by coalescing the various single disciplines located at each level into one singular 
branch Bn, coupled with the layer-cake account's universal scope and inherent commitment to 
the Unity of Science,  makes  this  simplification of the structure of nature understandable. 
More specifically: Understandable, but not justifiably. By abstracting away from the particular 
entities  in  nature,  and  their  specific  compositional  relations,  these  entities  lose  their 
distinctness,  and are homogenized into a  large clump of  'details'  to  be  clarified  as  either 
reducible or irreducible (depending on which position one defends). This feature of the layer-
39  That this list  is not exhaustive is  unimportant, as the authors themselves were aware that  their list was 
tentative. 
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cake account, as will be seen, is also widely disputed by critics of the account.
2.2.4 Correspondence Between Nature and Science
The layer-cake account of levels postulates a strong correspondence between the entities of 
nature represented by levels and the sciences that investigate these entities.  In its strictest 
form,  this  correspondence  thesis postulates  more  than  just a  passing association  between 
nature and the study of nature. Rather, this correspondence postulates a 1:1 relation between a 
particular level of organization and a specific scientific discipline that investigates this level. 
This feature of the account, in addition to its claim of stepwise compositional continuity, is the 
most controversial features of the layer-cake account. Nevertheless, philosophical arguments 
in which the concept of 'levels of organization' is referenced, such as those for or against 
reductionism or anti-reductionism, often rely substantially on this feature of the layer-cake 
account for their constructive or critical comments (Churchland 1986, Ch. 7; Churchland and 
Churchland 1992; Waters 2010, 240)40. This reliance can already be seen in Oppenheim and 
Putnam's paper, where they heavily cite their levels framework as support for their notion of 
micro-reduction. As they say: 
“The essential feature of a micro-reduction is that the branch [of science] B1 deals with 
the parts of the objects dealt with by B2. We must suppose that corresponding to each  
branch we have  a specific universe of discourse UBi;  and that we have a part-whole 
relation,  Pt  [between  these  branches].”  (Oppenheim and  Putnam 1958,  6,  emphasis 
added)
This  passage  highlights  the  strong form of  correspondence  that  the  authors  took  to  hold 
between  science  and  nature.  In  advocating  the  correspondence  thesis,  the  “universe  of 
discourse” attached to a branch of science becomes a stand-in term for a  proper level of 
organization, as the two terms 'branch of science' and 'universe of discourse'become inter-
40 This point will be discussed in detail in Chapter 3, particularly Section 3.3.
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defined with 'levels'  in  Oppenheim and Putnam's  account.41 However,  the correspondence 
thesis introduces an especially problematic element of ambiguity to the levels concept. This 
ambiguity concerns what is represented by levels of organization in the first place: Do levels 
of organization represent things in the world that science investigates or do they represent 
epistemic tools of science that investigate nature?42
Whether  the ontological  ordering  of  things  in  the world or  the  epistemic ordering of  the 
sciences and products of science should take precedence is not initially clear. The primary 
emphasis of Oppenheim and Putnam's original paper is clearly on articulating and defending 
their Unity of Science thesis, for which they offer their notion of microreduction in rder to 
illustrate how this Unity will be achieved. In turn, their account of levels is offered as a means 
to both explicate and defend their account of microreduction. Unfortunately, this is where the 
blurring of distinct  ideas and concepts with the levels concept begins.  Take,  for instance, 
Oppenheim  and  Putnam's  use  of  levels  (here  in  the  form  of  “composition”  and 
“decomposition”  as  a  means  of  justifying their  account  of  microreduction.  This  is 
accomplished by designating a “potential microreducer”, which exploits the levels concept in 
order to posit independent, tentative evidence that microreduction between different branches 
of sciences is possible (or probable). This is visible in the following passage: 
“We shall say that a Branch1 is a potential micro-reducer of a Branch2 if the objects of  
the universe of discourse of B2 are wholes which possess a decomposition into proper  
41 One  caveat  to  this  observation  must  be  made.  Oppenheim  and  Putnam  expected  the  number  of  “core 
disciplines” covering the level hierarchy postulated by the layer-cake account to shrink over time as science 
came closer and closer to its reductionist Unity. Hence, the disciplines that correspond to the entities in nature 
(and summarized by their universes of discourse) constitute a transient  set of epistemic constructions as  
“simplifying reductions” worked to coalesce the diverse disciplines of science into a representative hard core 
discipline.  So, in reality, Oppenheim and Putnam expected the number of scientific disciplines to shrink:  
“[Following simplifying reductions in the process of the realizing Unity of Science] we often encounter a 
division into simply physics, biology, and social sciences” (1958, 28). 
This would appear to have peculiar consequences for the levels of organization that are postulated to 
hold in nature, independently of science. Specifically: If the number of scientific disciplines shrinks over  
time,  what  will  remain  of  the  corresponding organizational  levels  in  nature?  Levels,  understood as  the  
universes of discourse manifesting the phenomena studied by science, will surely not disappear, despite any  
epistemic trends in philosophy or science. This would require that the new emerging disciplines constituting  
science would become increasingly multi-level and, consequently, the correspondence between science and 
nature would have to be modified to account for this trend.
42 Craver (2007a, 174-6) has pointed this out, and takes it as a primary point of criticism against the layer-cake 
account. See Section Section 2.3.2).
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parts all of which belong to the universe of discourse of B1. The definition is the same 
as the definition of 'micro-reduces' except for the omission of the clause 'B2 is reduced 
to B1'” (Oppenheim and Putnam 1958, 6;  see Section 2.2.4.
This could speak for the precedence of the epistemic ordering of the sciences as the primary 
contribution  resulting  from the  layer-cake  account  of  levels.  However,  this  contradict  the 
underlying ontological connotation of levels, observed through the articulation of levels as 
encompassing (ontologically) distinct universes of discourse hierarchically connected by its 
compositional continuity. 
Ultimately, the layer-cake account (given the correspondence thesis) emphasizes that both the 
ontological  and  epistemic  modes  of  representing  levels  offer  significant  contributions  to 
philosophy and science (see below). Remaining again with Oppenheim and Putnam, this was 
indeed the perceived contribution proffered by the original authors of the layer-cake account 
(independently of its role in structuring their reductive approach to the Unity of Science). 
Because of the correspondence thesis, a general structure of science that reliably reflects the 
structure  of  the  world  could  be  constructed  (or  so  they  thought).  First,  speaking  to  the 
epistemic ordering, they say:
“The idea of reductive levels employed in our discussion suggests what may plausibly 
be  regarded  as  a  natural  order  of  sciences.  For  this  purpose,  it  suffices  to  take  as 
'fundamental  disciplines'  the  branches  corresponding  to  our  levels  [see  figure  2.1 
above]. It is understandable that many of the well-known orderings of things have a 
rough similarity to our reductive levels, and that corresponding orderings of sciences are 
more  or  less  similar  to  our  order  of  6  'fundamental  disciplines'”  (Oppenheim and 
Putnam 1958, 28)
This affirmation of the layered structure of science, Oppenheim and Putnam claim, follows 
the layered structure of nature, as expressed by their layer-cake account because the former 
derives  its  justification  by  reliably  representing  the  actual  structure  of  the  world.  They 
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continue:
“But these other [historical]43 efforts [at structuring science] have apparently been made 
on more or less intuitive grounds; it does not seem to have been realized that  these 
orderings are 'natural' in a deeper sense, of being based on the relation of potential 
micro-reducer obtaining between the branches of science” (ibid. emphasis added)
Modeling  the  structure  of  science  on  the  structure  of  the  natural  world  is  offered  by 
Oppenheim and Putnam as a novelty that had apparently been missed by others who have 
defended  a  similar  structuring  of  science.  Though  this  is  a  dubious  claim  to  make  in 
contemporary times, it is important for present purposes to see how the interwoven claims 
made by the layer-cake account continues to influence philosophical usage of the concept of 
levels. Perhaps Oppenheim and Putnam's dual-treatment of levels is simply a device with to 
make room or the Aristotelian tasks of philosophy, which, using their dual-treatment of levels, 
are actively coordinated with one another. Whichever interpretation one takes on concerning 
what levels fundamentally represent, it will have a corresponding structure already prepared 
for it, and vice versa.44 
2.2.5 The Continued Influence of the Layer-Cake Account
The influence of the layer-cake account of levels is difficult to quantify definitively, due to its  
intricate entanglement with so many other particular ideas and general debates. The image of 
the world mediated by the layer-cake account of levels used by Oppenheim and Putnam to 
justify  their  account  of  microreduction,  which  was  in  turn  used  to  achieve  the  Unity  of 
43 Oppenheim and Putnam do not offer a precise analysis of historical predecessors to their layer-cake account  
of science, but they do cite Ludwig von Bertalanffy and Auguste Comte as predecessors expressing a similar,  
hierarchical, representation of the sciences (Oppenheim and Putnam 1958,; 29f, 32f, respectively).
44 More particularly, the respective ontological and epistemic orderings that Oppenheim and Putnam take levels  
to  represent  resembles  Aristotle's  distinction  between  first  philosophy  and  second philosophy.  That  is, 
respectively, the study of what exists (ontology) and the study of that which studies existence (science, or  
rather Aristotelian physics) (cf. Bodnar 2012). Aristotle, like Oppenheim and Putnam, also argued for the 
simultaneous necessity of both enterprises (ibid.).
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Science (for a critique of the Unity of Science, see, for instance, Fodor 1974; 1975, 10-12; 
Dupré 1993, 88; Steel 2004, 60). Unity of Science  is achieved by constructing an ultimate 
theory  of  physics  that  collects  all  of  the  laws  of  science,  corresponding  to  all  levels  of 
organization in the world, into one theory. This seems to result in the non-existence of any 
level  of  organization  above  the  most  fundamental:  Since,  according  to  Oppenheim  and 
Putnam,  the  disciplines  of  science  (which  strictly  correspond  to  those  in  nature)  will 
eventually “reduce” to another discipline located at the level adjacently below it, levels seem 
to disappear as well (cf. Carrier and Finzer 2006, 271). For this reason, the Unity of Science,  
at least in this form, is not considered defensible in contemporary philosophical discussion.
Far  more important  than  the levels  concept's  association with  the Unity of  Science  is  its 
subsequent  and questionable association with various accounts of theoretical reductionism 
and anti-reductionism. This trend continued with later accounts of reduction, particularly in 
the debates surrounding Ernest Nagel's account of theoretical reduction (1961, ch. 11), which 
invigorated  the  discussion  concerning  theoretical  reductionism.45 Though  whether,  or  the 
extent to which, Nagelian-inspired accounts of reduction can, or should, be associated with 
any conception of organizational levels is an open question, the layer-cake account is widely 
present in the literature surrounding reductionism in the biological sciences in general (see 
especially Beckner 1959, ch.9)46.
This  association  of  the  layer-cake  account  of  levels  with  reduction  and reductionism has 
already been established in conjunction with Oppenheim and Putnam's (1958) paper.  In a 
45 It is a matter of debate to what extent Nagelian reduction needs to be associated with levels of organization at  
all.  Raphael  van Riel's  recent  (2011) defense of  Nagel  offers  an especially clear  articulation of  what  is  
required  for  Nagelian  reduction,  and  implies  that  there  is  no  strong  analytic  association  with  levels  of 
organization at all (van Riel 2011, 270). This view is not without precedence, and other well-known defenses 
of  Nagelian  reduction have also avoided  references  to  the  levels  concept  (e.g.,  Schaffner  1967;  Hooker 
1981).  However,  it  is also true that certain articulations of Nagelian-inspired reductionism have a vested 
interest in attaching Nagelian reduction with the notion of levels (e.g., Churchland and Churchland 1992). 
Looking  to  antireductionist  positions,  the  role  of  levels  is  more  clearly  present,  particularly  as  a  vital 
background condition against which to articulate what reductionist and anti-reductionist positions amount to 
(e.g. Kitcher 1984; Jackson and Petit 1992).
46 This controversy is exacerbated by both (1) Nagel's tendency to treat himself to levels-laced language in 
talking about the reduction relation (see, e.g., his treatment of the reduction of thermodynamics to statistical 
mechanics, Nagel 1961, 342) and (2) Nagel's own preoccupation with part-whole analyses in biology, which 
he took to be vital for capturing biological theorizing and explanation (see especially ibid., ch. 12).
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similar  fashion,  the  layer-cake  account  is  especially  prominent  in  accounts  of  anti-
reductionism  in  biology.  C.  Kenneth  Waters  (2010),  in  criticizing  the  reductionism-anti-
reductionism  discussion  in  biology,  identifies  the  layer-cake  framework  as  a  principal 
identifying feature of the debate, saying: “Layer-cake antireductionism is the dominant view 
among philosophers interested in this debate [of reductionism vs. antireductionism]” (2010, 
244; Section 3.3; cf. also Love and Brigandt 2010). This point is exemplified quite clearly in 
Philip  Kitcher's  influential  (1984)  paper  criticizing  theoretical  reductionist  approaches  in 
biology.  In  the  following  passages,  Kitcher  lays  out  an  explicit  place  for  levels  of 
organization,  and  more  specifically  the  layer-cake  account,  in  his  defense  of  anti-
reductionism. This affirms several of the account's defining features, particularly its global 
scope and the correspondence thesis between the ordering of the world and the ordering of 
science47:
“[One] ought to allow that,  in the current practice of biology, nature is divided into 
levels which form the proper provinces of areas of biological study: molecular biology, 
cytology, histology, physiology, and so forth” (Kitcher 1984, 370).
This  one statement  identifies  quite  clearly a  conception of levels  that  closely follows the 
layer-cake account. Like the reductionists, subscription to the concept of levels is not one of 
mere convenience, but rather a central premise in Kitcher's argument for anti-reductionism: 
“So far,  anti-reductionism emerges as the thesis  that there are  autonomous levels of 
biological explanation.  Anti-reductionism construes the current division of biology not  
simply as a temporary feature of our science stemming from our cognitive imperfections  
but  as  the  reflection  of  levels  of  organization  in  nature”48 (ibid. 371,  emphasis 
47 One feature of the layer-cake account that is conspicuously absent in Kitcher's paper is the stepwise condition 
of layer-cake compositional continuity. This is understandable, since the reductionism debate in biology has 
traditionally focused on whether Mendelian genetics can be reduced to molecular genetics. Correspondingly,  
the organizational levels that are identified in this tradition are, respectively, chromosomal and cellular levels, 
and the molecular levels. This focus was established by Schaffner's original (1967) reductionist claim that the 
former was in the process of Nagel-reducing the latter. The span between these respective levels is rather 
disparate, and for this reason the stepwise condition in which reduction was conceptualized by Oppenheim 
and Putnam is irrelevant to the debate that was later pursued.
48 A similar argument was made by Jerry Fodor, in his direct rejoinder to Oppenheim and Putnam's Unity of 
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modified).
So, the concept of levels also plays a central role in the articulation of the anti-reductionist 
position.  In  particular,  it  communicates  a  thesis  about  the  structure  of  the  world  and  of 
science, against which the denial of reductionist claims is justified. This, interestingly, mirrors 
the arguments of Oppenheim and Putnam above. This affirmation of the layer-cake account 
by Kitcher is especially significant, because it highlights an overarching goal of applying the 
concept of levels of organization in any form. Specifically, the usage of the levels concept is a 
means of giving structure to the problem it is utilized in engaging, namely, the problem posed 
by the  competing  reductionist  and  anti-reductionist  theses  of  science  and  the  world  (see 
Chapter 4, for more on this point as concerns the use of levels in science). Anti-reductionists 
like  Kitcher  (1984),  like  their  reductionist  counterparts,  hence  rely  heavily on  the  levels 
concept, and particularly the layer-cake account, in order to give structure to the problem that 
they collectively engage, and to articulate their proposed respective solutions to this problem:
“[T]o the extent that we can make sense of the present explanatory structure within  
biology – that division of the field into subfields corresponding to levels of organization  
in nature – we can also understand the antireductionist doctrine. In its minimal form, it 
is the claim that the commitment to several explanatory levels does not simply reflect 
our cognitive limitations” (ibid. 373, emphasis added)
The entanglement of the organizational levels as depicted by the layer-cake account with so 
many other  positions  and  ideas  offers  a  tentative  explanation  for  the  rampant  ambiguity 
associated with the levels concept, at least in philosophy. As will be seen in the next chapter, 
much of the criticism heaped upon levels of organization as a nonviable theoretical concept is 
a result of the ideas stemming from the layer-cake account.
Science hypothesis (rather than their account of micro-reduction): “I am suggesting, roughly, that there are  
special sciences not because of the nature of our epistemic relation to the world, but because of the way the 
world is put together” (1974, 113). This supports the claim here that the structure of the world, as represented 
by the layer-cake account of levels, is a leverage point in the argumentation for both reductionist and anti-
reductionist  arguments.  It  should  be  said,  though,  that  although  Fodor's  argument  can,  like  Nagelian 
reduction, also arguably be made without reference to levels, Fodor still engages in levels-laced language to 
bring his point across (see, e.g., Fodor 1974, 112; and especially Fodor 1997, which is, in contrast to the  
former, completely saturated with references to levels).
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2.3 The Mechanistic Account of Levels
Organizational levels are also a central element to the currently popular “New Mechanistic” 
approach  to  explanation  in  the  biological  sciences  (Craver  2007a,  Ch.  5;  Bechtel  2008; 
Bechtel  and  Richardson  1993[2010],  Introduction,  Ch.  2).  According  to  mechanist 
approaches,  explaining  a  phenomenon  proceeds  by showing  how it  was  produced  by its 
component parts and activities (Machamer et al. 2000; Craver 2007a; Bechtel and Richardson 
1993[2010]).  Constructing such an explanation proceeds, approximately,  in three steps: by 
characterizing  the  phenomenon  of  interest,  identifying  the  component  parts  and  activities 
responsible  for  the  phenomenon,  and  describing  the  kinds  of  organization  between  the 
mechanism’s  components.  In  turn,  this  often  entails  postulating  a  number  of  levels  of 
organization, across which these items are distributed.
The usage of levels of organization in mechanistic explanation is much more streamlined than 
that found in the layer-cake account. Specifically, the levels concept is utilized as a means for 
explicating the structure of a mechanism, and thereby the structure of explanations in the 
biological sciences (see especially Craver 2001; Craver 2007, 163-164; Bechtel 2008, 22). 
However, the overall significance of the concept for the biological sciences is of secondary 
importance  to  the  mechanists.  The  more  important  issue  for  mechanist  philosophers  is  a 
working definition for the concept of a “mechanism”, and showing how exactly mechanisms 
contribute to a philosophical understanding of how explanations are constructed in science 
(Machamer et al. 2000; Bechtel and Abrahamsen 2006; Craver 2007a. Ch.4). 
For this reason, the discussion of the mechanistic conception of levels in this section will 
serve primarily as an initial contrast to the layer-cake account discussed above. As will be 
seen here, the conception of levels developed by the mechanistic account is too narrow to 
serve for a general analysis of the levels concept in science or philosophy, at least outside the 
context of discussing (New) mechanistic explanation. Markus I. Eronen (2013, 2014) agrees 
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with this conclusion (Eronen 2013, 1047), and has offered a number of compelling arguments 
that the mechanistic conception of levels is problematic.  In its place, Eronen argues for a 
deflationary approach to the mechanistic account of levels.  His motivation for this  is that 
contextualized accounts of levels, and in particular the mechanistic account (Eronen 2013, 
1044),  typically  utilize  the  label  of  “levels”  as  a  stand-in  term for  another  criterion  for 
distinguishing between, or for relating, objects and processes, such as composition or scale 
(ibid. 1048-50). However, neither scale nor composition is synonymous with talk of levels, 
and without specifying clearly what “levels” refers to in a certain context, there is a strong 
tendency for this loose levels-talk to allow confusing and inconsistent ambiguities to creep 
into the discussion. (Eronen, 2014, 17) By referring to 'levels' when in fact the account in 
question  requires  nothing  more than  a  way  of,  e.g.,  specifying  part-whole  relations  or 
differentiating between kinds of interactions that occur at certain scales, this begs the question 
as to what the usefulness of levels can be in the first place (cf. Ch. 3 below). A significant part 
of the ambiguity that surrounds the concept of levels is hence preserved when an argument for 
the topic in question (like mechanistic explanation or downward causation) is developed in 
terms of  levels,  but  another  more precise notion clearly does all  of the conceptual  work. 
Therefore, Eronen concludes, the mechanistic conception of levels “is too limited as a theory 
of levels” to be of much use (Eronen 2013, 1047).
A  mechanism  is  hierarchically  arranged,  and  its  elements  stand  in  a  part-whole 
(compositional)  relationship  with  one  another  (Craver  2007a,  7,  Ch.  4).  These  elements, 
comprise the mechanism's working parts49, and are organized together in a way that produces 
the phenomenon. The total set of component parts and activities composing a mechanism in 
turn designate several levels of organization within the system of interest. The components 
(and derivatively the organizational levels at which these components are occupied) that are 
designated for a particular explanation are so designated only relative to the phenomenon for 
which the respective mechanism is described. A schematic for a multi-level mechanism is 
illustrated  in  below  figure  2.3.  Lower  levels  in  this  hierarchy  are  the  components  in 
mechanisms for the phenomenon, which is located at the highest level of the hierarchical 
49 “Working parts” is a technical  term in the mechanist literature.  It  stands for,  briefly,  only the individual  
components that interact within a particular mechanism that contribute to producing the phenomenon
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layout. 
This account of levels is markedly different from the layer-cake account. One of the most 
prominent observations, in fact, of the mechanistic account of levels is the tendency of its 
proponents to outright reject as much similarity to the layer-cake account as possible. The 
characteristic features that will be discussed here include the following:
(1)  Local  Scope  and  Radically  Contextualized  Character:  According  to  the  mechanistic 
account,  levels  are  local  in  scope,  and contextualized in  character;  that  is,  levels  are  not 
generalizable beyond the particular mechanism in which they are postulated. The character of 
mechanistic levels is radical in that levels can only be postulated relative to a phenomenon for 
which  a  mechanistic  explanation  is  sought.  This  is  the  most  significant  feature  of  the 
mechanistic account of levels, and distinguishes it strongly from the layer-cake account.
(2) Principled Rejection of the Correspondence Thesis: The mechanistic account also rejects, 
principally,  any significant  correspondence between nature and science that resembles the 
correspondence thesis of the layer-cake account. This rejection also holds generally for any 
levels-mediated ordering of science, independently of the question whether the structure of 
science and nature are associated.
(3)  Branching Structure: Unlike the layer-cake account,  the mechanistic account of levels 
exhibits  a  branching  structure,  where  the  parts  that  compose  the  whole  mechanism  are 
distributed  along  different  level  stratifications.  More  importantly,  the  branching  structure 
between levels signifies that particular parts at a given level are not uniformly related to one 
another outside of their particular relation to the whole to which they all belong.
(4)  Constitutive Relevance: Levels of a mechanism are related via compositional relations, 
and what counts as a component of an explanatory mechanism is defined by its relevance in 
producing the phenomenon. This underlines the mechanist attitude that levels are explicitly 
ontological, not epistemic.
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Figure 2.3 A multi-level mechanism with mechanisms as its components. The highest level (Ln0) represents the 
phenomenon  (SΨ).  The  descending  levels  below  the  phenomenon  designate  a  compositional  hierarchy 
highlighting the relevant components required to produce the phenomenon occurring at (Ln0). Descending one 
rank, the next level below the phenomenon (Ln-1), the phenomenon may be decomposed into a set of parts (X1-4) 
and activities (Φ1-4). These things are in turn further decomposed into things at still lower organizational levels  
than the XΦ level, which include, respectively, other parts and activities (namely, P1-4  and ρ1-4,  and T1-3 and τ1-3). 
These levels are then organized together to form the explanatory mechanism. Figure from Craver 2007a, 194.
2.3.1 Local Scope and Radically Contextualized Character
The first  characteristic feature of the mechanistic  account  of levels is  its  local scope and 
radically contextualized scope.  For  the  mechanistic  account,  'levels  of  organization'  only 
make sense in the context of a specific mechanism. More particularly, levels of organization 
can  only  be  explicated  relative  to  a  particular  phenomenon  for  which  a  mechanism  is 
described.  Carl  Craver,  one  prominent  proponent  of  the  New  Mechanist  philosophy, 
articulates this feature of levels thusly:
“[L]evels of mechanisms are far more local than the [layer-cake] image suggests. They 
are defined only within a given compositional hierarchy. Different levels of mechanisms 
are found in the spatial  memory system, the circulatory system, the osmoregulatory 
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system,  and  the  visual  system.  How  many  levels  there  are,  and  which  levels  are 
included, are questions to be answered on a case-by-case basis by discovering which 
components at  which size scales are explanatorily relevant for a given phenomenon. 
They cannot be read off a menu of levels in advance...My central point is that levels of 
mechanisms are defined componentially within a hierarchically organized mechanism, 
not by objective kinds identifiable independently of their organization in a mechanism.” 
(Craver 2007a, 191; emphasis added)
Consequently, the character of the levels concept according to the mechanistic account, i.e. 
what  levels  can  be  taken  to  mean,  is  also  radically  contextualized.  Claims  involving  a 
particular layout of levels, which is identified in terms of explanatory relevance (see Section 
2.3.4) for detailing a particular mechanism cannot be extrapolated to other phenomena that, 
e.g.,  make  reference  to  the  same  kinds  of  structures  for  its  respective  explanation.  This 
immediately distances the mechanistic conception of levels from the layer-cake account. In 
contrast to the layer-cake account, the mechanistic account introduces the levels concept only 
insofar as it aids in uncovering the structure of a (particular) explanatory mechanism. This 
means that however a level is identified in a specific case, any claim regarding levels is only 
meant to hold with respect to that particular case, to that particular mechanism. 
Indeed, the motivation for this radically contextualized approach to understanding levels is 
often expressed as a strong antipathy to the features of the layer-cake account. In this regard, 
advocates of the mechanistic account of levels sometimes argue as if  any generalizability 
implies a commitment to Oppenheim and Putnam's (1958) conception of levels. Craver, for 
instance, clarifies the appeal of the mechanistic conception of levels in terms of its rejection 
of the layer-cake account. He says: “The idea of monolithic [layer-cake] levels of nature that I 
reject can be generated by abstracting from interlevel relations among particulars to interlevel 
relations among types”. (Craver 2007a, 191). For this point, Craver introduces three different 
statements that make the contextualized approach of the mechanistic account clear.  These 
statements include:
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“(a) This pyramidal cell is at a lower level of mechanisms than this hippocampus. 
(b) Pyramidal cells are at a lower level of mechanisms than hippocampi. 
(c) Cells are at a lower level of mechanisms than organs.” (ibid. emphasis added) 
Claims involving levels in the mechanistic account include those like (a), which is strongly 
constrained to a certain cell in a particular hippocampus. Claims like (b) and (c), on the other  
hand, are identified by Craver as typical of “monolithic” accounts of levels like the layer-cake 
account.50 Claims like these are unacceptable, he argues, because they contain an inherent 
ambiguity in them whereby it becomes unclear whether a global statement about the world is 
hidden within such claims (ibid. 192). More specifically, Craver is worried that claims like (b) 
and (c) can be interchangeably interpreted with the following claims: “(b1) The pyramidal 
cells that compose hippocampi are at lower levels than hippocampi, and (b2)  All  pyramidal 
cells are at a lower level than  all hippocampi” (ibid. 191, emphasis added). While (b1) is 
“unproblematic and consistent” with the mechanistic account, claims like (b2) simply make 
no sense, because there is no embedding mechanism to give the things organized by levels in 
these claims a basis of comparison. As Craver says: “To put the point differently, on my view 
of levels, it makes no sense to ask if my heart is at a different level of mechanisms than my 
car's  water  pump  because  there  is  no  mechanism containing  the  two  (except  in  bizarre 
science-fiction cases, in which case talk of levels might be appropriate)” (ibid. 191). At a first 
glance, this may appear an odd shift in emphasis, but in fact points to an important motivation 
for the radically contextualized approach of the mechanistic account. Namely,  any  kind of 
general claim or statement containing levels that is not contextualized by the New Mechanist 
framework (in particular the presence of a mechanism) seems committed to something like 
the layer-cake account. And the layer-cake account, it seems, regularly produces conundrums 
involving  ordering  hearts  and  water  pumps  against  one  another  in  a  layout  of  levels  of 
organization. Once again, Craver (2007a):
“As with my heart and the water pump, it makes no sense to ask if pyramidal cells are at  
50 More particularly, Craver attributes statements like (b) to Wimsatt's prototype characterization of levels, and 
statements like (c) to the layer-cake account. This distinction will not be relevant here, because, according to  
Craver, both the statements of (b) and (c) both suffer from the same problems (ibid. 191-192).
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a lower level than hippocampi generally [as in the case of (b2) above]. Some pyramidal 
cells are at a lower mechanistic level than [i.e. compose] hippocampi, and some are not.  
Precisely the same ambiguity attends (c), the monolithic view of levels that Oppenheim 
and Putnam (1958) propose.” (ibid. 192)
Though an antipathy to the layer-cake account is understandable (see especially Chapter 3), 
the  radical  extent  to  which  levels  of  organization  are  contextualized  in  the  mechanistic 
account is problematic.51 In referring to levels of organization, scientists are interested in more 
than token explanatory statements that only hold in the context of one study or even one 
mechanism; i.e. they are interested in expressing some generality with their explanations. This 
generality  may  not  end  up  being  lawfulness  or  lawlikeness  (especially  in  the  biological 
sciences), but it seems unjustifiably construed to avoid any identification with the layer-cake 
account,  be its  particular  conception of levels (as here),  the theoretical  reductionism with 
which it is associated (ibid. 230), or the Unity of Science thesis that it is meant to support 
(ibid. 193, Ch. 7). This in turn puts into question what precisely the mechanist means by their 
emphasis on contextualized characterizations of levels. Levels, officially, are only useful in 
the context of a particular mechanism. At the same time, though, given that statements like 
(b1) above “unproblematic and consistent” with the mechanistic account of levels, it seems 
plausible that the mechanistic account could be modified to accommodate more generality to 
its framework of levels. As it stands, however, the radically contextualized conceptualization 
of levels in the mechanistic account is far too restrictive to be of general use as an account of 
levels of organization in science.
51 Craver seems to have backed off from from the stance that “'levels of mechanisms' captures the  central  
explanatory  sense  [alternatively:  most  relevant;  ibid.,  164]  in  which  explanations  in  neuroscience  (and 
elsewhere in the special sciences) span multiple levels.” (2007a, 163; emphasis added), and now appears to 
defend a  more  blatantly pluralistic  attitude  (2015),  but  still  emphasizes  the  primacy of  the  mechanistic 
account (ibid.).
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2.3.2  Principled  Rejection  of  Correspondence  Between  Science  and 
Nature
Another characteristic feature of the mechanistic account is its  principled rejection of any 
levels-mediated  correspondence  between nature  and science.  This  rejection  occurs  in  two 
steps.  The  first  step  involves  the  rejection  of  the  postulated  correspondence  between  the 
nature  and  science.  This  feature  of  the  mechanistic  account  exploits  a  distinction  in  the 
concept of 'levels of organization', namely “levels of nature and “levels of science” (Craver 
2007a, 171). “Levels of nature” comprises an ontological ordering of the objects of the world, 
whereas “levels of science” comprises an epistemic ordering of the units  and products of 
science (e.g., scientific disciplines and theories or explanations, respectively). 
The mechanistic  account  flatly rejects  any direct  levels-mediated correspondence between 
science and nature in both of these forms. Products of science (like theories and explanations) 
simply  do  not  line  up  neatly  with  the  objects  of  the  world,  regardless  of  how they are 
represented  by levels  of  organization.  Rather,  theories  and  explanations  in  the  biological 
sciences often refer to natural objects  located multiple levels simultaneously,  and actively 
incorporate  interlevel  connections  into  them (Schaffner  1993,  97-99;  Craver  2007a,  9-16; 
Bechtel  2008,  148-157).  Likewise,  units  of  science  (like  scientific  disciplines  or  fields) 
regularly  investigate  multiple  levels  simultaneously:  nothing  prohibits  disciplines  like 
molecular  biology  and  ecology  from  investigating  or  explaining  things  at  various 
organizational  levels.  Consequently,  no  strict  correspondence  exists  between  nature  and 
science, at least as expressed by the levels concept.
The second step in rejecting the correspondence thesis involves a more general rejection of 
the coherence of  an epistemic  conception  of  levels  (here,  levels  of  science).  The task of 
ordering scientific investigative or explanatory activities, and the products of those activities, 
into a sleek, well-defined hierarchical ordering simply does not work, the mechanists argue, 
because  of  the  role  that  interdisciplinary  contributions  play  in  contemporary  biological 
research. Similarly, individual researchers are also not beholden to any rigid, single-discipline 
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approach. Consequently, “[biological disciplines like] [c]ontemporary neuroscience thus do 
not  fit  Oppenheim  and  Putnam's  hierarchical  structure.  Fields,  journals,  and  scientific 
organizations are now organized around interfield collaborations to such an extent that it is no 
longer possible to resolve [e.g.] neuroscience into well-defined strata of research” (ibid. 176).
Again, a strong motivation for this feature of the mechanistic account, in both of its steps,  
appears  to  be an  attempt  to  distance  the  account  from the  layer-cake  account  offered  by 
Oppenheim and Putnam (1958). In this regard, Craver articulates this point as the “primary 
criticism” of the layer-cake account, saying:
“My primary criticism, however, is not of the simplicity or descriptive inadequacy of 
[the  layer-cake  account's]  vision  of  the  world...Rather,  I  object  to  the  supposed 
correspondence  between  levels  of  nature,  levels  of  units,  and  levels  of  products  of 
science.  Oppenheim and Putnam do not seem to recognize any difficulty in moving 
freely  between  these  different  conceptions  of  levels...In  neuroscience  [and  other 
biological sciences], this tidy correspondence breaks down.” (Craver 2007a, 174-175, 
emphasis added)
As commented above concerning the feature of contextualization of the mechanistic account, 
such an antipathy for the layer-cake account is not in itself dubious or problematic.52 At the 
same time, it is one thing to reject an entire account, or rather the problematic elements of that 
account, and another thing to reject anything taken to resemble that account.53
52 The reasons for this will be explored in more detail in the following chapter.
53 The degree to which levels can or cannot help to order epistemic items is unclear. Though it is clear that a  
sweeping, comprehensive account of such an ordering (like that offered by Oppenheim and Putnam (1958)) 
is unsatisfactory, a more local (but not radically local) ordering may be possible. A philosophical justification  
for  this point  will  not  be pursued in this dissertation, but rather  will  be taken as  a  primitive possibility 
because of its  widespread prevalence in scientific  literature (see especially Chapter  4 and Chapter  5).  A 
tentative approach to dealing with this topic in a philosophical context is offered in Brooks (2014).
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2.3.3 Branching Structure 
Levels of organization in mechanisms exhibit a branching structure, rather than a linear one 
(see Figure 2.3 above).  This feature of mechanistic levels captures two further aspects of 
mechanistic explanations. Firstly, it expresses the fact that the components of a mechanism do 
not designate homogeneous entities that are unified only in terms of being 'lower-level'  to 
some whole. Rather, the components of a mechanism each contribute, in a very specific way, 
to  the  production  of  the  phenomenon.  In  the  layer-cake  model,  lower-level  entities  were 
grouped  together  into  one  unified  “universe  of  discourse”,  which  designated  the  entities 
belonging to a particular level solely in terms of whether they were typically investigated by a 
corresponding science. Secondly, each component of a mechanism can itself be composed of 
several  further  sub-components,  which  are  located  at  even  lower  levels  than  the  item in 
question is located. Insofar as this is the case, the compositional hierarchies of the respective 
components are also distinct from one another. Craver and William Bechtel (2007) identify 
this as one of the principle advantages of conceptualizing levels according to the mechanistic 
account:
“[L]evels  of  mechanisms are  not  monolithic  divides  across  all  of  nature.  Levels  of 
mechanisms are defined locally, within the context of a given type of mechanism. One is 
thinking of levels as monolithic divides across all of nature when one thinks of levels as  
levels  of  sciences  (e.g.,  economics,  psychology,  biology,  chemistry,  physics;  see 
Oppenheim  and  Putnam  1958)  or  as  levels  of  entities  (e.g.,  societies,  individuals, 
organs, molecules, atoms).” (Craver and Bechtel 2007, 550)
The branching structure that the mechanistic account introduces to the hierarchical ordering of 
levels  is  a  strict  improvement  over  the  linear  structure  offered  by the  layer-cake  model. 
Specifically, postulating a linear structure to the character of organizational levels only makes 
sense with an implicit commitment to some conception of the Unity of Science, which, as 
seen above, is one of the primary motives behind Oppenheim and Putnam's (1958) paper. This 
commitment, which the mechanistic account rejects, allows for differences between distinct 
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entities,  organized  within  or  between  levels,  to  be  effectively  expressed.  Though  the 
mechanistic  account  makes  this  point  in  the context  of  defending a  particular  account  of 
explanation, this point can be evaluated on different merits (see especially Chapter 5). 
2.3.4 Constitutive Relevance
Levels of organization in a mechanism comprise the interacting components that make up the 
behaviors of a phenomenon for which an explanation is sought. As explained above in Section 
2.3.1,  this  means  that  organizational  levels  in  the  mechanistic  account  are  defined, 
exclusively,  in  terms of the part-whole relations that  hold within a mechanism between a 
specific  phenomenon  and  its  parts.  However,  identifying  the  levels  of  organization  that 
compose a given mechanism is not done haphazardly, i.e.  completely relativistically. Rather, 
each mechanism is accompanied by certain relevance criteria that serve to decide what levels 
(and  more  specifically  the  components  located  at  these  levels)  actually  compose  that 
mechanism.  These  criteria  specify  whether  the  certain  things  constitute  components  of  a 
mechanism or not, and, ipso facto, they also specify what levels of organization are involved 
in the working of that mechanism. 
Though the specific details pertaining to what component is being discussed (or what level or 
levels are involved) will certainly be context-dependent, both will be identified by checking 
whether  they exhibit  constitutive relevance  to  the  mechanism in question.  Detailing  what 
exactly constitutive relevance means, Craver specifies, goes hand in hand with whether or not 
the putative component is  explanatorily relevant to the phenomenon in question. That is, a 
putative  component  for  a  mechanism  will  be  constitutive  of  that  mechanism  if  it  is 
explanatorily relevant to that mechanism, and vice versa (Craver 2007b, 3). Establishing this 
relevance is accomplished by performing empirical tests on these prospective components, 
and  the  wholes  to  which  they  putatively  belong.  These  tests,  described  by  Craver  as 
“interlevel experiments” (Craver 2007b, 12-13), are illustrated in Figure 2.4.
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Figure 2.4 Interlevel experiments for testing constitutive relevance in a mechanism. Intervening to change a 
constituent part of a mechanism at a, respectively, higher or lower level of a mechanism reveals whether the 
lower level putative element in question is really a working part, i.e. component of that mechanism. When one  
can intervene both in a top-down and bottom-up manner, this means that the “mutual manipulability” condition  
of constitutive relevance is fulfilled (Craver 2007a, 151-154). Figure taken from Craver 2007a, 146 (cf. also 
Craver 2007b, 12).
These  interlevel  experiments  operate  by  introducing  a  change  to  the  mechanism,  and 
observing whether a change occurs on another level. As Figure 2.4 shows, these experiments 
can be either bottom-up or top-down. In bottom-up experiments, one putative (lower-level) 
component is changed via experimental intervention. If a change occurs in the phenomenon 
(located at  a  high level),  then the object  or entity that  was changed can be considered a 
component of the respective mechanism. Conversely, a specific change can also be introduced 
at the (higher) level of the phenomenon via experimental intervention, and the effects of that 
change can be tracked in a specific (lower-level) component. Using both of these kinds of 
tests  together  to  determine  the  constituency  of  a  mechanism results  in  the  condition  of 
“mutual manipulability” being met,  whereby the components (and levels)  belonging to an 
explanatory mechanism can be uncovered. At the same time however, the general character of 
these  tests,  the  details  of  this  “mutual  manipulability”  must  be  specified  differently  for 
different mechanisms and even different components within a single mechanism. 
So, what counts as a component of a mechanism, and thereby what levels of organization are 
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involved in the explanation of a particular phenomenon, is only specifiable on a case-by-case 
basis. Given this, and in stark contrast to the layer-cake account, the mechanistic account of 
levels allows for rampant level-skipping when searching for an explanation in the sense that 
stepwise compositional continuity is not present in real scientific part-whole relationships.54 
This point complements the discussion above in Section 2.3.1: In particular, the things that 
designate components of a mechanism will not be identified in terms of some inherently given 
relation to other things in the world (of which they are a part), but rather in terms of their  
location within a given mechanism. For this reason, the hierarchical layout of one particular 
mechanistic explanation may or may not be comparable to other hierarchical layouts given in 
other contexts. Not all levels of organization will be relevant to explaining all explananda.
This feature of the mechanistic account of levels also guarantees that the conception of levels 
that it offers will be strongly contextualized in character. Since levels of organization can only 
be specified in connection to a particular mechanism, after it can be specified what constitutes 
a component of that mechanism, this makes any generalizations concerning the levels concept 
(including their identity and characteristics) completely context-dependent.
2.4 Conclusion
The layer-cake account is the default conception of levels of organization in philosophy. It's 
depiction of  levels,  however,  reveals  that  philosophers  use the  term interchangeably with 
many other ideas. Section 2.2 showed that extracting a conception of levels from the many 
references to the layer-cake account is a subtle task, because the concept is used, variously, as 
justification for one claim (such as the viability of Oppenheim and Putnam's micro-reduction 
relation, or as support for the anti-reductionism thesis in Kitcher (1984)). Nonetheless, when 
this conception is extracted from these other ideas, the characteristic features of the layer-cake 
account uncover a source of questionable ideas associated with the term.
54 See the discussion on “direct composition” in Section 3.2.1 below.
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First, the scope of the layer-cake account is global, and is meant to hold for all entities of  
nature. This leads to difficulties when trying to articulate in detail what levels of organization 
represent about the world, since trying to find a singular account of what all things in the 
world  have  in  common such that  they are  related  together  under  one concept  will  prove 
difficult, if not impossible. In particular, the skeptical arguments against the concept of levels 
that have been developed in recent years focus on the attempt of the layer-cake account to 
accomplish this task. This issue will be the focus of the next chapter. 
Secondly,  the definitional criterion posited by the layer-cake account is one of part-whole 
composition. However, there is no one interpretation for what this exactly means for those 
who refer to the layer-cake account of levels. Oppenheim and Putnam (1958) avoided talking 
in concrete terms about the material relations between particular objects in nature, and instead 
relied on the ability of their micro-reduction relation to derive explanatory laws  about the 
things in nature at a given level (Ln) from the laws about other things composing those things 
located at  the next  adjacent  level  (Ln-1).  This  strategy continued throughout  other  debates 
concerning  reductionism,  and  was  used  widely  by  reductionists  and  anti-reductionists  to 
articulate  their  respective  positions.  That  is,  though  layer-cake  levels  of  organization  are 
posited as an objective feature of the world, their explication often relies on the epistemic 
relations for which they themselves are used to give structure.
Thirdly, the mode in which levels of organization are presented by the layer-cake account is 
both an epistemic and ontological. That is, levels of organization are depicted as representing 
both an ordering of the world, and a corresponding ordering of the sciences. This follows 
directly  from  the  correspondence  thesis,  which  is  a  central  characteristic  feature  of  the 
account, and is widely accepted by both reductionists and anti-reductionists that utilize the 
concept of levels.
Finally, the wide and tangled variety of uses of the levels concept by advocates of the layer-
cake account  belies  an overarching feature found in instances of layer-cake depictions  of 
72
Chapter Two: Philosophical Conceptions of Levels
levels.  This feature comprises the use of 'levels of organization',  as conceptualized by the 
layer-cake account, as a structural feature that shaped the debate in which it was embedded. 
As detailed in this section, the levels concept is applied in order to articulate the particular 
claims at stake in the debate surrounding reductionism and anti-reductionism. Furthermore, 
this is a goal that is Reductionist positions like that expressed in Oppenheim and Putnam 
(1958) rely on levels of organization in order to express the give meaning to their claim that  
sciences are moving toward Unity, and that this Unity would proceed as the sciences located 
at one level of organization would be reduced to the one located below it at the adjacent level 
below it. Anti-reductionists like Kitcher (1984), similarly, rely on the levels of organization to 
justify their assertions that higher-level disciplines will not reduce to lower-level ones. Further 
significant  consequences  of  these  widespread  associations  of  the  layer-cake  account  with 
other philosophical debates and positions will be discussed in the next chapter.
The mechanistic account of levels provides a stark counterpoint to the layer-cake conception 
of levels. In fact, almost every aspect of the mechanistic account comprises a direct rejection 
of some aspect of Oppenheim and Putnam's (1958) conception of levels. The mechanistic 
account shifts the focus of understanding levels from issues of unifying nature and science to 
issues  of  contextualized  approaches  to  understanding  scientific  explanation,  explanatory 
relevance,  and  actual  scientific  practice.  Though  these  motivations  are  also  directly 
responsible  for  the  popularity  of  the  New  Mechanist  philosophy,  they  also  make  the 
mechanistic conception of levels of limited use for a general analysis of the levels concept. 
For  one  thing,  the  mechanistic  conception  of  levels  only  makes  sense  in  the  context  of 
specifying what a mechanism is, and what it means for a mechanism to explain. Extrapolating 
this  conception  of  levels  outside  of  mechanistic  explanation  is  not  possible,  due  to  the 
concept's dependence on a mechanism for contextualization.
Firstly,  the  scope  of  levels  exhibited  by this  account  is  radically  contextualized.  For  the 
mechanists, levels of organization are only useful insofar as they represent the structure of an 
explanatory mechanism. More specifically,  levels of organization within a mechanism can 
only be identified and described in relation to a specific phenomenon, whose workings are to 
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be uncovered by the mechanism that produces it. For this reason, levels are not generalizable 
beyond the instances of the particular mechanistic layout in which they are locally specified. 
This  signifies  a  radical  departure  from  the  layer-cake  account,  which  posited  levels  as 
encompassing  the  whole  of  nature,  and as  a  portrayal  of  the  structure  of  nature  holding 
independently of science.
Secondly, the definitional criterion of levels exhibited by the mechanistic account is one of 
part-whole composition. Though this resembles the criterion used in the layer-cake account, 
the mechanistic account of levels conceptualizes composition in a radically different way than 
the  former.  Whereas  the  reductionists  and  anti-reductionists  advocates  of  the  layer-cake 
account  expressed  composition  as  the  relations  holding  sum  universes  of  discourse 
investigated by a “core” scientific discipline, the mechanists postulated constitutive relevance 
as a technical term by which to define the membership of a particular structure as a working 
component  in  a  mechanism.  The  mechanists  place  great  value  in  a  clearly  specifiable 
composition relation, but only because of its importance to understanding what a mechanism 
is and how it explains natural phenomena.
Finally, the mode in which levels are depicted is unambiguously ontological. Craver's (2007a, 
ch. 5) analysis of levels explicitly rejects any meaningful association with between levels of 
organization  and  scientific  disciplines.  Bechtel  (2008)  echoes  these  sentiments. 
Organizational  levels,  according to  the mechanists,  pick out  actual  entities  in  nature,  and 
which  disciplines  investigate  these  entities  are  determined  by  context  (i.e.  relative  to  a 
particular  phenomenon).  Identifying  levels  in  a  mechanism is  accomplished when mutual 
manipulability experiments can be accomplished.
This chapter has summarized and analyzed the two most prominent conceptions of levels of 
organization  in  philosophy.  These  two  conceptions,  the  layer-cake  account  and  the 
mechanistic account, are in many ways antipodal positions. For one thing, their characteristic 
features  are  completely  different  from one  another.  This,  at  least  in  for  the  mechanistic 
account, is deliberate, because of the numerous issues that the layer-cake introduces in its 
74
Chapter Two: Philosophical Conceptions of Levels
conception  of  levels.  More  importantly,  both  accounts  of  levels  were  tailored  for  very 
different  types  of  issues  and  very  different  debates.  The  layer-cake  account,  originally 
embedded  in  Oppenheim and  Putnam's  argument  for  the  Unity  of  Science,  later  became 
associated with the debates concerning theoretical reductionism and anti-reductionism. The 
problematic element of the account have endured in these embedding debates, leading to a 
general skepticism of the levels concept (see Ch. 3). The mechanistic conception of levels, on 
the other hand, is embedded in the New Mechanist framework of mechanistic explanation. 
Since this account is largely hostile of the classical layer-cake conception, and especially any 
generalized conception of levels, the account does not offer itself to further analysis at this 
time, given its inherent commitment to another concept, that of a 'mechanism'. Some steps 
have  been  taken  to  analyze  the  mechanistic  conception  of  levels  (notably,  Eronen  2013; 
2014), but reception of the mechanistic account of levels outside of its embedding framework 
of mechanistic explanation remains rather critical  in terms of its importance to an overall 
conception of levels (ibid.).
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Chapter Three: Levels Skepticism
3.1 Introduction
In recent years, a number of doubts have emerged against the use of the levels concept in 
philosophy and science, resulting in a growing overall attitude of levels skepticism. The crux 
of  this  skepticism,  however,  rests  on  philosophical  reconstructions  of  levels,  which  were 
detailed in the last chapter. Several lines of argument have been constructed. Firstly, one line 
of argument  holds that  levels  constitutes a  flawed concept  that,  while  perhaps  capable of 
minimal refinement, does not have any useful application in either philosophy or science. 
Another line of skeptical argument holds that the concept of levels is not only useless, but also 
misleading. That is, skeptics claim that the notion of levels is a pernicious idea that leads to 
confusing or false ways of thinking about phenomena in biology. A third, more principled, 
criticism of the levels concept is the charge that its importance for science has been largely 
exaggerated by philosophers. That is, the concept of levels of organization is  irrelevant to 
scientific practice, and has been wrongly emphasized by philosophers as an important term 
for characterizing the way that biologists construct knowledge of the world. These ideas must 
be considered,  and disarmed,  before any role  for  levels  in  the biological  sciences  can be 
entertained.
3.2 Levels – A Flawed, Misleading, and Irrelevant Concept? 
Burton  S.  Guttman  (1976)  is  particularly  critical  of  the  concept  of  levels.  Guttman 
acknowledges both the ubiquity of the term in biology and the relative lack of any sustained 
analysis of its precise meaning (Guttman 1976, 112). However, Guttman also believes that a 
compelling defense of the levels concept will not be forthcoming, even if a sustained analysis 
of the concept were to be offered. He claims, rather, that the levels concept thrives, and must  
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thrive, on its ambiguity, saying: “I contend that, if it is stated in any but the sloppiest and most 
general terms, it is a  useless  and even  misleading  concept” (Guttman 1976, 112; emphasis 
added). Angela Potochnik and Brian McGill (2012) share this skeptical attitude of looking for 
a defensible conception of levels, and assert furthermore that “[t]he search for a universal 
hierarchical ordering with any broad significance is futile” (Potochnik and McGill 133).
3.2.1 The Levels Concept is Flawed
The first argument against levels that will be considered is the charge that it is an inherently 
flawed  and  therefore  useless  concept  for  philosophy  and  science.  Guttman  (1976)  and 
Potochnik and Brian McGill  (2012) develop this  line of  thought  particularly clearly.  The 
concept of levels of organization, they argue, is useless because the descriptions of the world 
that it constructs are radically false, and so cannot support the various philosophical claims 
that it is purported to support.
Consider  first  the  critical  comments  offered  by  Guttman.  He  begins  by  observing  the 
widespread reference of the concept, citing two introductory textbooks that were common at 
the  time.  Guttman,  himself  a  biologist  and  author  of  several  introductory  textbooks 
(Biological Principles  1971,  Understanding Biology  1983, and  Biology  1998) expresses his 
extreme  disdain  of  the  levels  of  organization  concept  in  his  (1976)  paper  “Is  'Levels  of 
Organization'  a  Useful  Biological  Concept?”.  In  his  commentary,  Guttman entertains  two 
different  definitions  of  the  levels  concept,  and  finds  both  deeply  problematic.  The  first 
interpretation  focuses  on  the  levels  concept  as  a  universalized  statement  of  global 
compositional relations among the hierarchical strata, while the second focuses on levels as 
mediators of types of causal interactions between two (uni-level) systems. Attending to the 
former,  compositional,  statement  of  what  levels  of  organization  amounts  to,  Guttman 
entertains the following definition:
Compositional  Definition:  “[E]very system of  level  n  is  made  entirely  and  exclusively  of 
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systems of level n-1.” (ibid. emphasis modified)
Interpreting the levels concept as positing compositional relations between levels in this way, 
Guttman claims,  is  “patently false”.  His  argument  for  this  rests  on  the  wide  presence  of 
counterexamples that falsify the “entirely” and “exclusively” qualifiers to the compositional 
“made of” relation offered in the definition. Entities or systems at one level (Ln) simply are 
not exhaustively nor entirely “made of” entities or systems at the adjacent lower level (Ln-1): 
Rather, there is an important sense in which entities or systems are composed of things at 
levels located at lower strata than the respective adjacent level (i.e. where Ln-x < Ln-1). For 
instance,  in  considering  blood as  an  entity  or  system belonging  to  the  tissue-level,  it  is 
obvious that blood is not exhaustively composed of the entities at the immediately adjacent 
level,  i.e.  cells. Rather, blood is somehow  directly composed of a range of entities whose 
level-placement spans strata of various,  non-adjacent altitudes in addition to germane cell 
entities like lymphocytes (white blood cells) and erythrocytes (red blood cells). Such entities 
include large- and small-scale biomolecules (so-called because they are synthesized by the 
living organism itself) such as proteins, sugars, and lipids (corresponding to the former) and 
vitamins,  metabolites,  and  hormones  (corresponding  to  the  latter).  Indeed,  even  physical 
things such as chemical molecular-level entities like water  (which constitutes 92% of the 
liquid volume of blood) and molecular oxygen (O2) also directly compose blood. This kind of 
counterexample can be replicated for entities in almost any chosen altitudinal stratum of the 
levels hierarchy overarching the biological world. In a similar manner, ecological ecosystems 
are not only composed of (adjacently located) communities of various populations, but also of 
non-biological  parameters  that  also  make  up  the  ecological  environment,  such  as  soil 
constituents (bacteria, pesticides), sources of water, and temperature. Likewise, cells are not 
only made of organelles, but also of a host of proteins and macro- and micromolecules within 
the intracellular cellular matrix that do not directly compose the hierarchically intermediate 
organelle structures. 
The point here is that “direct components” of the entities of any given level of organization 
will almost always include entities whose compositional relation to the system of interest is 
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not mediated by the adjacent (Ln-1) level.55 As a result, the levels concept, interpreted by the 
strict compositional criterion given above, does not appear to be a useful for capturing the 
structure of entities of the biological world. Potochnik and McGill (2012) endorse a similar 
conception of levels for their analysis (see, however, section 3.3.2), and argue that such a 
problematic  conception  of  levels  undercuts  the  metaphysical,  epistemic-explanatory,  and 
causal significance of levels. The main problem with the concept of levels, which undercuts 
all these facets of significance, is the “uniformity”56 that the concept imposes onto nature. 
This agrees with the criticism of Guttman developed above. “Metaphysically” speaking, the 
“uniformity”  in  the  above  definition  of  levels  (which  they  claim  is  most  commonly 
encountered in science and philosophy) simply fails to reconstruct adequate depictions of the 
world. Potochnik and McGill enumerate: 
“Indeed, the very notion of stratified levels depends on not only the ubiquity, but also 
the uniformity,  of part-whole composition.  For strata to emerge,  atoms must always 
compose molecules, populations must always compose communities, and so forth. But 
the uniformity of composition needed for stratified levels simply does not exist.” (2012, 
126)
Potochnik  and  McGill  are  cautious  concerning  their  assertion  that  the  composition-based 
descriptions of nature that emerge from the levels concept are false. In particular, they are 
specifically critical of the exhaustive and exclusive nature with which the concept of levels is 
developed. This “uniformity”, they say, should not result in rejecting the claim that things are 
composed of other things, but rather how this compositional relation is spelled out: “It may be 
that every whole is composed of smaller parts. We do not question that claim here. But it is 
certainly not the case that every whole is composed of only parts at the next lower level” 
(ibid. 127). This, according to Potochnik and McGill, undercuts the metaphysical significance 
of levels, since composition is a major element belonging to the concept of levels.
55 Of course, Ln-level entities are partially composed of adjacent Ln-1-level entities notwithstanding the presence 
of such 'free-standing' direct components. See section 5.3.2.1.
56 Their term “uniformity”, as will be seen below, can be read as a direct consequence of the ‘comprehensive 
character’ of the conception of levels that they entertain.
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This  failure  of  the  levels  concept  to  construct  accurate  descriptions  of  the  world  also 
supposedly undercuts the concept's purported epistemic significance in organizing different 
explanatory statements based on levels (see below).  In Chapter 2, the two conceptions of 
levels  that  were  discussed  emphasized  that  the world's  hierarchical  structure  is  of  central 
significance to understanding how the concept aids scientific explanation. However, the levels 
skeptics also claim that the levels concept  alone is not sufficient to draw any conclusions 
about explanatory efforts in science:
“Most  basically,  granting  the  existence  of  part-whole  composition  and mereological 
supervenience is not sufficient support for the idea that theories and representations are 
related in  these ways.  Metaphysical  determination  is  a  relation among properties  at 
different  levels;  this  does not straightforwardly dictate the explanatory or epistemic  
relationship  among  the  theories  that  have  been  formulated  about  phenomena  at  
different  levels.”  (Potochnik  and  McGill  2012,  130,  emphasis  modified; See  also 
Guttman (1976, 113).
The conclusions that are drawn from the view of nature offered by levels of organization 
cannot be supported by such a simplistic representation of nature. This is sufficient to see that 
the  concept  of  levels  is  not  a  useful  concept  for  either  science  or  philosophy.  Hence, 
Potochnik and McGill conclude: “In our view, the many overly ambitious conclusions drawn 
from the simple fact of part-whole composition – and the persistence of those conclusions – 
demonstrate that hierarchical stratification is not useful as a general conception of ecology or  
science” (2012, 126; emphasis added). Guttman agrees with this conclusion, but hints that the 
apparent uselessness is only part of the problem with the levels concept: “If there is any other 
possible interpretation of the concept of levels of organization that is at all meaningful or 
useful, I would like to hear about it. Obviously, I consider it an idea that ought to be dropped 
or drastically deemphasized in all teaching” (1976, 113). Another problem with the levels 
concept, as Burton mentions in this passage, is that the levels concept is misleading. This 
problem will be discussed in the next section.
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3.2.2 The Levels Concept is Misleading
The abundance of counterexamples to the above definition of levels does not only show the 
concept  to  be  useless.  Rather,  the  general  uselessness  resulting  from the  false  examples 
produced by the levels concept also  misleads  scientists by supporting “dangerous ways of 
thinking” (Guttman 1976, 112) about the things that supposedly populate the different ranks 
of the hierarchy of the world. Biologists invested in this compositional interpretation of levels 
seriously misconstrue  how biological  phenomena are  organized  as  objects  of  explanatory 
inquiry. This can be instantiated in two types of misconstruals. Firstly, the levels concept, 
interpreted  as  exhaustive  composition  relations  between  entities  of  adjacent  levels,  leads 
scientists  to  mistakenly  categorize  groups  of  entities  under  demarcational  units  that 
fundamentally misconstrue the differences between otherwise distinct entities that nominally 
should be grouped into the same level-bound type of entity. Take for example the level of 
'organisms'. Organisms (here, Ln) are supposed to be exclusively and exhaustively composed 
of organs (Ln-1), which are composed of tissues (Ln-2),  which are composed of cells (Ln-3). 
However,  organisms,  so  construed,  assumes  a  decisive  bias  towards  conceptualizing 
organisms as multicellular, though there are clearly widespread examples of “organisms” that 
do not fit this description. Unicellular organisms57 such as bacteria and archaebacteria form 
entire taxonomic domains separate from multicellular life forms, while other unicellular life 
such as various forms of algae, amoebae, and some fungi populate a diverse range of phyla 
within  eukaryotic  forms  of  life,  thereby  sharing  their  taxonomic  classification  with 
multicellular relatives (as is the case for fungi and algae). This issue can be reiterated in any 
respective compositional hierarchies that include such problematic taxa, and the conceptual 
confusion of determining what things like “organisms” (or algae or fungi, which appear to 
populate  a  number  of  distinct  levels)  are  composed  of  is  reiterated  for  each  successive 
compositional stratum. 
This  quickly  leads  to  a  general  conundrum  that  also  undermines  the  significance  and 
57 Acellular  organisms,  if  they exist  (or  better:  insofar  as  things  like  viruses  can  clearly be  designated  as  
“organisms”),  would  be  another  problematic  kind  of  “organism”  that  strays  decisively  from  the 
organizational framework for nature that the present conception of levels gives us. 
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usefulness of the levels concept. For instance, when one attempts to clarify the component 
parts of unicellular  organisms, there is a temptation to consider structural components like 
organelles within unicellular life as analogous 'organs'. Yet, according to the conception of 
levels entertained above, 'organelles' are supposed to designate their own organizational level, 
at least insofar as organisms themselves are composed (in whatever way) of cells. Moreover, 
the organizational significance of cell organelles like mitochondria in the somatic cells that 
compose  multicellular  organisms  are  then  radically  different  for  unicellular  organisms 
composed of  completely different  kinds  of  structures.  The  units  around which  levels  are 
demarcated seem to dissipate into a deeply confused misconstrual of nature. This misconstrual 
lies in the inherent conceptual confusion in the terms that reference to levels take as primary 
for giving structure to the world, against which the distinctions in nature it means to elucidate 
can  be  based.  “Organism”  and  “organ”  are  themselves  not  conceptually  clear,  and  this 
ambiguity is imported into the levels concept. Yet, given the stringent definition of levels most 
often entertained by scientists and philosophers (see Section3.2.1) purports to generalize the 
false organizational structure it represents to all of nature. This inference is, however, highly 
misleading.
A second misconstrual is offered by Guttman, building on the first just  discussed.  This is 
somewhat hyperbolic and will only be mentioned in passing. If, Guttman claims, scientists 
decide to sidestep the issues of clarifying the demarcational units  by which levels should 
structure the world (such as “organism”, or “organ”,  etc.),  and choose instead to bite the 
conceptual bullet (thereby accepting the conceptual problems attached to the counterexamples 
that follow from the levels definition), the absurd conclusion must be drawn that scientists 
who study, e.g., unicellular life must be judged as not studying organisms. 
A second  interpretation  of  organizational  levels  is  also  entertained,  and  disparaged,  by 
Guttman:
Interaction Mediator Definition: Interactions between systems of level n are mediated through 
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objects of level n-1 (or some other specific level less than n)58
(ibid, 113)
This definition, says Guttman, “would be a really interesting and useful generalization”. (ibid) 
If true, this definition of levels would allow scientists to construct generalized criteria for 
identifying salient  kinds of interactions between the entities at  any given level.  Alas,  this 
definition also runs afoul of numerous counterexamples like those mentioned above. The only 
difference being that the relation postulated by this levels definition is interaction rather than 
composition. Once again, nature seems to be more complex than is allowed by the levels 
concept. To see this, consider two organisms (organism level Ln) interacting as predator and 
prey,  for  instance  a  rattlesnake  envenomating  a  rabbit.  The  interaction  between  these 
organisms  will  not  be  mediated  exclusively  by  one  single  level,  but  by  many  levels 
simultaneously. The route of envenomation, i.e. delivery of toxins by the snake's fangs into 
the  rabbit's  body,  may  be  tracked  along  several  different  organizational  levels.  The 
significance of these respective levels will be determined largely by a researcher's interest in 
isolating one or several of these levels, instead of others. Snake venom59, whose active agents 
are composed of proteins or enzymes (the “molecular-level”), are already orders of magnitude 
lower  in  the  hierarchical  strata  that  make  up  this  inter-organismal interaction,  but  the 
mediating effects that may attract the interest of a particular group of scientists (e.g. damage 
caused by the toxin's presence as an etiological agent for the rabbit's death) may be located at 
the  tissue-level  (dissolution  of  muscles),  the  organ-level  (degeneration  of  circulatory 
elements),  or  even  remain  at  the  organism-level  (death  by  shock).  The  salient  types  of 
interactions on which scientists may focus between two or more systems at a given level Ln 
are  simply not  mediated  by only one  single  level  Ln-1.  Even granting  that  the  mediating 
elements must not be adjacently located vis-a-vis the level of reference, it is a radically false 
expectation that the entities of only one other level should mediate the interactions of entities 
at another level.
58 This  definitional  criterion  was  not  explored  in  the  above  sections,  but  nonetheless  fits  the  leitmotif  of  
ambiguity surrounding discussions on the levels concept.
59 No  kind  of  snake  venom  contains  only  a  single  active  agent,  hence  toxin  types  like  “neurotoxic”  or  
“hemotoxic” are misnomers (Mackessy 2002).
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The  implication  of  the  foregoing  definition  of  levels  is  that  lower-level  “mediation”  of 
interactions occurs between a type of entity or entities at a given reference level Ln will hold 
universally and wholesale. This, as for the compositional definition above, does not appear to 
be  a  viable  conception  concerning  either  the  character  or  the  significance  of  levels.  The 
interactions in which organisms (or ecosystems, organs, tissues, etc.) engage are not mediated 
solely by one or several levels in any universally generalizable way. Pursuing this line of 
reasoning would result in an unwarranted and unmotivated law-like generalization of the form 
“all interactions between the entities of level Ln are mediated by the entities of level Ln-x or by 
entities located in a concrete constellation (Ln-x  + Ln-x1  + … Ln-xN)”, which regardless of its 
expression implies that the only way conceive of levels, and their uses, is with reference to 
adjacent,  neighboring  levels.  This,  however,  proceeds  completely  independently  of  what 
might be relevant for understanding what is going on at that respective level in the first place.
These kinds of misleading situations strengthen the conclusions of the levels skeptics that the 
levels  concept  is  not  viable.  Guttman hence  concludes:  “If  [concept  of  levels]  were  only 
useless, this issue would not be so important, but since it is misleading as well, I think it is 
time to let the idea die.” (Guttman 1976, 113)
3.2.3 Are Levels of Organization Irrelevant to Science?
One final skeptical argument against the levels concept will be considered here only briefly. 
Though not explicitly articulated by level skeptics, this argument can be constructed from 
intermittent comments given levels skeptics, and concerns the basic motivation for looking at 
the concept of levels in the sciences at all. In other words: Is possible that the significance of 
'levels of organization' for scientific research has simply been exaggerated by philosophers, 
and that the concept in reality carries no, or at least greatly reduced, importance for many 
ideas it is usually taken to express?
Interestingly, the commentary out of which this argument is found appears in conjunction with 
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discussing the epistemic role supposedly carved out by levels of organization in biological 
practice. This supposed role of the levels concept in science, the skeptics claim, belies an 
actual  irrelevance of  levels  for  scientific  practice.  If  true,  this  would  undercut  a  vital 
motivation for any continued philosophical analysis of levels: If 'levels of organization' are 
unimportant for scientific practice, then the concept decisively fails  to be significant in any 
way for philosophy or science.
This epistemic role, Guttman observes, “may be seen as an important way to organize the 
major  ideas  of  biology  for  pedagogy,  and...is  commonly  included  among  the  definitive 
characteristics  of  living  beings,  since  by definition an  organism is  'organized'.”  (Guttman 
1976, 112) In other words, one role that the levels concept plays in biology is to introduce 
themes that express the “major ideas” of biology (see Chapter 4). Potochnik and McGill also 
acknowledge this role of levels, especially in ecology. Noting the wide presence of the levels 
concept in a number of influence introductory textbooks to ecology, they say:
“Editions of these textbooks have been around for decades and have been used to train 
most practicing ecologists today. (Indeed, the second author learned his introductory 
ecology from [Ecology: Individuals, Populations, and Communities  (1986).] over 25 
years ago.) The ecologists writing these textbooks were themselves trained to focus on 
hierarchical organization.” (Potochnik and McGill 2012, 122)
However, if the skeptical arguments discussed in Section 2.3.1 and Section 2.3.2 are correct, it 
doesn't make much sense to apply to a useless and misleading term as a significant epistemic 
tool.  Despite  the  observations  that  the  concept  is  “frequently emphasized  in  introductory 
textbooks” (Guttman 1976, 112) acknowledged by the skeptics above, it follows that 'levels of 
organization' is simply a toy concept that gathers student intuitions together so that for their 
training  as  life  scientists  can  begin.  Eronen (2014)  expresses  a  stronger  suspicion  of  the 
overall  relevance  of  levels,  and  downplays  the  presence  of  the  levels  concept  both  in 
textbooks and in the research literature, at least in the case of some conceptions of levels. He 
says that, in contrast to philosophical attempts to motivate the scientific importance of levels: 
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“In general, [philosophers such as]  Bechtel and Craver [(2007),] may have exaggerated the 
importance of the notion of levels of mechanisms in science.” (Eronen, 2014, 11). 
In contrast to the skeptics, this purported epistemic role attributed to the levels concept will be 
of  substantial  importance.  This  will  be discussed  in  Chapter  4  and Chapter  5,  where  the 
usefulness of the levels concept will be defended in exactly its capacity to “organize the major 
ideas of biology.”
3.3 Considerations of Levels Skepticism
The general theme of skeptical arguments against (global conceptions of) levels is that  the 
biological world is more complicated than the levels concept can represent. As pointed out by 
Guttman (1976) and Potochnik and McGill (2012), counterexamples abound with respect to 
the image of nature resulting from 'levels of organization'. Even worse, the general structure 
of  these  counterexamples  apparently  point  to  deep  problems  confronting  any  attempt  to 
clarify what  is  meant  by the  term 'levels':  Not  only is  the  concept  useless for  scientific 
practice, it actively misleads scientists into implicitly accepting absurd claims about both the 
structure  of  biological  world  as  well  as  disciplinary  profiles  of  working  scientists. 
Furthermore,  another  argument  was  independently constructed  above,  which  claimed that 
philosophical interest in levels is unfounded, because the concept is in fact largely irrelevant 
to scientific practice. Rather, they say, philosophers have exaggerated the importance of the 
term for science. Each of these authors contend that the continued use of a comprehensive 
conception  'levels  of  organization'  in  further  philosophical  (and  scientific)  discussion  is 
unwarranted.
3.3.1 A Straw-Man Conception of Levels
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The arguments against the concept of levels considered above appear compelling, at least in 
their current form. However, their soundness is highly questionable. Though the arguments 
offered above are clearly meant to hold generally for the concept of levels, the authors of 
these arguments only entertain the conception of 'levels' given by the layer-cake account. Seen 
as arguments against  the layer-cake  notion of levels,  the calls  of skeptics to  minimize or 
eliminate the levels concept are understandable, and even justified. For this reason, however, 
the  levels  skeptics  direct  their  arguments  towards  a  straw man.  There  are  other  ways  to 
conceptualize the notion of levels, which should be kept distinct from the layer-cake account 
(see Section 2.3, Chapter 4; Chapter 5).
Recognizing  the  layer-cake  conception  of  levels  in  the  arguments  against  levels  is 
straightforward. Recall from chapter 2 that the layer-cake conception of levels is identifiable 
by four characteristic features: (1) global scope, (2) stepwise compositional continuity,  (3) 
linearity of levels strata, and (4) the correspondence thesis. Of these four features, (2) and (4) 
were said to be the most important for designating a particular account of levels as being 
“layer-cake”. One or both of these features are clearly presented as an identifying feature for 
'levels of organization' in the arguments laid out above. Conceiving of interlevel connections 
as constituting a stepwise continuity is particularly important to levels skeptics' portrayal of 
levels  of  organization.  Guttman  is  forthright  in  his  working  definition  of  levels  wherein 
“every system of level n is made entirely and exclusively of systems of level n-1” (1976, 112, 
emphasis added). Likewise, Potochnik and McGill also heavily rely on this feature in their 
description of the “classical” account of levels:
“The basic idea is that higher-level entities are composed of (and only of) lower-level 
entities, but the prevalent concept of hierarchical organization involves stronger claims  
as well. The compositional hierarchy is often taken to involve stratification into discrete  
and universal levels of organization. It is also often assumed that levels are nested, that 
is, that an entity at any level is composed of aggregated entities at the next lower level.” 
(Potochnik and McGill 2012, 121)60
60 Reconstructing Potochnik and McGill's precise conception of the “classical” account of levels is difficult,  
because they take the “classical” account to encompass three distinct sources. The first of these sources,  
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The correspondence thesis is also cited by the levels skeptics as a defining feature of levels in  
general. Waters is direct in this association, saying:  “The  sciences of biology  [according to 
theoretical  (anti-)reductionism]  are  like  the  layers  of  a  cake,  with  each  layer  aimed  at  
explaining the phenomena that are best explained at the level of organization corresponding  
to that layer...both [reductionism and anti-reductionism ] advance 'layer-cake' pictures” (2010, 
240). 
Interestingly, in choosing the layer-cake notion of levels as their target of criticism, the levels 
skeptics also frequently cite the notion's association with the reductionism debate in order to 
characterize what they take to be levels. Further passages identifying what is meant by 'levels 
of organization' even openly cite the particular reductionist and anti-reductionists programs 
resulting from Oppenheim and Putnam's (1958) paper,  and even the layer-cake theoretical 
(anti-)reductionism  by  its  name,  as  an  impetus  for  their  critical  comments.  Once  again, 
Potochnik and McGill: “This is the apex of the pyramid [of the classical account of levels]  
often used to represent the classic reductionist conception of the whole of science, which 
ultimately bottoms out at subatomic particles (Oppenheim and Putnam 1958).” (2012, 122). 
The above passage cited from Waters (2010, 240) is also especially clear in this association.61
These passages clearly identify the layer-cake account  of levels as the respective authors' 
primary  source  for  conceptualizing  levels  of  organization.  So,  why  is  layer-cake  not  a 
legitimate target for criticizing the concept of levels of organization? The accusation here that 
the levels skeptics are attacking a straw-man can serve for some diagnostic remarks on getting 
the record straight with the role that levels of organization play in scientific practice. In order 
to motivate a renewed analysis of the concept of organizational levels in science, it would 
seem that the levels skeptics' emphasis on the layer-cake notion of levels is indicative of a 
identified  here,  is  the  layer-cake  account  developed  by Oppenheim and Putnam (1958).  The  other  two 
sources include introductory textbooks in science (ibid.) and a relatively unknown paper on organizational 
levels by James K. Feibleman (1954). Combining these three sources and labeling them as the “classical  
account of levels” is a grievous mistake, as these three sources each belong to completely different (global) 
conceptions of 'levels of organization'. The reasons for this will become clearer later, when the latter two of 
these sources are treated in turn in their proper context (see Ch. 5).
61 This  supports  and  expands  upon  the  point  already  broached  in  Section  2.2.5,  where  the  embedding 
frameworks of the layer-cake account was initially discussed.
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tendency in philosophy to associate 'levels of organization' with a slew of unpopular ideas, 
particularly debates concerning theoretical (anti-)reductionism. This tendency, alone, could 
threaten any attempt to uncover the role of levels in scientific reasoning. Namely, whatever 
significance of the levels concept might possess, it will be unattainable if 'levels' are depicted 
as anything resembling the layer-cake notion of levels. 
3.3.2  Guilt  by  Association:  The Layer-Cake Account  as  the  Default 
Conception of Levels
In Chapter 2, it was argued that the layer-cake account of levels is the default conception of 
levels  held  by many philosophers.  As a  consequence of  this  “default”  status,  it  was  also 
pointed out that the term 'levels'  has become deeply associated with philosophical debates 
concerning especially theoretical (anti-)reductionism. This section will explore more deeply 
how the layer-cake notion of levels, as a result of its status as the default conception of levels, 
is responsible for much of the skeptical attitude that philosophers possess against the levels 
concept in general.  The deep association of the layer-cake account of levels with debates 
surrounding  theoretical  reductionism introduces  a  problem in  the  way the  levels  skeptics 
analyze the concept of organizational levels. Namely, the embedment of levels within these 
debates  conflates  features  taken  to  hold  with  the  levels  concept  with  various  other 
commitments and ideas stemming from the layer-cake account of levels  in particular. The 
argument levels skepticism that will emerge will be that insofar as the layer-cake account is 
used to identify 'levels' by the levels skeptics, this makes their criticisms unwarranted.
There are two facets to this dubious association, which need to be distinguished. First is the 
direct association of 'levels of organization' with the  layer-cake account of levels. This has 
resulted in the belief  that the levels concept is  best  characterized in terms of the account 
stemming back to Oppenheim and Putnam's original (1958) conception of levels, discussed in 
the  last  chapter.  Guttman's  treatment  of  levels  shows  this  very  clearly,  and  so  will  be 
emphasized  in  the  below  comments.  The  second  facet  is  the  tacit  assumption,  perhaps 
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resulting  from the  first,  that  'levels  of  organization'  is  indicative  of  one  or  another  idea 
associated with the  layer-cake theoretical  reductionism.  Potochnik and McGill  (2012) are 
especially guilty of this association in their criticism of the levels concept, and so will be 
emphasized accordingly below.
Both of these associations are unwarranted, and serve to undermine the initial appeal of levels 
skepticism.  Concerning  the  former  association,  the  layer-cake  account  of  levels is  an 
extremely unattractive conception of levels, for reasons that are nicely pointed out by the 
skeptical arguments offered above. Concerning the second association, there is no reason to 
suppose  that  endorsing  some  other  conception  of  levels  commits  one  to  an  account  of 
theoretical  (anti-)reductionism,  nor  any  of  the  elements  of  those  accounts.  Theoretical 
(anti-)reductionism is problematic for its own reasons, independently of one's conception of 
levels.
This situation has been perpetuated by the trend, started also by Oppenheim and Putnam and 
reiterated  by  later  reductionists  and  anti-reductionists  such  as  Kitcher  (1984),  to 
instrumentalize  the  layer-cake  notion  of  levels  as  a  central  premise  in  their  respective 
arguments and positions (see Section 2.2.5). Combined now with the tendency of most 'levels 
skeptics' to identify 'levels of organization' solely with the layer-cake conception of levels, it 
is a valid question to what extent the concept of 'levels of organization'  is simply in “bad 
company” as a result of its past associations with layer-cake levels and layer-cake theoretical 
(anti-)reductionism. 
3.3.3 Association of 'Levels' with 'Layer-cake Levels'
The layer-cake notion of levels is extremely problematic. Firstly, notice that the features the 
layer-cake account proposes to represent nature are extremely simplistic. In particular, the 
feature of stepwise compositional continuity asserted by the layer-cake account (section 2.2.2) 
restricts interlevel compositional relations between entities the elements that populate  only 
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adjacent (lower) levels. As a result of this, counterexamples are easily constructed to show 
that the compositional relations of a given biological phenomenon cannot be held to such 
overly stringent criteria. The rigid image of nature and science that follows from this feature 
of layer-cake levels (i.e. stepwise compositional continuity) simply fails to reconstruct any 
useful description of natural systems. For one thing, different things that directly compose a 
given entity  in  nature  can  be  distributed  across  several  levels,  without  any mediation  by 
(higher)  adjacent  levels  where other  direct  components  are  located.  This  was seen in  the 
example of blood, which is located at the tissue level of organization. 
Blood  (Ln)  is  “made  of”  hormones  (small  biomolecules  Ln-3)62 and  chemical  and  atomic 
structures like H2O and molecular oxygen (Ln-4, Ln-5, respectively) in a direct (not distal, i.e., 
not mediated by interspersing levels) and relevant sense that it is “made of” adjacently-located 
cell entities like hematocytes (Ln-1). This is not to say that there some parts located at the 
adjacent level that also directly compose things at the immediately adjacent lower level Ln-1 
(red and white blood cells in the case of blood). It would be quite spooky to think of “floating 
entities”  whose  composition  wholly  skip  underlying  adjacent  levels;  candidates  for  such 
entities  that  come  to  mind  would  include  those  housed  in  the  legendarium of  scientific 
obsolescence (entelechies, élan vital,  phlogiston). In other words: some adjacently-located, 
underlying Ln-1 entities may be necessary to account for the material existence of Ln entities, 
but their role in detailing the composition of something located at a given level Ln is neither 
exclusive nor exhaustive.
Secondly,  it  is  simply  absurd  to  claim that  there  is  anything  approaching  a  strict  1-to-1 
correspondence  between  the  ontological  levels  constituting  nature  and  epistemic  levels 
constituting scientific  disciplines.  This  feature of the layer-cake account  has  already been 
readily  rejected  by  the  New  Mechanists  (see  Section  2.3).  Though  it  may  be  a  hasty 
conclusion that there is no association whatsoever between science and nature that levels can 
capture (see especially Section 5.4.3), the point is well-taken from the mechanist conception 
62 This notation follows the intuitive textbook hierarchy of nature. The exact algebraic representation of the  
following levels' distance from the reference object (blood) is irrelevant. The point is simply that important 
components of almost any given biological entity are not exclusively,  nor exhaustively, exhibited by that  
object's adjacent levels. 
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of levels that the layer-cake understanding of this relation is also extremely simplistic.
Criticism against conceiving compositional relations of biological phenomena as occurring in  
a stepwise fashion  is  hence completely sound and appropriate.  Compositional relations in 
biology simply do not reflect this structure. Similarly,  criticizing the strict correspondence 
between nature and science in the manner that the layer-cake envisions is equally acceptable. 
The layer-cake account of levels, from which these ideas stem, is therefore rightly criticized 
as useless and misleading. However, referring to 'levels of organization' does not commit one 
thereby to understand to a layer-cake understanding of levels. For this reason, the generalized 
character of the dismissal of the levels concept by the levels skeptics engages in attacking a 
straw-man.
3.3.4 Association of 'Levels' with Layer-Cake Reductionism
In their discussions, levels skeptics often veer from a discussion of the levels concept (or 
rather the layer-cake conception of levels) into a criticism of some particular aspect of layer-
cake theoretical (anti-)reductionism. These tangential criticisms, however, sometimes result in 
making implicit or explicit assertions concerning the levels concept as either (1) indicative of, 
or (2) a product of, particular features of theoretical (anti-)reductionism. As claimed above, 
the reason for this  lies  in  the tendency of  some philosophers to  conflate  certain ideas  or 
commitments endemic to debates about theoretical (anti-)reductionism to the levels concept 
(or  rather,  the  layer-cake  conception).  This  false  association  is  also  perpetrated  by  both 
proponents and by critics of theoretical (anti-)reductionism.
Two unattractive features of theoretical (anti-)reductionism that, unfortunately, have become 
especially associated with the levels concept will be discussed here. These include (1) the use 
of 'levels of organization'  to,  in itself,  be designative of particular epistemic assertions of 
theoretical  (anti-)reductionism,  and (2)  the  levels  concept  somehow implicitly  supporting 
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theory-centered approaches to philosophy of science, wherein scientific theories are treated as 
primary or privileged epistemic units of science. Each of these features are problematic for 
their  own  reasons  (see  especially  Hüttemann  and  Love  2012  and  Kaiser  2012),  but  are 
especially  troublesome  in  falsely  motivating  levels  skepticism  due  to  their  unwarranted 
association with the levels concept. 
So, it is also important to separate rejection of the layer-cake account of (anti-)reductionism 
generally from the rejection of the layer-cake account of levels in particular. Neither the Unity 
of the Science thesis defended by Oppenheim and Putnam (1958), nor the numerous accounts 
of theoretical reductionism and anti-reductionism commonly associated with the layer-cake 
account (e.g., Nagel 1961; Schaffner 1967; Hooker 1981; Churchland and Churchland 1992; 
Bickle 1998), are held in especially high regard among contemporary philosophers of biology 
(Wimsatt  1979;  Steel  2004;  Craver  2007a,  ch.  7;  Love and Brigandt  2010;  Waters  2010; 
Hüttemann and Love 2012; Kaiser 2012). Bechtel and Richardson summarize this dismissive 
tone in their  assertion that theoretical reductionist  approaches are “utterly inapplicable” to 
case studies of explanation in the biological sciences (1993[2010], xvii). This is due to several 
unattractive  features  of  theoretical  reductionism,  some of  which  are  intertwined  with  the 
layer-cake notion of levels, due to the various philosophers using the latter to develop the 
former.  Two features that are intertwined with ‘levels’ that will be discussed here include 
seeing levels as epistemic assertions of (anti-)reductionism, and placing emphasis on theories 
as privileged epistemic units.
1.) Levels as Epistemic Assertions of (Anti-)Reductionism
The  layer-cake  account  of  levels  has  come  represent  the  epistemic  assertions  postulated 
between different theories which, according to the particular (anti-)reductionist argument one 
entertains, one theory is said to superior to the other. This conflation of levels and theories is 
committed, for instance, by Potochnik and McGill in their diagnosis of the levels concept: 
“[S]ome  [reductionists]  explicitly  or implicitly  consider  lower-level  theories to  be 
epistemically more secure than  higher-level theories.  An example is  Oppenheim and 
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Putnam’s  (1958)  suggestion  that  all  scientific  investigations  ultimately  may  be 
vindicated by demonstrating their foundation in microphysical law” (2012, 125). 
Similar  assertions  are  also  easily  found  in  arguments  for  anti-reductionism.63 So,  for 
(anti-)reductionists,  this  conflation is  expressed by assertions that  lower-level  theories  are 
superior (for one reason or another) than higher-level ones, while anti-reductionists assert the 
opposite.64 For this reason, and regardless of the details of a particular argument for or against 
(anti-)reductionism, 'levels of organization' is taken in these situations to embody the criteria 
by  which  these  ideas  of  epistemic  superiority  were  evaluated  in  the  theory-based 
philosophical analyses. Potochnik and McGill are explicit on this, and do not shy away from 
pointing the finger at the levels concept for this state of affairs: “These supposed explanatory 
and epistemic significances of hierarchical organization arise from a common source, namely, 
assumptions  regarding  universal  stratified  levels,  and  how  lower-level  parts  and  their 
properties metaphysically determine higher-level objects and their properties.” (2012, 130) 
Moreover, this conflation between levels and epistemic criteria regarding the evaluation of 
theories seems to be a particularly deep-seated idea in the minds of philosophers. This point is 
also alluded to by, again, Potochnik and McGill, imply that Oppenheim and Putnam (1958) 
are responsible for this trend:
“To  Oppenheim  and  Putnam,  the  only  alternative  seemed  to  be  acknowledging 
nonphysical  entities  such  as  the  élan  vital  or  nonphysical  soul,  a  repellant  [sic] 
proposition for any sort of physicalist...Though this conception of epistemic vindication 
via reduction may now be out of favor, we suspect that its ghost lingers in a tendency to 
credit  lower-level  theories  with greater  epistemic security than higher-level  theories. 
This  would account  for the tendency to assume that  higher-level  theories should be 
63 Montalenti  (in  Ayala  and  Dobzhansky 1974,  18)  occupies  the  other  extreme  in  the  appraisal  of  levels,  
claiming that the mere existence of multiple levels of organization (rather than only one fundamental level) is 
decisive evidence against reductionism.
64 Arguments in support of these claims are varied. Reductionists, for instance, claim that lower-level theories  
are superior because they are more explanatorily robust (Bickle 1998), more “fundamental” (Kim 1998), or 
able to unify more of scientific knowledge than higher-level theories (Oppenheim and Putnam 1958). Anti-
reductionists,  on the other  hand,  claim that  higher-level  theories  are  superior  because they e.g.,  contain 
relevant explanatory knowledge for the phenomenon in question (Kitcher 1984; Jackson and Petit 1992), or 
are simply irreducible to lower-level ones (Fodor 1972; Rosenberg 1985).
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rejected in favor of lower-level theories when they conflict” (2012, 129)
This  point  that  Oppenheim and  Putnam's  (1958)  arguments  for  reductionism continue  to 
exercise  considerable,  if  implicit,  influence  on  the  way  that  philosophers  conceptualize 
reductionist explanation is surely correct (cf. Section 2.2.5). It is also quite convincing that the 
“ghost” lingering in this influence has much to do with the role that levels of organization 
played in the reductionist arguments that Oppenheim and Putnam offered. The analysis of 
Oppenheim and Putnam's conception of levels offered in Chapter 2 certainly vindicates this 
claim. However, it is a different thing entirely to assert that this state of affairs is due, solely, 
to “the” (global) notion of levels of organization. Rather, it seems more justified to assert that 
an unwarranted and poorly motivated association between the levels concept and theoretical 
reductionism (mediated by the layer-cake account) exists.
2.) Emphasis on Theories as Privileged Epistemic Units
Another false accusation against the concept of levels is  its  assumed role in supporting a 
theory-centered  approach in  the  philosophy of  science.  This  is  also  a  direct  result  of  the 
complicated,  but  ultimately incorrect,  association  of  the  concept  of  levels  (understood as 
layer-cake  levels)  with  theoretical  reductionism.  Traditionally,  accounts  of  theoretical 
reductionism focus on developing reduction as a relation holding between scientific theories. 
“Scientific theories” are a technical concept in the philosophy of science, and are defined, 
roughly,  as a set of terms referring to the entities and concepts about which the theory is 
postulated.65 These terms are related together into statements that comprise the laws expressed 
by that theory (see especially Nagel 1961, ch. 11). Reduction, then, is typically understood as 
a relation postulated between two theories in which one theory is reduced to the other when 
the reducing theory is able to derive the laws and terms of the reduced theory from its own 
laws and terms. Kemeny and Oppenheim's (1956) account of reduction and Nagelian-type 
accounts of reduction (Nagel 1961; Schaffner 1967; Bickle 1998) differ slightly from one 
65 This  is  the  “syntactical”  view  of  scientific  theories.  The  competing  “semantic”  view  of  theories 
conceptualizes  scientific  theories  as  sets  of  models  rather  than  sentences,  allowing for  a  more  flexible 
framework  to  work  out  how  exactly  reductionism  proceeds  (see  especially  Bickle  1998,  ch.  3).  This 
distinction  here  is  irrelevant,  however,  as  it  is  the  emphasis  on  scientific  theories  that  is  considered 
unattractive.
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another in the particular form that this reduction would proceed,66 but both nonetheless ascribe 
a “distinguished epistemic role” to scientific theories in matters of reduction and reductionism 
(van Riel 2011, 361).
The most  obvious connection between the levels  concept  and theory-based approaches  to 
explanation and/or reduction found in theoretical reductionism is due to the correspondence 
thesis  (Section  2.2.4).  Though  Oppenheim  and  Putnam  (1958)  heavily  focused  on  the 
presence of scientific disciplines as the correspondent standing in relation to a particular level 
of  organization,  this  was  immediately  abandoned  in  practice  in  order  to  develop  their 
reduction relation. More specifically, in terms of the actual  reduction that would take place 
between one  (Ln)  and another  (Ln-1)  level,  this  would  proceed by focusing  on how the 
respective theories of these different levels would line up to each other (see Section 2.2.2).
Scientific theories were privileged epistemic units for much of the twentieth century during 
the influence of positivist and post-positivist philosophy of science (Waters 1990, 126). The 
emphasis on theories in philosophical analysis of science (at least at that time) was motivated 
in part by a general desirability to conduct philosophy of science in a formalized manner. In 
particular, it was seen as particularly desirable to conduct philosophical inquiry of science 
(especially questions concerning scientific  explanation) in  a way that  lent  itself  to logical 
analysis.67 The  analytical  character  of  scientific  theories  articulated  by  theoretical 
(anti-)reductionists  made theory-centered approaches to  analyzing scientific  knowledge an 
especially  attractive  framework  for  philosophers.  As  a  result,  a  generalized  “theory-bias” 
66 In  particular,  Kemeny-Oppenheim reduction  is  an  indirect  relation,  meaning  that  reduction is  a  relation 
between each respective theory and the phenomenon that both theories seek to explain, but not between the 
two theories. Reduction between theories in such instances is said to occur when one or the other theory 
fulfills  a  number  of  other  criteria  concerning,  e.g.,  its  sufficiency  in  accounting  for  features  of  the  
phenomenon that need to explaining. Nagelian-type reduction, on the other hand, is a direct relation between 
the two theories in question, and reduction is said to occur when one theory can derive the explanatory laws 
and terms from the reduced theory (as well as when other criteria are fulfilled such as, the reducing theory 
being more generalized in scope). These differences are irrelevant for the moment, as for present purposes it 
is  only important  to  note  that  both  privilege  theories  as  epistemic  units  in  their  treatment  of  scientific 
explanation.
67 This was certainly the case with the accounts of theoretical reduction defended by Kemeny and Oppenheim 
(1956)  and  Nagel  (1961);  reduction  in  both  cases  are  types  of  derivations,  and  the  characterization  of  
scientific theories to  fit into these accounts of reduction reflects this observation. More generally, the logical 
approach  to  analyzing scientific  explanation in  philosophy,  embodied  by the D-N model  of  explanation 
(Hempel and Oppenheim 1949), was the notoriously dominant throughout most of the twentieth century. 
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emerged in the philosophy of science (Waters 2010, 240; see also Hüttemann and Love 2012; 
Kaiser 2012). 
In the philosophy of biology, focusing on theories as the primary epistemic unit of science 
was  put  into  question.  The  most  common  argument  against  the  focus  on  theories  in 
philosophy  of  science  calls  into  question  the  adequacy  of  theory-based  approaches  for 
capturing how life scientists themselves organize scientific knowledge. The formal manner in 
which  theoretical  reductionism is  characterized  places  an  important  emphasis  on  the  in-
principle character in which it casts analyses of scientific knowledge.68 Wimsatt observes that 
'in principle' qualifiers for theoretical reductionist claims is usually a “dead giveaway” the 
account  is  unable  to  accommodate  the  contextualized  and  tentative  character  in  which 
knowledge in biology is most often cast (1979, 357). More recently, Marie Kaiser has argued 
that this aspect of theoretical reduction blocks attention to “substantive” issues in favor of 
“formal” ones concerning reductive explanation in biology (see also Sarkar 1998). Issues such 
as characterizing the criteria by which an explanation is considered “reductive” in a given 
setting in biology, or coming to grips with the diversity in the kinds of cases of epistemic 
reduction in biology are completely missed by theoretical reductionism (Kaiser 2012).
Similarly,  Waters  (2010)  criticizes  theory-based  approaches  in  philosophy of  biology  for 
missing investigative practices in biology (2010, 240, 246).69 In his analysis, however, Waters 
also directly criticizes the layer-cake image of the science produced by the levels concept's 
association  with  theoretical  reductionism.  Consequently,  the  theory-based  approaches  of 
theoretical reductionism remain thoroughly intermeshed with the concept of levels. Rejecting 
one will mean rejecting the other, as the following passage makes clear:
“Theory  bias  is  ubiquitous,  not  just  among  theoretical  reductionists  and  layer-cake 
68 Later defenses of theoretical reductionism in the biological sciences attempted to prop up particular accounts  
of reduction to accommodate this commitment to offering in-principle arguments concerning some “future 
state” of biology, in which the conditions of theoretical reduction can take place. Kenneth Schaffner (1993, 
ch. 9) and John Bickle (1998, ch. 3), admitting that biological knowledge requires substantial revision and  
reconstruction before such reduction can take place, independently construct conditions into their accounts of 
theoretical reduction to take this into account.
69 By focusing on theoretical developments in biology, he argues, we miss the actual influence that drove some  
of the most important discoveries in biology, such as Watson and Crick's discovery of the structure of DNA. 
97
Chapter Three: Levels Skepticism 
antireductionists, but among philosophers of science in general. Removing this bias will  
enable  us  to  look  beyond  the  layer-cake  image and  see  what  Watson  and  Crick’s 
discovery did for genetics and how the resulting development in genetics transformed 
scientific practice throughout much of biology.” (Waters 2010, 240, emphasis added)
However, there are good reasons to doubt that theoretical reductionism necessarily requires a 
conception of levels at all,  layer-cake or otherwise. The association between the notion of 
'levels of organization' and theory-based approaches in philosophy of science is unwarranted, 
and serves only to make even more of a straw-man of the concept of levels of organization. 
The  significance  of  the  layer-cake  conception  of  levels,  and  the  layer-cake  account  of 
reductionism with which it is deeply embedded, is largely historical concerning an analysis of 
the  character  and  significance.  Furthermore,  the  problematic  elements  of  theoretical 
reductionism, which are interchangeably referenced with the concept  of levels,  have been 
criticized  time  and  again  by  philosophers  of  biology  over  the  last  few  decades,  quite 
independently of 'levels of organization'.
3.4 Conclusion 
Despite the ubiquity of references to the levels concept in both philosophy and science, there 
also seem to be compelling reasons to doubt the concept's overall viability. Indeed, the lack of 
a systematic analysis of levels of organization in biology has left many of the intuitive ideas 
attached to the concept acutely underdeveloped. This itself may threaten to undermine the 
concept, and thereby any role that it could play for scientific research. 
However, the soundness of the arguments offered by levels skepticism is highly questionable. 
The  criteria  out  of  which  the  problematic  counterexamples  are  so  easily  constructed  are 
consequences  of  an  implicit  commitment  to  the  layer-cake  conception  of  levels  of 
organization. But it is not the case that such skepticism has done any work in convincingly 
grasping the notion of levels as it appears in scientific practice. Rather, the most common 
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skeptical arguments offered by the levels skeptics identify a number of features belonging to a 
straw-man conception of levels, namely, that of the layer-cake account. This account of levels 
is extremely problematic, and in itself quite unattractive, and yet it is cited substantially as an 
innocent attempt to clarifying what is typically meant by levels of organization. With such a 
problematic  initial  description  of  levels,  it  is  no  wonder  why  the  concept  of  levels  of 
organization is judged to be useless and misleading.
Interestingly,  the levels skeptics collectively claim that their  understanding of levels stem 
from a conception commonly illustrated at the beginning of introductory biological textbooks. 
So  the  better  question  to  ask  is  whether  biologists  themselves  conceptualize  'levels  of 
organization' resembles the layer-cake account. The answer to this, which will be detailed in 
the next chapter, is a resounding “no”.  The analysis of the next chapter will reveal that (1) 
there is another way to approach conceptualizing levels that does not collapse into some form 
of the layer-cake account,  and (2) that the epistemic tasks expected of the levels concept 
(detailed in section 1.4) actually are central for understanding the character and significance 
of the levels concept. 
The conception of levels of organization utilized by the levels skeptics, i.e. that of the layer-
cake account is predominantly static. In order to properly grasp the usefulness of the levels 
concept, one must be able to entertain how exactly the concept is operationalized by scientific 
practice. This, in turn, requires that one discard the hope for any comprehensive,  singular  
conceptualization of the levels concept, and particularly the layer-cake account. The criticisms 
offered by the levels skeptics are easy to construct if the use of levels in a particular instance 
is not considered in a contextualized fashion: i.e. the research context in which it the concept 
appears will give boundaries of relevance to the object and the things of which it is composed. 
In fact, several kinds of uses are entertained by the levels skeptics, albeit  in a dismissive 
manner. One of these is the epistemic role of the levels concept across many instances in 
which levels are used, which is written off as “mere introductory or pedagogical contexts of 
application” (Guttman 1976; cf. Eronen 2014). This use of levels will be investigated in the 
next chapter. As will  be seen, levels skepticism is easily disarmed when one realizes that 
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levels of  organization are not utilized univocally across the different ways that science is  
practiced. A more sustained analysis of the levels concept will also allow a general response 
to the charge in Section 3.2.3 that the levels concept is irrelevant to scientific practice will  
require a more sustained response. For one thing, its motivation does not rest only on how one 
conceptualizes levels (like the layer-cake account), but also on an understanding of scientific 
practice. In particular, the charge of irrelevance challenges exactly those instances in science 
where the levels  concept  is  thought,  even by scientists  themselves,  to at  least  play  some 
significant role. 
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4.1 Introduction
If the concept of “levels of organization” turned out to be a nothing more than a useless or 
misleading concept,  this  would be an astounding conclusion to ascertain.  The ubiquity of 
references  to  levels  in  the  biological  sciences,  seen  throughout  virtually  all  textbooks  in 
biology and in its widespread use in research literature, at least demand that the term not be 
thrown aside casually (see Ch. 1). Nevertheless, the last two chapters have shown that much 
work is now required to make sense of the concept of levels of organization. In Chapter 2 it 
was  seen  that  the  two  prominent  accounts  of  levels  of  organization  in  philosophy  are 
unsatisfying and problematic.  Chapter 3 developed the problematic issues surrounding the 
levels  concept  into  a  general  emerging  'levels  skepticism'  that  advocates  eliminating  or 
strongly de-emphasizing the use of the concept. 
Against this levels skepticism, this chapter will offer an alternative account with which to 
understand the character and significance of the concept of levels of organization in scientific 
practice.  This  account  will  posit  a  pluralist  understanding of  levels  that  embraces  a  wide 
variety of distinct but legitimate depictions of levels of organization. Like the mechanistic 
account  of  levels  in  Chapter  2,  the  account  developed  here  holds  that  levels  must  be 
contextually determined to be of effective use. This contextualization, however, will not be as 
radical  as  the  mechanistic  account,  and  will  only  hold  for  the  character of  the  levels 
concept.70 In  contrast  to  its  character,  the  significance of  levels  exhibits  relative  stability 
across different contexts of usage. This significance is found in the epistemic goal motivating 
the use of the levels concept, which is to structure explanatory problems in biology. This idea 
will be developed by using an approach to analyzing scientific concepts recently constructed 
by Ingo Brigandt, who proposes the term “epistemic goal” as a significant means of analyzing 
70 See Section 4.3 and 4.4 for an explanation of what is specifically meant with “content”.
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the use of scientific concepts (Brigandt 2010; 2012).
Key to this account will be the claim that 'levels of organization' is a  fragmentary concept  
(Section 4.2). A fragmentary concept, tentatively, is a scientific concept that exhibits strong 
variation across different contexts of usage in some, but not necessarily all, of its components 
of semantic content, while simultaneously exhibiting stability in the way that it is used. In the 
case of levels of organization, this will mean that though the levels concept exhibits strong 
variation across different usages in what is taken to be the reference and the meaning of 'levels 
of organization', the “epistemic goal” motivating the usage of levels is remarkably conserved 
across different contexts of usage (Section 4.3). The epistemic goal motivating the use of the 
levels concept is to provide structure to explanatory problems in science, particularly biology 
(Section 4.4). This allows for the significance of the concept to be extended beyond isolated 
instances  of  usage,  even  though  the  character  of  levels  between  contexts  is  determined 
contextually. This account of levels of organization will then be exemplified by looking to the 
explanation oxidative phosphorylation via chemiosmosis in the 1960's and 1970's (Section 
4.5).
One  general  motivation  for  the  pluralist  framework  developed  here  can  be  found  in 
philosophical  analyses  of  other  concepts  in  biology that  exhibit  strong variation  between 
contexts  of  usage.  For  instance,  the  so-called  molecular  concept  of  a  “gene”  is  another 
fragmentary  concept  whose  exact  character  and  significance  is  hotly  debated  among 
philosophers and scientists. Like the concept of levels of organization, there are a number of 
interpretations for what  the term “gene” can possibly mean or refer  to,  and a  number of 
distinct  accounts  for  what  the  concept  can  be  taken to  mean has  led  some to  call  for  a 
radically contextualized approach to understanding genes, not unlike the mechanistic account 
in the case of levels (Kitcher 1992)71. However, despite this variation, and indeed because of  
71 Kitcher's comments can serve as a quick sample of the spirit of this 'gene skepticism'. As he says: “What is a  
gene? Nucleic acid. How much? We don't need to say. There are many good ways to segment nucleic acid 
into genes – though not every way of segmenting nucleic acid is a useful way. Much of biology can be done  
without any principle of segmentation at all. Where segmentation is needed, there are alternative principles of  
different utility in different situations. There is no need to seek the Holy Grail of the unique correct principle.  
It is enough to adopt one and make one's choice clear. A species, so the cynic says, is anything a competent  
taxonomist chooses to call a species. We can reach the same level of genuine insight and the same level of  
overstatement in the case at hand. A gene is anything a competent biologist chooses to call a gene.” (Kitcher  
1992, 131)
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it, the gene concept continues to facilitate scientific research across the various contexts in 
which it is used (Rheinberger 2000; Waters, 2004; 2006; Brigandt 2010)72. The concept of 
levels resembles that of the molecular gene concept in that both concepts display some unity 
in their respective cases due to a stable epistemic goal. 
4.2 Semantic Variation and the Levels Concept
Semantic  variation  is  a  common  feature  of  concepts  in  science,  and  especially  those  in 
biology (Burian et al.  1996; Kellert  et al.  2006). Concepts such as 'gene' and 'species' have 
received a  great  deal  of  philosophical  attention  due  to  the  complicated  and controversial 
nature of understanding their many possible meanings (Griffiths and Stotz 2007; Ereshefsky 
2010). The existence of such concepts need not lead to condemnation of their use in science,  
and this variation itself can be a source of insight for both scientists and philosophers into the 
dynamics of scientific reasoning. However, this variation must be organized into a framework 
that makes clear how these kinds of concepts can provide such insight. One such framework 
has  recently been  constructed  by Ingo  Brigandt  (2010;  2012),  and  will  be  introduced  in 
Section 4.3 below.
The variation exhibited by the levels concept in science is especially daunting. The diversity 
of ways that levels are represented in biology (as illustrated in Section 1.4) differ from one 
another  in  multiple  ways,  which  will  be  analyzed in  the  rest  of  this  section.  Due to  this 
variation, constructing a singular account of levels that covers, in a comprehensive manner, 
all depictions of levels throughout biology is extremely unlikely, because there doesn't appear 
to be a common standard by which to directly compare, on the basis of their content, the many 
different instances of 'levels' throughout biology (see Section 4.2.2; Love 2012).73 This builds 
on and complements the result obtained in Chapter 3, where it was seen that comprehensive 
72 To read particular arguments for this claim, please see the literature cited. In this chapter, the usefulness of  
semantic variation will only be considered for the case of levels of organization. In this regard, the literature  
on the character and significance of the gene concept will serve as a background assumption with which to  
correspondingly motivate the current analysis.
73 The desirability of such an account is also questionable, given the problems that attempts at constructing such 
accounts pose (Chapter 5).
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accounts  of  levels  (like  the  layer-cake  account)  lead  almost  systematically  to  false  and 
misleading descriptions of nature. Moreover, unlike terms like 'gene', 'levels of organization' 
possesses a less tangible status in biological reasoning due to 'levels' not being proper material 
entities which can be directly observed.
The semantic variation one encounters with level claims will require a pluralistic account to 
make sense of  the concept  of  levels.  Alan  Love (2012) offers  two initial  observations  to 
motivate this, which can be seen as conditions to consider when constructing an account of 
levels. Firstly, the content of particular characterizations of levels in actual scientific usage is 
contextually determined (Love 2012, 120). This means that the content of the term 'levels of 
organization' is determined from the perspective of a particular scientific discipline in which 
the term is applied in a concrete claim or statement, and accordingly is applied to a particular 
system  or  set  of  systems  that  a  researcher  working  in  this  discipline  is  interested  in 
investigating. Call this the condition of contextuality for understanding levels. Secondly, as a 
result of this contextuality, what the term 'levels of organization' will express in science will 
encompass a large diversity of different particular characterizations (ibid.). This means that 
particular level claims made across biology differ from one another concerning the specific 
features used to describe particular systems in terms of levels. For instance,  the way that 
relations between certain systems and their parts are understood to hold, the temporal features 
that characterize the workings of that system, and even the way and degree in which the 
system is  demarcated  from its  surrounding  environment,  can  be  characterized  differently 
between and even within the particular disciplinary perspectives that construct these level 
claims. Call this the plurality condition for understanding scientific conceptions of levels. 
These two conditions (contextuality and plurality) are sufficient to establish that the concept 
of  levels  exhibits  some kind  of variation  in  its  use  in  science.  However,  the  extent  and 
character of this variation remains unclear: does the semantic variation exhibited by the levels 
concept really yield a pluralism about 'levels of organization' or could there be a monistic, that 
is singular or comprehensive, account lying behind the plurality of different depictions of 
levels in science? That is, despite the plurality of ways that levels are depicted in particular 
scientific claims, could there actually be some shared essential feature behind these depictions 
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that can be captured in a comprehensive account of levels?74 In what follows, it will become 
clear that the variation exhibited by the concept of 'levels of organization' is indicative of an 
underlying pluralism: There are many distinct ways of characterizing levels that may or may 
not share common semantic content across all cases. This pluralism, as will be seen, is distinct 
from that of the mechanistic account, and does not subscribe a radical contextualization. 
The concept 'levels of organization' hence exhibits a fragmentary character. Calling the levels 
concept “fragmentary” is meant to combine three observations: (1) In particular instances, the 
character of 'levels' can be very well-defined, and an effective means of expressing ideas and 
thoughts  about  the  system or  phenomenon  to  which  the  claim involving  levels  is  made. 
However,  (2) the character of the levels concept,  taken as across these instances, exhibits 
significant incommensurability (see Section 4.2.2) due to the variation between the different 
instances  of  usage,  which  makes  their  mutual  comparison  difficult.  Nonetheless,  (3)  the 
significance  of  the  levels  concept  is  sufficiently  unified  due  to  a  remarkably  conserved 
epistemic goal that motivates otherwise different usages of the levels concept (this will be 
developed below in Section 4.4). In order to gain a better grasp on the fragmentary character 
of the levels concept, it will be useful to start laying out the extent and form of the variation  
the concept exhibits. This will be the task of the rest of this section. 
The  choice  of  wording  in  calling  a  concept  'fragmentary'  is  intentional,  and  is  meant  to 
constrain its application to a contemporary perspective. This contrasts with other appraisals of 
certain biological concepts as exhibiting a 'fragmentary' status. Though these terms share the 
characteristic  of  attributing  a  variable  character  to  a  concept  at  a  given  point  in  time 
(especially in a contemporary setting), the latter term is more loaded in that it can imply a 
strong historical aspect to the manner in which this fragmented status can be understood. In 
particular, this label strongly implies an historical process by which a concept began, at a 
74 This emphasizes a difference between the notions of plurality and pluralism, which need to be distinguished 
from one another. Plurality in the sciences represents “a feature of the present state of inquiry in a number of 
areas of scientific research […] These are characterized by multiple approaches,  each revealing different 
facets of a phenomenon” (Kellert et al. 2006, ix). This stands in contrast to pluralism, which “is a view about 
this state of affairs: that [e.g.] plurality in science possibly represents an ineliminable character of scientific 
inquiry and knowledge” (ibid. ix-x). It is important to keep these ideas distinct, for, as just hinted, a singular, 
“monistic” account of levels is consistent with the plurality of different level depictions in the sciences, but 
not with a pluralistic account. 
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certain earlier period in history,  to fragment from a (relatively) unified status in its former 
character or significance to a concept that exhibited increasing variation such that, at a later 
period  of  time,75 no  unified  conception  of  that  concept  was  empirically  or  conceptually 
tractable. Here philosophical analyses of the concept of a “gene” is especially instructive, as 
“the” gene concept has been observed as exhibiting a “fragmented” status by several authors 
(Dietrich 2000, 1139-1140; Griffiths and Stotz 2007, 101-102; Brigandt 2010, 31). In each of 
these instances, the authors draw this conclusion from the history of the semantic change in 
the gene concept as the source for the variation that the concept exhibits in a contemporary 
setting. Michael Dietrich makes this clear when in his statement that “[t]he problem of the 
[contemporary concept  of  the]  gene  is  rooted  in  the  fragmentation  of  the  classical  gene  
concept”, which, in the context of the transition from the Mendelian (classical) concept of the 
gene to the molecular concept of the gene in the middle of the twentieth century, made this  
“fragmentation” “an historical inevitability” (Dietrich 2000, 1139-1140, emphasis added; cf. 
Rheinberger 2000). In a similar fashion, Brigandt asserts a similar history-oriented process in 
the transition from the “classical” molecular gene concept (i.e. the original molecular gene 
concept as construed in the 1950's-1960's) to the “contemporary” molecular gene concept (i.e. 
the molecular gene concept as conceived after the 1960's). Brigandt characterizes this process 
as one leading to the current fragmented status of the molecular gene concept:
“While  the  classical  molecular  concept  featured  a  unified  vision  of  genes,  the 
contemporary gene concept is a more  fragmented concept, in that different scientists 
offer different characterizations of what genes are and use different structural criteria of 
individuating genes, leading to a situation where [from a contemporary perspective] the 
term 'gene'  refers  to  different  categories  in  different  contexts”  (Brigandt  2010,  31, 
emphasis added).
The  contemporary  sense  of  a  concept  being  fragmented,  as  expressed  by  the  term 
“fragmentary”, is captured in the second half of this passage. That is, “fragmentary” refers to 
a current situation of science in which the character of a concept exhibits the traits described 
75 Perhaps trivially, this phrase “point in time” is not meant to as a particular date or year (though the possibility 
is not ruled out), but rather as general points of index from which an author makes their claim, e.g.: “The  
gene concept in the 1920's-1930's” vs. “The gene concept in the 1950's-1960's”.
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above  concerning  the  levels  concept:  clear  and  well-defined  in  particular  instances,  but 
variable (indeed incommensurable) across contexts of usage. In the case of the levels concept, 
the historical aspects of this fragmentation, though fascinating, will not be analyzed here.76 
4.2.1 Fragments of the Levels Concept 
Though the semantic content that is expressed using the term 'levels' may be different between 
different instances, the particular variation between these instances of usage can be identified 
in one or more of the following elements that are expressed by the term 'levels'. This list 
reflects  the elements discussed in Section 1.4,  but here are more readily classifiable  with 
respect to conceptual content.
The Entities Designated by Level Claims
First, and most obviously, are the particular things that are designated by claims involving 
levels. What exactly is designated is tied closely to how the other fragments are set by each 
respective level claim. Depending on how the definitional criteria that inform the meaning of 
levels (see below) is set, level claims relying on part-whole compositional relations between 
levels  will  designate different  things than claims relying on scale.  Likewise,  the mode in 
which levels are articulated are important, as some claims designate ontological items, such as 
entities (e.g., cells, ecosystems, molecules – Reece et al. 2010, 3-5), while others designate 
epistemic items that are  found at  certain levels (e.g.,  explanations,  scientific disciplines – 
Reece et al. 2010, ibid.; Woodward 2010). While ontological items appear to take priority, 
epistemic items are often cited as accompanying them as the items most important for the 
context  in  which  the  respective  level  claim  is  made.  Though  ontological  items  may  be 
strongly implied (even when not explicit), the importance of epistemic items designated by 
certain level claims may be more significant for the scientific task in question (Grillner et al. 
2005).
76 Chapter 5 will deal with the historical aspects of the levels concept in biology. There, it will be seen that there 
was no “fragmentation” in the sense described here; i.e. where a comprehensive concept became fragmented. 
Rather, the fragmentary character of the levels concept was present from the beginning.
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Scope of Application
Another important element of variation in level claims is the  scope of entities in the world 
over which the levels concept is quantified. The scope of levels can range between global and 
increasingly local breadths. Like the point above concerning the particular things designated 
by levels  claims,  the  scope  of  particular  these  claims  can  apply  to  both  ontological  and 
epistemological  things.  Perhaps  the  most  readily  accessible  depiction  of  levels  is  in  the 
hierarchical  view  of  the  world  often  found  in  introductory  science  textbooks,  and  often 
reiterated in the research literature. Such views are global because they extend to all things in 
the natural world. Local depictions of levels are also commonly found in science, both in 
advanced textbooks books as well  as in the research literature.  Local depictions of levels 
contrast  with  global  counterparts  in  that  the  stratifications  that  are  represented  in  these 
depictions are made in relation to a more specialized disciplinary perspective, rather than in 
relation to the study of biology as a whole, where global depictions sometimes extend to the 
entirety of nature. The range of the scope in level claims can be appreciated by taking the 
philosophical accounts of levels discussed in Chapter 2, which represent the extreme poles of 
a spectrum: The layer-cake account, on the one hand, is universal and comprehensive, while 
the mechanistic account on the other hand is radically contextualized and local. Levels claims 
can, however, also occupy a degree of generality or locality between these accounts as well.
Definitional Criterion of Content
Another important dimension of variation concerns the definitional criterion of level content. 
The  definitional  criterion  characterizes  what is  being  represented  in  the  use  of  levels  of 
organization in the first place. The two most prominent criteria that are used, as discussed 
above, include  composition (i.e. part-whole relations), and  scale (i.e. a graduated range of 
values related by magnitude). Recent philosophical literature on levels has focused on which 
of these criteria is more constructive for explicating levels of organization in science (Craver 
2007a, Craver and Bechtel 2007, and Findlay and Thagard 2012 prefer composition, while 
Rueger  and  McGivern  2010;  Potochnik  and McGill  2012,  and Eronen  2013;  2014 favor 
scale). Though scale has recently received increased attention, no general account for levels of 
organization based on a scale criterion has yet  been offered.77 The two major accounts of 
77 One exception may be Wimsatt (1994[2007]), who argues that scale is one major criterion for differentiating 
levels. However, as seen in Chapter 1, Wimsatt's account of levels is still preliminary, and a detailed analysis  
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levels in philosophy, the layer-cake account and the mechanist account, both heavily favor 
part-whole composition as the definitional criterion to explicate levels. In science the situation 
is more nuanced, and both criteria are frequently used interchangeably, sometimes in the same 
context (Section 1.4).
Mode of Presentation
Yet another  dimension of variation in  the meaning of levels concerns  the mode in which 
levels are applied. Specifically, are levels meant to represent an ontological ordering of things 
in the world or an epistemological ordering of things in science? Whereas the hierarchical 
image of  the world presented in  scientific  textbooks is  presented as an ontological  claim 
(Section 1.4), the ordering of things like scientific disciplines or the knowledge associated 
with  these  disciplines  is  also  commonly emphasized  by other  uses  of  the  levels  concept 
(Oppenheim and Putnam 1958; Kitcher 1984; Grillner et al. 2005; Wimsatt [1994]2007; see 
Chapter 5). All of these modes are commonly applied in the scientific literature. Representing 
these modes together remains a highly contentious issue, for, when understood too strictly, 
can be a decisive flaw in the articulation of levels. This was the case with the layer-cake 
account  (cf.  Craver  2007a,  171).  However,  it  is  still  premature  to  prohibit  that  levels  of 
organization have any association with the units and products of science (cf. Section 2.3), as 
this too is an insight into the constructive use of levels in scientific research (see Chapter 5 for 
more on this).
4.2.2 A Common Standard for Comparing Level Claims in Biology
One way to better structure the semantic variation observed in the levels concept is in terms of 
the “incommensurability” between particular instances in which levels are characterized. The 
idea  of  “incommensurability”  as  it  will  be  used  here  refers  to  the  inability  to  compare 
different uses of a particular scientific term as it used in different contexts of usage, and will 
be discussed in more detail below.78 This follows Love's (2012) use of this idea to articulate 
of whether scale as a criterion for levels can accomplish what is expected of the levels concept in science and 
philosophy remains an open question.
78 The term “incommensurability” originally stems from the works of Thomas Kuhn and Paul Feyerabend.  
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the challenge of making sense of 'levels of organization' in science:
“Whether  the  different  representations  of  hierarchical  relations  in  [e.g.]  causal 
explanations79 found in diverse sciences can be combined or integrated is a question of 
hierarchical representation commensurability: is there a common standard or hierarchy 
to which heterogeneous hierarchical representations can be reduced or unified?” (Love 
2012, 116)
The contextuality condition mentioned above specified that  the content  of level  claims is 
made from the perspective of a particular discipline in which the term 'levels' is applied. This 
discipline-bound aspect of level claims already constrains the applicability of the term 'level'  
in a decisive way that in turn inhibits direct comparison of particular level claims between 
different  disciplinary perspectives.  Three initial  reasons can be given for this.  Firstly,  the 
specific  content  that  a  discipline-bound  perspective  attributes  to  the  concept  will  be 
constructed from the conceptual resources that inform that discipline's way of investigating 
nature. As a result of this, different things are designated as the constituents of the different 
'levels' that are postulated in another given instance. Secondly, and closely related to this, the 
manner in which a particular discipline demarcates a phenomenon that is  described using 
levels language will also be tailored to the interests and resources that inform the way that 
discipline in question selects its objects of study. Thirdly, the content that is given from a 
particular  perspective  will  also be evaluated  using  the knowledge that  is  endemic to  that 
discipline, but not necessarily to others. As a consequence of this, the way that 'levels of 
organization'  is  applied  in  different  instances  will  differ  in  such  a  way  that  comparison 
between these different instances will be difficult to reconcile with one another. These three 
observations  allow for  a  basic  understanding concerning how different  uses  of  the  levels 
Kuhn in particular developed several distinct notions of incommensurability over his career, of which the 
“semantic” variety related to the one described here is only one (Bird 2013; see also Kuhn 1982). Other  
notions of incommensurability include, respectively, methodological and theoretical incommensurability. The 
use  of  the  term  “incommensurability”  is  not  meant  to  encapsulate  traditional  philosophy  of  science 
discussions about commensurability, but rather a more pedestrian observation of that salient differences in the 
content of particular level claims make any straightforward comparison between these claims difficult to 
pursue without first properly contextualizing (i) how each fragment of the concept is informed in a given case 
and (ii) how each of these fragments is weighted in terms of its importance for that given case. 
79 In  this paper,  Love is discussing the role of levels in evaluating claims of downward causation. This is  
irrelevant to the present discussion, as the point holds despite this particular focus in his paper.
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concept can be said to be “incommensurable”.
Two  further  caveats  concerning  differences  in  the  use  of  the  levels  concept  in  science 
complicate matters further. Firstly, the modes (see the foregoing section) in which the term 
'levels' is applied can differ both within and between disciplinary perspectives. Since the term 
'levels of organization' can itself often comprise a 'package deal' combining an assortment of 
ontological  and  epistemological  claims,  this  can  make  interpreting  even  particular  level 
claims  a  delicate  matter.  Depending  on  how  the  fragments  of  the  levels  concept  are 
determined in a given instance,  various claims can differ at  least  in terms of (1) a set of 
entities in the world that are directly referred to as a hierarchically organized system, but 
sometimes  also  (2)  a  set  of  investigative  techniques  and  methods  associated  with  the 
structures and processes referred to in (1), and (3) explanatory generalizations associated with 
(1) or (2). The information in (1) constitutes the 'levels of organization' claim proper and is  
primarily ontological, while (2) and (3) are epistemic claims non-trivially associated with the 
these level  claims.  The specific  emphasis  that  is  given in  particular  level  claims to these 
different kinds of information, i.e., the mode in which the levels concept is applied, can vary 
between  these  three  kinds  of  information  depending  on  what  the  speaker  wishes  to 
communicate by using the term 'levels of organization'. 
For this reason, the mode of a level claim can decisively influence how variation in other parts 
of the concept can be understood. If, for instance, a claim involving levels applies the term in 
a manner that emphasizes epistemic information (corresponding to (2) or (3) in the foregoing 
paragraph), then the things designated by that levels claim may or may not include entities 
and processes in nature, but rather will designate (at least primarily, given the purpose for 
applying levels in that mode), e.g., epistemic units or products of science. In intradisciplinary 
settings, dealing with this variation can be challenging when levels claims in that discipline 
are not clear on the modes in which these claims are applied. More challenging, however, is 
when these claims are directed to  other  disciplines that designate different things with their 
level claims, express different scopes in those claims, and apply their level claims in different 
modes. Hence, both intra- and interdisciplinary kinds of level claims introduce substantial 
opportunities for semantic variation of the levels concept to arise.
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Secondly, different disciplines regularly refer to the same entities in their own respective level 
claims.  The  degree  to  which  these  respective  claims  differ  can  lead  to  obstacles  in 
communication between researchers that belong to different disciplines in addition to basic 
concerns  of  incommensurability described above.  Specifically,  when different  disciplinary 
perspectives each work on investigating a common phenomenon that is  distributed across 
different organizational levels, the degree to which specific level claims attached to these 
respective disciplines resemble or differ from one another will become extremely important 
for how (or whether) these disciplines can coordinate their efforts together to collaboratively 
investigate the phenomenon. For now it is only important to note this kind of situation as yet  
another aspect of the variation endemic to the concept of levels, but can be made clear in the 
following manner. A “cell” is a very important biological entity for studying and explaining 
living phenomena, and is often designated as a “level” in many explanations or descriptions 
across biological disciplines. However, a “cell” can be characterized in many different ways, 
or  vary  in  explanatory  significance  depending  on  one's  disciplinary  perspective,  and  the 
perceived relationship between a “cell” seen as a structural unit and the phenomenon that is 
being investigated.
The prospects for articulating a comprehensive, global account of levels that explicates the 
character  and  significance  of  levels  throughout  science  (like  the  layer-cake  account)  are 
extremely doubtful. The challenges of the levels skeptics discussed in Chapter 3 against such 
types  of  accounts  document  quite  well  the  problems  that  hinder  attempts  to  construct  a 
singular conception of levels that extends to all  of nature.  The use of the weaker idea of 
“semantic incommensurability” here expands on this point. Specifically, since there is no  a  
priori common standard by which to directly compare the content of different level claims in 
science, it can be concluded that the plurality of different depictions of levels in science is 
indicative of a pluralistic rather than a comprehensive, i.e.  monistic concept. The reason for 
this is the contextualized manner in which the content of claims involving the term 'levels' is 
determined. 
Turning back now to the 'incommensurability' of level claims, it should be clear that what is  
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not  meant by the term is that the content of different level claims are not comparable  in  
principle, but rather that comparing level claims cannot rely on a unified or unifiable concept 
of levels, given the actual variation displayed between different usages of the term 'levels'. 
Indeed, given now that  the variation of the levels concept  has been given more tentative 
structure with the fragmentary layout that the concept exhibits, comparison between different 
level claims is now not only possible, but also a constructive endeavor for teasing out the 
more specific implications that different level claims bring to bear on the tasks for which they 
are  used.  In  this  way,  “incommensurability”  is  of  a  more  modest  variety,  which  Kuhn 
distinguished as “local incommensurability”: “There is no common measure. But lack of a 
common measure does not make comparison impossible. On the contrary, incommensurable 
magnitudes  [of  this  modest  variety]  can  be  compared  to  any  required  degree  of 
approximation” (Kuhn 1982, 670). Hence, the fragmentary framework offered here is a means 
of showing that different level claims are in fact comparable.
4.3  A Framework  for  Analyzing  Semantic  Variation  in  Biological 
Concepts
Ingo Brigandt (2010; 2012) has recently articulated a useful framework in which to analyze 
semantic variation of concepts in biology.80 The framework that he offers is novel in that he 
construes it as a use-oriented methodological guideline for analyzing both semantic change 
and variation in specifically biological concepts (Brigandt 2012, 78-79). The key motivation 
of this framework is that it strives to contextualize semantic variation of concepts in their 
actual use in scientific practice. Traditional approaches to analyzing scientific concepts often 
overlook  the  importance  of  context  in  biological  concepts,  which,  given  the  amount  of 
semantic variation one often encounters,  makes them unfit  for analyzing how concepts in 
biology are treated, (see section 4.3 below).81 Instead, what is needed, especially in the case of 
80 Brigandt  himself  emphasized the relevance of  his account  for  both conceptual  change  and  for  semantic 
variation. For the account of levels being developed here, only the latter issue is relevant here. Hence, the  
purpose  of  the discussion here is  to  analyze  the state  of  affairs  in  present  day science,  where different 
contexts are not individuated by, e.g., theories or paradigms, but rather different instances of usage that are 
localized by other embedding factors, i.e. disciplinary setting.
81 What this means will be explained in detail momentarily.
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'levels', is a means for analyzing semantic variation that specifically aims at understanding 
why variation itself is sometimes an unavoidable, and even desirable, feature for biological 
concepts.  Whereas  traditional  approaches  attempt  to  explain  away semantic  variation  by 
searching for one or several essential properties shared between instances of a term (Putnam 
1973), Brigandt argues that philosophers should (at least sometimes) embrace variation as an 
important aspect of the way that concepts are used in biology. Particularly, this variation can 
be an important source of insight into scientific practice, specifically the role of context in 
generating reasoning patterns in science. Brigandt explains: “The philosopher has to account 
for how scientists can  legitimately modify a term's definition. Likewise, a term's usage may 
vary across different disciplines...The philosophical task is to understand why such a variation 
in  a  term's  meaning  need  not  lead  to  a  breakdown  of  communication  across  different 
researchers” (2010, 20-1).
The framework that Brigandt constructs begins by offering a layout of conceptual content. 
According to  this  layout,  analyzing a  scientific concept is  done by three looking at  three 
features of its content, including its reference, meaning (or inferential role, as Brigandt calls 
it),  and epistemic goal (Brigandt 2010, 21-22). The first  two are components of semantic 
content (reference and meaning), and are more familiar to philosophical analyses of scientific 
concepts.  The  third  feature  (epistemic  goal)  constitutes  the  novel  proposal  of  Brigandt's 
account.  The epistemic goal of a concept refers to the purpose motivating the use of that  
concept,  which  in  contrast  to  the  reference  or  meaning of  a  concept,  is  rarely expressed 
explicitly  by  a  statement  involving  that  concept.  Rather,  it  is  expressed  implicitly  and 
encompasses a collection of criteria by which the use of a concept can be evaluated.
Out  of  this  framework,  Brigandt  argues  that  the  epistemic  goal  of  a  concept  can  also 
constitute the basis for minimally unifying a concept (2010, 19-20, 36). This “unification”, 
preliminarily, is articulated by the ability of a concept's (stable) epistemic goal to account for 
variation observed in other components of a concept (Section 4.3.2, 4.3.3). One interesting 
consequence that this account supports is that semantic variation (in some but not all of a 
concept's  semantic  components)  is  a  conditionally  attractive  feature  of  some concepts  in 
biology. Both of these points make Brigandt's framework especially well-suited for analyzing 
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the levels concept given the strong variation that the term 'levels of organization' exhibits. 
This framework will be illustrated by building on work done on the molecular concept of the 
gene, which Brigandt also uses to make the tenets of his framework clear. A “gene” in the 
molecular sense used here is some kind of sequence of nucleic acids that codes for a protein 
or RNA product of some kind, rather than (or in addition to) an abstract unit of hereditary (see 
e.g.  Pearson  2006,  399).  The  contemporary  concept  of  a  “molecular  gene”  is  another 
fragmentary concept82 that exhibits  significant semantic variation in contemporary biology 
(Brigandt 2010, 31; see also Burian et al. 1996; Dietrich 2000; Griffiths and Stotz 2007).83 For 
this reason, this case will be important for framing the discussion of levels to follow below. 
The molecular gene concept is significant because, like the levels concept, both reference and 
its  meaning  of  a  “gene”  exhibit  variation  between  different  contexts  of  usage  among 
biologists. That is, there are several distinct, but legitimate, ways of specifying the content 
both for what a gene is and how it is applied (i.e. its meaning), and also in the things that the 
concept is taken to refer to (i.e. its reference). Despite this variation, Brigandt claims that the 
molecular gene concept demonstrates at least “some unity underlying the various uses of the 
term” (2010, 34).
82 As mentioned above, the term “fragmented” strongly implies an historical aspect of a scientific concept by 
which that  concept  becomes  fragmented over a  period of  time.  It  also implies,  e.g.,  that  the concept  in 
question  was,  at  an  earlier  time,  relatively  unified  in  its  character  and/or  significance,  whether  as  an 
observation of the convictions held by scientists at that point in history, or as a matter of fact regarding how 
the concept was in fact used at that time.
83 The “classical” gene concept refers to a way of conceptualizing genes as a means of predicting patterns of 
inheritance  observed  in  phenotypic  traits.  In  contrast,  the  “molecular”  gene  concept  refers  to  another  
conception of genes that is meant to explain how genes produce their molecular products (such as RNAs and 
proteins)  (Brigandt  2010,  28,  34).  This  distinction  is  important  in  that  the  gene  concept  is  analyzed  in 
philosophy as an instance of semantic change and semantic variation. ‘Semantic change’ refers, roughly, to 
change in the meaning or reference of a concept over time. This distinguishes it from semantic variation due 
to a more prominent historical role in tracking differences in concept usage. The shift from the classical gene  
concept to the molecular gene concept is a straightforward case of semantic change in a scientific concept 
over time (cf. Bechtel and Richardson 1993[2010], Ch. 8). Brigandt claims that his framework for analyzing  
biological concept can account for cases of both semantic change and variation (ibid. 25; 2013, 75). Though 
related, the analysis here will not take a position on semantic change, either generally or in the specific case  
of levels of organization.
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4.3.1  Components  of  Semantic  Content  and  the  Molecular  Gene 
Concept
The first component of content is the concept's referent:
1.) The Concept's  Referent  : The reference of a concept constitutes the thing to which a term 
refers in an expression containing that term. The referent of a concept is typically taken to be 
an entity 'out there in the world' about which a speaker wishes to speak. For instance, “H2O” 
is said to be the referent for the concept “water”.
The thing to which a molecular “gene” is taken to refer can vary strongly between different 
contexts. Due to the collection of processes that comprise splicing, it becomes difficult to say 
what nucleic acid entity designates a gene. During splicing, non-coding segments of the DNA 
template  that  are  transcribed  into  the  pre-mRNA (called  introns)  are  removed  from  the 
primary transcript, and the remaining segments that  do code for a particular product (called 
exons) are joined together (in protein-coding sequences) to form the mature mRNA, which is 
sent to the ribosome for direct production of the protein. Here, three physical distinct entities 
(the DNA template, pre-mRNA, the mRNA) each can be the referent for a ‘gene’.  So, what 
ensemble of nucleic acids qualifies as “the”  referent for the gene concept? The answer, it 
turns  out,  is  that  there  is  no  single  answer,  because  different  entities  are  designated  by 
different research contexts that use the concept of a gene (Griffiths and Stotz 2007, 85). 
The ambiguity attached to setting a referent for genes is now directly acknowledged in major 
scientific  journals,  which  propose that  the  label  of  “gene”  now needs to  accommodate  a 
variety of constellations of different nucleic acid structures, both DNA- and RNA-based, to 
account for the referent of genes. One article in Nature comments on the “slippery” character 
of the gene concept: 
“[T]he cell’s protein-building apparatus requires a number of RNA molecules as well as 
proteins to operate.  But the finding of ‘microRNAs’ and other RNA molecules now 
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known to be vital in controlling many cellular processes in plants and animals, and the 
newly revealed ferment of RNA transcription, contributes to the view that RNA actively 
processes and carries out the instructions in the genome. Perhaps the regions that make 
non-coding RNA should also carry the status of genes, if not the name itself. (Pearson 
2006, 400)
Likewise, in an article in Science, another commenter states that the “distributions of exons, 
promoters, gene start sites, and other DNA features [processed and regulated in large part by 
RNA  structures]  and  the  existence  of  widespread  transcription  suggest  that  a 
multidimensional network regulates gene expression” (Pennisi 2007, 1556, emphasis added). 
The  “multidimensional”  nature  of  gene  expression  here  refers  in  part  to  the  plurality  of 
different nucleic acid structures, both DNA- and RNA-based, that are directly related to the 
creation of  the  molecular  products  that  arise  out  of  “genes” (ibid.  1555).  That  is,  all  the 
possible referents of the gene concept play a role somewhere.
 
Burian et al (1996) suggest that the solution to deciding on what the term “gene“ refers to for 
all cases of usage must rest on the purposes informing usage:
“There are two types of hereditary material, after all [i.e., RNA and DNA], and given 
significant enough differences in function we might choose, indeed some have chosen, 
to reserve the term ‘gene’ for the [sic] DNA. The usefulness of definitions truly does 
depend on purpose. For some purposes it is useful to choose a more restrictive definition 
and for others to adopt a more liberal one. Such choices affect how elegantly issues can 
be  discussed and conveyed,  but  they need not  affect  the  range of  facts  that  can be 
captured” (Burian et al 1996, 19).
Their reasoning for this is that something more is needed to account for why one particular 
entity  or  another  is  chosen to  be  the  referent  for  the  gene  concept.  This  cannot  be 
accomplished by only looking at well-established empirical facts about what the details of the 
“hereditary material” that constitutes genes is, because biological research clearly designates 
distinct yet equally legitimate referents.
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The second component of conceptual content Brigandt discusses is the concept's meaning:
2.) The Concept's  Meaning  : The meaning of a concept is typically taken to comprise a set of 
beliefs  about  the concept's  referent  (see below) held by the speaker  that  enables them to 
reliably communicate ideas about the concept.84 The content of these beliefs identify certain 
properties  that  are  attributed  to  the  referent.  For  instance,  the  belief  that  “electrons  are 
negatively charged” posits a property (“negatively charged”) that it attributes to or associates 
with the referent (an “electron”), which is represented by the speaker in virtue of that person 
possessing the concept “electron”. These properties can be found, e.g., in the definition given 
to the concept.85 
Like the referent for a gene, the meaning of the concept “gene” also exhibits variation in 
scientific usage. This is easily seen by considering the context-sensitivity of deciding on what 
information should be used for defining a “gene” in different instances. Defining a gene in a 
given situation often proceeds by identifying the relation a gene possesses to the product for 
which it codes. Though it was once believed that each gene codes for exactly one protein (a 
one-one relation), it is now known that many different relations obtain between certain genes 
and their protein products; one gene can relate to several products (one-many), many genes 
can relate to one product (many-one), and many genes can relate to many products (many-
many)  (Pearson  2006;  Brigandt  2010,  31-32).  These  differences  are  more  than  merely 
conventional; these differences lie in the variable ways whereby the genetic ‘information’ of a 
‘gene’ is extracted from DNA in the genome and ‘processed’ along the way at each step of its 
expression,  especially during transcription.  The products  of  gene  expression,  after  all  are 
different from each other and also do different things. So, similarly to the differences in the 
referent, differences in the meaning of a gene are also supported by well-established empirical 
knowledge about what genes do.  Whichever definition is chosen in a given instance will be 
84 Brigandt's understanding of meaning is an extension of “conceptual role” (or “inferential role”) semantics, 
which emphasizes the use of concept in communication or social interaction for determining meaning (Block 
1998). 
85 The “definition” given to a concept is not an exhaustive term containing all information which specifies the 
meaning of a given concept. The purpose of focusing on a concept's definition here is simply to direct the  
discussion  towards  highlighting  that  meaning  in  biological  concepts  (here  molecular  concept  of  genes) 
exhibit variation. 
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determined by what the study in question requires a gene to be, making a singular meaning for 
“gene” elusive.
4.3.2 Epistemic Goals of Concept Usage
In addition to meaning and reference, Brigandt's framework for semantic variation introduces 
third feature for analyzing scientific concepts, i.e. the epistemic goal:
3.) The Concept's  Epistemic Goal  : The epistemic goal of a concept specifies an aim or aims 
that motivate the use of a concept (Brigandt 2010, 23; 2012, 77-78). As the name implies, this  
aim is epistemic in nature and specifies a certain task to be achieved by applying a certain 
concept (such as pursuing an explanation for a particular phenomenon). Epistemic goals also 
specify epistemic standards by which to evaluate the use of a concept in achieving the task it 
is  meant  to  accomplish (Brigandt  2010, 24; 2012, 78).  Such standards  may include,  e.g., 
evidential standards to assess empirical claims that make use of the respective concept, or 
criteria  that  specify criteria for explanatory adequacy;  that  is,  by what  standards different 
attempts at explanation can be judged as better or worse. 
The  epistemic  goal  of  a  concept  differs  from a  concept's  meaning  in  several  important 
respects.  Most  importantly,  epistemic  goals  do  not  comprise  a  set  of  beliefs,  empirical 
descriptions, or definitions, but rather specify a set of epistemic values (Brigandt 2012, 78). 
The information represented by the epistemic goal of a term hence operates in a very different 
manner  than its  meaning.  Whereas  meaning contains  representational  information about  a 
term's referent (such as a definition or empirical description) and specifies rules regarding 
how a respective concept is to be used, an epistemic goal specifies certain values, i.e. aims 
and  standards,  which  guide  the  use  of  a  concept  towards  accomplishing  a  certain  task 
(Brigandt 2012, 97). 
A second important difference between a concept's meaning and its epistemic goal is that the 
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values expressed by the latter are determined by the concept's use in the scientific community, 
rather than an individual who uses the concept (Brigandt 2010, 23). Epistemic goals are hence 
not always explicitly expressed with a concept's use, unlike the meaning or reference of that 
concept. Instead, it can be implicitly expressed with a particular term as a property possessed 
by that term in virtue of being embedded in one or several scientific disciplines. 
For this reason, introducing the epistemic goal of a concept is not meant to expand the number 
of components of semantic content, on par with the meaning and reference of a term. Rather, 
the reason for postulating epistemic goals is specifically to aid in analyzing cases of semantic 
change and variation that are philosophically challenging. Its justification should be measured 
in terms of whether and to what degree it can help explain why a particular concept exhibits 
variation in its use (Brigandt 2012, 98-99). Brigandt specifies:
“My tenet is not that every scientific concept can be assigned a unique epistemic goal or 
a clearly delineated set of epistemic goals, or that this idea can be fruitfully applied to 
all scientific fields. Rather, my claim is that epistemic goals can be assigned to those 
central  concepts  (at  least  in  biology)  that  underwent  conceptual  change  [or  exhibit 
variation],  such  that  this  semantic  change  [or  variation]  can  be  explained  in  these 
terms.” (Brigandt 2010, 23: see also 2012, 78-79)
At  the  same  time,  Brigandt  acknowledges  that  epistemic  goals  can  themselves  exhibit 
variation, or can be one among many different resources that inform the use of a scientific 
concept. This is exhibited in the (historical) shift from the classical to the molecular gene 
concept (ibid.). For instance, whereas the epistemic goal of the classical (Mendelian) concept 
of a gene is to predict patterns of inheritance observed in phenotypic traits, the epistemic goal 
of  the  molecular  gene  is  to  explain  how  genes  “bring  about  their  molecular  products” 
(Brigandt 2010, 28).86 In this case, though differences in a concept's epistemic goal can be 
86 As mentioned above, the difference between the classical and molecular gene concepts is better viewed as a 
case of semantic change over time, rather than semantic variation due to the historical element at play in the 
emergence and development of the distinction between the two concepts. The point here is simply to point  
out that semantic differences in a particular concept (here ‘gene’, but equally so for ‘level’) can also rest on 
differences in the epistemic goal attributed to a particular concept, even when this results in the creation of  
distinct concepts. 
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cause to split that concept into multiple distinct concepts, it also shows how stable epistemic 
goals,  insofar  as  they can  be  identified,  can  result  in  unifying  an  otherwise  fragmentary 
concept. Brigandt explains:
“While a scientific community often uses several concepts and theoretical resources to 
pursue a particular explanatory or investigative goal, in  some cases such an epistemic 
goal (or set of epistemic goals) can be tied to an individual scientific concept, in that the 
rationale of the introduction or continued use of a central theoretical concept is to pursue 
this epistemic goal” (Brigandt 2010, 23; emphasis modified).
So, with respect to its status as a feature of concept usage, an epistemic goal is pragmatic 
rather  than  principled.  It  is  meant  to  aid  philosophical  analysis  of  actual  concept  use  in 
scientific  practice,  where  the  case  at  hand  is  warranted  for  looking  at  the  information 
expressed by that goal (i.e. the aim and standards informing the use of the concept). One kind 
of  case  that  especially  warrants  consideration  of  a  concept's  epistemic  goal  is  when that 
concept  exhibits  variation  in  its  other  semantic  components,  which  is  in  some  way 
incommensurable.
4.3.3 Unifying Fragmentary Concepts under their Epistemic Goal
When a particular claim involving a certain concept is made, the information specified in the 
epistemic goal of that concept can allow for comparisons between different particular claims 
involving  that  concept.  It  does  this  in  the  following  way:  Since  the  epistemic  standards 
expressed by a concept's goal are applied relative to a task that the use of a concept should 
achieve (i.e.  the aim of  a concept),  then it  becomes a legitimate question to what  extent 
different  uses  of  that  concept  actually achieve  this  goal.  The answer,  or  answers,  to  this 
question can be assessed by using these standards, which follow from the epistemic values 
informing the concept's goal.
The appeal of attending to the epistemic goal of a concept is that the values it encompasses 
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can serve to in some sense unify a fragmentary concept. Very roughly, to unify a concept is to 
connect different uses of that concept previously thought to be unrelated. This proceeds by 
uncovering some commonality shared by each different instance of a given concept. However, 
this vague sense “unify” requires further clarification. Consider the distinction of two notions 
of unification articulated by Dietrich (2000) concerning the molecular gene concept: 
“When considering the problem of the gene then we must drive a wedge between the 
scientific  values  of  generality and  unification.  The  problem of  the  gene  should  be 
decomposed  into  two  [distinct]  problems:  Is  it  necessary  or  desirable  to  have  a 
comprehensive or generalized concept of the gene? and Is it necessary or desirable to 
have a unifying concept of the gene?” (Dietrich 2000, 1140, emphasis added)
The purpose for distinguishing between these two ways of “unifying” is extremely important.  
Whereas  other  approaches  to  “unifying”  concepts  tend  to  focus  on  stronger  forms  of 
commonality, like uncovering a hidden essential property or referent that all instances of a 
concept  share,  epistemic  goals  unify  in  a  much  weaker  sense.  What  this  means  will  be 
articulated in  more detail  below, but  for  now the sense of  “unify”  used here is  meant  to 
specifically  contrast  with  stronger  forms  of  unifying  that  attempt  to  reconstruct  a 
comprehensive concept  that  unites  all  uses  of  the  word.  The  layer-cake  account  is  a 
comprehensive account of the levels concept.
One major  motivation  for  using  epistemic goals  to  account  for  semantic  variation  is  that 
traditional discussions have tended to focus only on a term's meaning and reference to account 
for semantic variation in scientific concepts. These discussions have tended appeal to a hidden 
comprehensive character  in  that  concept  in  order  to overcome incommensurable semantic 
variation. One such approach is to try and uncover a common reference for the concept in 
question that exhibits variation. This approach is exemplified by Hilary Putnam (1973), who 
proposed  that  the  concept's  referent  exhibits  a  “transtheoretical  character”  that  unites 
otherwise  distinct  uses  of  the  concept,  which  have  incommensurable  meanings.  This 
“transtheoretical  character”  postulates  a  comprehensive  account  of  a  concept  in  that  it 
attributes  a  singular,  unchanging character  to  the concept's  referent,  which remains  stable 
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independent from changes in the descriptions or beliefs that speakers use to inform their usage 
of a concept, where further nontrivial modifications to that concept are not possible. Semantic 
variation  is  hence  dealt  with,  because  even  if  different  utterances  describe  or  attribute 
different  meanings  to  a  particular  concept,  like  'gene'  and 'level',  each  of  these  utterance 
nevertheless designate the same referent, to which each refers. Variants of this solution to 
incommensurable semantic variation oscillate between whether a stable referent is uniquely 
designated  by  properties  given  in  descriptions  occurring  in  the  meaning  of  a  concept 
(descriptivist  theories  of  reference,  e.g.,  Russell  1905)  or  whether  the  referent  itself 
determines  how  those  descriptions  successfully  refer  (causal  theories  of  reference,  e.g., 
Putnam 1973, and Kripke 1980).
Appealing  to  the  meaning or  reference  of  a  concept  to  account  for  semantic  variation  in 
biological  concepts  is  unsatisfactory for  two reasons.  First,  and most  obviously,  both  the 
reference  and the  meaning of  many biological  terms  are  already known to  strongly vary 
between contexts of usage. As seen in the above sections, it is possible to identify several  
distinct referents and meanings for the molecular concept of a gene. Yet at the same time the 
empirical  research  that  informs  the  gene  concept,  i.e.  contemporary  genetics,  is  a  well-
established scientific discipline that regularly produces robust and reliable knowledge about 
the phenomena that it  studies. The same situation holds for the levels concept, as seen in 
Section 4.2. Hence, focusing on the reference or meaning of such biological concepts is not 
helpful for accounting for the variation that they exhibit.
A second reason that such approaches are unsatisfactory, which builds on the first, is that the 
search  for  the  “transtheoretical  character”  of  biological  concepts  like  'gene'  or  'levels' 
necessitates  abstracting  away  from  the  actual  scientific  context  in  which  the  respective 
concept  is  used.  This  makes  “general”  theories  of  meaning  and  reference  even  more 
inadequate for analyzing biological  concepts,  because their  results  make them empirically 
vacuous, and hence inapplicable to the way that scientists themselves use these concepts in 
their own reasoning patterns. Burian et al. (1996) emphasize this point in their criticism of 
both descriptivist and causal theories of reference. Focusing, again, on the gene concept in 
particular, they say that:
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“The strength of a non-descriptive approach [to accounting for semantic variation]87 – 
whether  for  reference,  or  meaning,  or  both  –  is  that  it  establishes  continuity  by 
abstracting altogether from the content of belief, by removing all descriptive content 
from concepts and from the determination of reference. It therefore eliminates problems 
with  comparability  and commensurability.  The price  this  exacts  is  enormous:  genes 
become the  Dinge an sich  responsible for the phenomena of trait transmission...Such 
descriptively empty concepts cannot readily be connected with chromosomes, protein, 
DNA, or RNA. Thus they cannot be used to reconstruct the actual debates in the history 
of genetics” (Burian et al. 1996, 18-19).
In the case of the molecular gene, different uses of the gene concept are unified not because of 
some ephemeral transtheoretical character, but rather because each strives towards achieving a 
stable overarching epistemic goal that each particular instance of the concept applies in a 
contextually determined way. This goal sets an explanatory aim (i.e., how does a sequence of 
nucleic acids bring about, or explain, a particular molecular product?) and an accompanying 
set  of  standards  by which  attempts  to  fulfill  this  aim are  evaluated  (such as  explanatory 
adequacy criteria). In other words, there is a common “generic” epistemic goal that these 
different applications of the (molecular)  gene concept,  whose details  are filled out by the 
specific epistemic goal that informs the ways that the concept is used in a given circumstance. 
Since the concept of a gene exhibits stark variation concerning, e.g., what it can refer to, and 
what  its  particular  meanings  might  be,  the  prospects  of  constructing  a  generalized, 
comprehensive gene concept is widely seen to be a lost cause, and in any case irrelevant for 
clarifying its use in scientific practice (Waters 2004).
In contrast to dealing with semantic variation by constructing a comprehensive conception of 
87 “Non-descriptive approaches” to accounting for semantic variation in this passage refers to causal theories of 
reference  (e.g.,  Putnam  1973;  Kripke  1980),  which  are  one  major  family  of  theories  of  meaning  in 
philosophy quickly mentioned above. The major details of these theories are not important here. Rather, what 
is important is the idea that these traditional approaches to analyzing semantic content that focus on other 
components  of  content  (i.e.  reference  and/or  meaning)  in  order  to  uncover  a  concept's  “transtheoretical 
character” are not useful for analyzing biological concepts (such as the molecular gene concept and, as will 
claimed below, the levels concept) that exhibit strong variation. On that token, it deserves mentioning that 
Burian et al. also reject the adequacy of descriptivist theories of meaning, for similar reasons (1996, 21).
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a concept that strongly unifies all the different uses of that concept, unifying a fragmentary 
concept  by appealing  to  its  epistemic  goal  offers  a  substantially  weaker,  but  nonetheless 
significant approach to understanding unification of concepts. Specifically, epistemic goals 
unify fragmentary concepts by revealing that different uses of a concept share a commonality 
in the form of a shared motivation that informs that concept's use. Brigandt offers two reasons 
why this weakened kind of unification is attractive.  First,  the information contained in an 
epistemic goal can actually explain why scientists form different beliefs about the concept in 
question (Brigandt 2012, 95; see also 2010, 24). Focusing on the epistemic goal of a concept, 
and in particular the aim that this goal specifies, the variation of a concept can be grouped 
together under an overarching purpose that informs all  the different uses of the term that 
otherwise conflict.  At the same time, the epistemic standards that are also specified by a 
concept's epistemic goal allow for the specific form of the epistemic goal pursued by, e.g., a 
particular research group, to be evaluated against the overarching form that unifies different 
uses of the concept.
Consider again the contemporary molecular gene concept. Though the particular meaning and 
reference of a 'gene' varies from instance to instance, the overarching epistemic goal of the 
molecular  gene  concept  remains  the  same:  i.e.  to  explain  how  genes  “bring  about  their 
molecular products” (Brigandt 2010, 28). In each different instance in which the gene concept 
is  used  in  this  capacity,  the  generic  epistemic  goal  is  applied  in  using  local  criteria  for 
articulating how exactly this goal is met. In contrast, focusing on only the meaning of a term 
can  only  reveal  how,  e.g.,  the  beliefs  belonging  to  a  concept  are  formulated,  or  various 
definitions  for  a  concept  were  constructed.  This  may be  sufficient  for  establishing  that  a 
concept  exhibits  variation,  and  what  the  character  of  this  variation  is.  Insofar  as  these 
differences  are  incommensurable  with  one  another,  this  will  not  help  account  for  this 
variation. 
Secondly, an epistemic goal can also show why semantic variation in fact can be an attractive 
aspect  for  a  scientific  concept.  Recall  from above  that  given  that  semantic  variation  is 
sometimes  an  unavoidable  state  of  affairs  for  biological  concepts,  philosophical  analysis 
should seek to explain why the incommensurability between different uses of a particular 
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concept does not hinder scientists from effectively sharing one another's ideas. Unifying a 
fragmentary concept by appealing to a shared epistemic goal accomplishes this by accounting 
for why a concept's variation promotes communication between researchers (ibid. 35, 37). In 
this way, the partial unification offered by a concept's epistemic goal hence constructs a role 
for context in understanding the use of scientific concepts.
4.4 The Epistemic Goal of 'Levels of Organization'
Using Brigandt's framework for analyzing semantic variation, the levels concept can now be 
given more structure. Particularly, the marked variation seen in different uses of levels can be 
reconstructed  in  a  similar  manner  laid  out  in  the  review of  the  molecular  gene  concept 
discussed  above.  Like  the  gene  concept,88 'levels  of  organization'  exhibits  a  fragmentary 
character in that there are multiple distinct ways of determining its content: The particular 
character of a specific claim involving levels is specified in a contextualized manner. The 
different elements (“fragments”) that constitute the content of particular level claims were 
summarized in Section 4.2.1. Corresponding to the “reference” of level claims are (1) the 
actual things designated by levels (be those natural or epistemic entities) as well as (2) the 
scope of application in which the level claim in question is taken to hold. The “meaning” of 
level claims corresponds, accordingly, to (3) the definitional criteria used to identify levels 
and (4) the mode in which the concept of levels is applied in a given instance. 
The semantic variation that the levels concept exhibits was also characterized in Section 4.2.2. 
The degree of this variation is substantial, though level claims are capable of effective clarity 
in particular instances of usage (even this requires substantial reconstruction in these instances 
when the authors are vague in their characterizations of levels). Specifically, the variation of 
88 The purpose of using the gene concept as a case study is not to directly join the discussion of levels to the 
more established debate about gene concepts. Rather, the purpose is only to point out that even otherwise  
well-established biological concepts can exhibit semantic variation in a way that demands a more significant 
role for context for determining that concept's character and significance. Additionally, that these concepts 
exhibit  stark  variation does  not  necessitate  eliminating either  of  them from scientific  use.  Even so,  the  
situations observed in  the 'gene'  and 'levels'  are not identical,  and their  differences need to be carefully 
differentiated from each other.
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the levels concept that is observed between different uses reveals different meanings. This is 
due to the character  of level  claims being contextually determined, which means that  the 
content expressed by the term 'levels' is set not only by the specific interests of a particular 
scientist  using  the  term,  but  more  importantly  by the  disciplinary context  informing that 
particular use. Consequently, there is no common standard with which to directly compare 
content of these different uses on the basis of their semantic content. More importantly, this 
immense variation exhibited by the concept  makes  essentialist  approaches  to  proposing a 
comprehensively unified conception of the levels of organization untenable, since the referent 
and meaning of different usages of the levels concept does not reveal any “transtheoretical 
character”.
Notwithstanding the major differences between genes and levels, there is a more important 
similarity that  connects these two cases.  Namely,  despite  the stark variation each concept 
exhibits between uses, each also possesses a relative stable epistemic goal motivating the use 
of each respective concept. This stability serves to partially unify the levels concept, just as it 
does the molecular gene concept. 
The  epistemic  goal  of  'levels  of  organization'  is  to  structure  explanatory  problems. 
Explanatory  problems  are  problems  concerning  the  construction  of  an  explanation  for  a 
certain phenomenon. These may include basic questions such as “what would be an adequate 
explanation for phenomenon x?”, i.e. how a particular kind of explanation can be pursued for 
a given phenomenon, or more nuanced questions such as compiling a basic understanding of 
the phenomenon itself, i.e. “what is this phenomenon x in the first place, for which we seek an 
explanation?” Other explanatory problems that are structured by levels may concern special 
issues  that  frustrate  the  search  for  an  explanation,  such  as  “what  sort  of  issues  hinder 
constructing an explanation for phenomenon x?” That is, in case there are shortcomings or 
obstacles in trying to explain a given phenomenon, it is important to identify possible sources 
of these shortcomings so that they can be addressed. Explanatory problems hence need not 
have to pertain only to the construction of the actual, ultimate explanation that is constructed 
for  particular  phenomenon,  but  rather  may  also  encompass  problems  pertaining  to 
conceptualizing other tasks that are equally important to working towards constructing an 
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explanation. Though the specific problems facing any given group of scientists may vary from 
instance  to  instance  throughout  biology,  the  content  of  'levels  of  organization',  properly 
informed  by  the  contextually-determined  content,  is  uniquely  capable  of  providing  a 
scaffolding by which these kinds of problems can be dealt with. 
4.4.1 How Levels of Organization Structure Problems 
How,  then,  do levels  “structure  problems”?  The specific  manner  in  which  levels  provide 
structure  to  explanatory problems is  tied  to  the  way in  which  particular  level  claims  are 
formulated. Recall from Chapter 1 that claims involving levels center around articulating a 
description of some system or systems in nature (or indeed the entirety of nature), which are 
laid  out  hierarchically.  The  form  of  these  claims  that  apply  the  levels  concept  can  be 
descriptive or hypothetical, which will be analyzed below. Both kinds of claims can structure 
explanatory  problems,  in  different  but  complementary  ways.  Additionally,  the  constituent 
items  referred  to  in  the  hierarchical  layout  of  different  level  claims  may include  (a)  the 
material entities that “make up” a phenomenon for which an explanation is being sought  or 
(b) the disciplinary resources used to investigate, explain, or characterize that phenomenon. 
The epistemic goal of levels hence accommodates whichever mode one chooses to express 
out of the “package deal” of ontological and epistemic information that can inform the usage 
of the levels concept in any particular instance. 
4.4.2 Descriptive Level Claims
Descriptive  level  claims  are  descriptive  in  that  they  make  active  claims  concerning  the 
organization  of  the  system  in  question.  This  allows  a  first  kind  of  problem  structuring 
accomplished by the levels concept to be identified. Namely, this  imposes a hierarchically 
organized layout to a particular system under investigation, which orders different items that 
belong to that system into strata that are articulated as constituent to that system. Using this 
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description, and in particular the parts of the system and their organization, scientists acquire 
a basic ability to navigate within a system, e.g., by localizing specific effects and processes 
that  occur  within  the  particular  system,  or  by  tracing  the  investigative  and  explanatory 
statements made about the behavior of that system back to those parts. Even this minimal kind 
of structuring can contribute crucial information to the construction of an explanation. 
For one thing,  knowing what  a system is  made of and how it  is  organized is  crucial  for 
explaining a phenomenon. In particular, the organization underlying a biological phenomenon 
is a significant determinant of the phenomenon's behavior, i.e. how it works. Consider the 
analogy of an unassembled bicycle; obviously the bicycle will not work if the parts are not 
arranged in the correct way. In the same manner, biological phenomena depend on a “correct 
assembly” in order to function properly. The organization of living things differs from non-
living systems in an important fashion, however. Namely, disturbing the organization of parts 
in living things can fatally disturb the system's workings in unknown ways such that the 
phenomenon becomes unreachable by investigative methods. On the other hand, removing the 
chain of a bike will make it  unusable, but will not permanently 'break'  it,  since it  can be 
reassembled.  This  occurs  because  organized  wholes  in  biology  can  manifest  completely 
different properties than those manifested by their parts in isolation from the whole. As a 
consequence, and unlike non-living systems such as a bicycle, biological phenomena cannot 
be adequately characterized by only looking at the parts out of which it is made. 
Descriptive level claims structure problems not only by providing descriptive information 
about  a  system's  constituents  and  their  organization.  They  also  provide  the  means  of 
identifying and characterizing a phenomenon and the things that compose it: what constitutes 
a  phenomenon  at  a  given  level  is  not  only  its  lower  level  constituents,  but  also  the 
organization of these parts. The arrangement of entities that constitute a phenomenon can be 
distributed across several levels of organization. The object of inquiry, i.e. the phenomenon, 
can be seen as perched at  a particular organizational level (or levels) that is flanked both 
above and below by still  other levels that contain structures important for explaining that 
phenomenon. Lower levels comprise the parts or processes that are known or suspected to 
compose the phenomenon, while higher levels comprise structures and processes to which the 
129
Chapter Four: A Fragmentary Concept
phenomenon belongs. This distinction is not principled, as a biological phenomenon can itself 
be composed of one or several embedding systems. The distinction between a phenomenon 
and its embedding system(s) is simply meant to capture the observation that constructing an 
explanation for certain biological phenomena is a product of how science works to reveal the 
details of natural phenomena via explanation. Nature, after all,  does not always reveal its 
secrets willingly, and requires active interpretation on the part of scientists in defining the 
explanatory tasks to which they turn their efforts.
4.4.3 Hypothetical Level Claims 
Hypothetical level claims resemble what Darden (1991) calls research strategies. These claims 
assume a hierarchical description is already given, or at least possible, for a particular system 
under investigation and then exploit this description by suggesting 'where to go' in order to 
deal with the explanatory problem at hand. More concretely,  hypothetical level claims are 
suggestions that involve “moving to a different level of organization” (cf. Darden 1991, 253-
254) in order to introduce new level-bound resources into the treatment of a given problem. 
These  resources  correspond  to  new  constituent  items  that  modify  the  content  of  the 
hierarchical description of the system. 
Like the rest of the items constituting the hierarchical description of a system, the new items 
introduced to a hierarchy can be material, i.e. when they include entities or properties that are 
added  to  the  hierarchy,  or  epistemic,  i.e.,  when  a  particular  investigative  technique  or 
explanatory approach is added to the way that the hierarchy is understood. They are level-
bound  in  the  sense  that  they  are  associated  with  items  found  at  a  particular  level  of 
organization that are not at found at other levels. In this way, “moving to another level of 
organization” means that new, level-bound, material parts of a system should be considered in 
the treatment of a problem, or that new resources or perspectives should be considered in the 
treatment of a problem. 
“Moving to a new level” entails that the prior hierarchical layout of the system in question is 
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modified in some way. Generally speaking, there are two senses in which this modification 
occurs. In one sense, the modification that occurs is primarily of epistemic significance in that 
the level to which scientists “move” is already represented in the hierarchical layout being 
offered in the description. That is, the overall hierarchical layout description of the system 
remains intact. The shift that occurs concerns the way that scientists appraise how the level in 
question contributes to the problem being treated. For instance, though a particular level may 
be,  ontologically  speaking,  already well-defined and understood,  for  a  particular  problem 
being  treated  that  level  may  acquire  new  significance  in  terms  of  what  insight  may  be 
provided by the items found at that level. This may be the result of new knowledge about the 
items  that  populate  that  level,  e.g.,  the  discovery of  new entities  or  properties  of  known 
entities or a new discoveries concerning the how those entities behave. This new knowledge 
may also be the result of new methods (or new interpretations of old methods) by which the 
material  entities of a level  are  investigated.  In another  sense,  the hierarchical layout of a 
system may also  be  modified  by adding  a  new level  or  levels  that  was  not  represented 
beforehand. 
In both senses of “moving” to a new level, the suggestion that is made by a hypothetical level 
claim is that we should shift our attention to a particular level or aspect of an already present 
level that, up until that point, has been left unattended. The “movement” pertains to one or 
another altitude within the overall number of levels (Ln) of the hierarchical strata given in the 
description of a system. Regardless of whether the description of the system is modified by 
adding  new  levels  or  by  ascribing  a  new  significance  to  already-existing  ones,  the 
“movement” that is made will be “look upwards”, “look downwards”, or “looking again” in a 
system. 
The  new  resources  that  are  acquired  by  moving  to  different  levels  of  organization  can 
structure explanatory problems in two specific ways, which were quickly mentioned above. 
Firstly,  hypothetical  level  claims  can  provide  new  insight (cf.  Darden  1991,  253)  into  a 
problem that cannot be solved using the resources already on offer at the level or levels from 
which one starts with an initial description of the system. For instance, the behavior of new 
entities found at a newly introduced level may provide insight by explaining an aspect of a 
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phenomenon  that  beforehand  could  not  be  explained.  In  the  case  of  constructing  an 
explanation for oxidative phosphorylation (also shortened to ox-phos, see Section 4.5 below), 
one of the key insights made in constructing the chemiosmotic mechanism was to postulate 
new, higher-level, structures in the mitochondrion as part of the system constituting oxidative 
phosphorylation in order to account for how ATP is produced. 
Secondly, hypothetical level claims are also made in order to change or modify the problem 
itself. Particularly, by moving up or down one or several levels, researchers also acquire new 
resources by which to change the way that problem is posed, or the conditions under which 
that problem can be considered solved. In the case of ox-phos, one of the key contributions 
that  allowed  for  an  explanation  for  ox-phos  to  be  constructed  was  that  the  problem that 
researchers  took  themselves  to  be  solving  had  to  be  changed  in  a  substantial  way.  This 
involved introducing a more 'biological' characterization of ox-phos, which postulated that 
explaining ox-phos was not merely a manner of finding the right chemical constituents with 
which to fill the gaps of the chemical reactions known to constitute the production of ATP. 
Rather, the problem involved introducing higher-level organizational features into thinking 
about how to situate the chemical items already known to constitute ox-phos into the system 
in which they were embedded.
Problems can also be modified in  more multifaceted ways,  which can be clearly seen in 
interdisciplinary problems that seek to combine many different organizational and disciplinary 
perspectives in order to explain a complex phenomenon. In these situations a framework of 
levels of organization can aid in structuring the way that different disciplines negotiate how 
they take their epistemic resources to interact with each other in the search for an explanation 
of a phenomenon that each discipline is trying to explain. Providing structure to this kind of 
explanatory  problem  will  involve  treating  distinct  constituent  problems  that  different 
disciplinary perspective pose of the phenomenon. There, it will be seen that this task is one 
that a framework of levels of organization is uniquely able to treat. In particular, attempting to 
integrate the different disciplinary resources together to construct an adequate explanation for 
motion adaptation, what was considered to be the problem itself changed several times over 
the past six decades.
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4.5 Case Study for the Use of Levels: The Explanation of Oxidative 
Phosphorylation
During  the  1960's  and  1970's  one  of  the  principle  scientific  problems  that  engaged 
biochemists and molecular biologists was trying to understand how living systems produce 
energy necessary to  sustain  life  (Weber  2005,  92).  This  problem comprised  detailing  the 
processes  by  which  ATP  (adenosine  triphosphate)  is  constructed  from  ADP (adenosine 
disphosphate) and an inorganic phosphate group, in a series of reactions known as oxidative 
phosphorylation (hereafter abbreviated as ox-phos).  The explanation of ox-phos is  a well-
documented case of biological  discovery,  and was one of  the most  controversial  areas of 
research in the biological sciences during the middle of the twentieth century (Prebble 2012, 
699-700; see also Bechtel 2006, 220-221). 
The discovery of the mechanism for oxidative phosphorylation is a particularly compelling 
case  for  the  decisive  importance  that  organization  distributed  across  several  levels  of 
organization can exhibit for explaining complex biological phenomena. Two aspects of the 
ox-phos case are especially pertinent in this regard: (1) Accounting for the organization of the 
chemiosmotic mechanism for ox-phos required that researchers move to a higher level of 
organization in order to account for chemiosmosis, and (2) this upward shift in levels was 
accompanied by a change in the character of the problem from a chemical one to a biological 
one. The key to understanding both of these aspects of the discovery of ox-phos, both as an 
empirical  case  and  as  an  epistemic  debate  among  the  researchers  investigating  ox-phos, 
focused the role of ATP synthase in the production of ATP (Prebble 2002; Weber 2005, 91; 
Bechtel 2006, 219). Ontologically speaking, ATP synthase designates an interlevel junction in 
the chemiosmotic  mechanism of ox-phos whereby the chemical-molecular  entities  driving 
metabolism (particularly protons, ATP, ADP, and the phosphate group) interact with higher-
level entities (especially the inner mitochondrial membrane) in the production of ATP. This 
interlevel  positioning  of  ATP synthase  turned  out  to  be  one  of  the  primary  explanatory 
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contributions of the chemiosmostic hypothesis  proposed by Peter Mitchell,  who would be 
awarded the  Nobel  Prize  for  his  research  into  ox-phos.  In  terms  of  the  scientific  debate 
surrounding  the  search  for  the  (unknown but  highly debated)  role  of  ATP synthase,  one 
decisive error that hindered constructing the chemiosmotic explanation of ox-phos was the 
widespread expectation that  ox-phos would  be accounted for  solely in  terms  of  chemical 
processes.  Particularly,  it  was  expected  that  the  explanation  of  ox-phos  would  revolve 
primarily around detailing redox reactions driving the construction of ATP from ADP with the 
aid  of  a  “chemical  intermediate”,  whose  existence  was  widely anticipated  but  ultimately 
repudiated  (Allchin  1998;  see  also  Prebble  2002;  2012).  In  other  words,  ox-phos  was 
conceived as  a  chemical  problem that  would  be  solved using  only chemical  entities  and 
processes,  and the investigative resources  of biochemistry.  The solution to explaining ox-
phos, however, required viewing ox-phos as a biological problem (Prebble 2012; see Section 
4.5.2),  which  necessitated  bringing  higher-level  resources  to  bear  on  the  overall  task  of 
explaining ox-phos. 
In  this  regard,  the introduction  of  new levels  of  organization,  as  will  be seen,  decisively 
contributed to the explanation of ox-phos. This occurred not by replacing the other levels 
involved  with  the  investigation  of  ox-phos,  but  rather  by complementing  the  descriptive 
layout in which the metabolic reactions occur. This modification allowed previously acquired 
knowledge of the reactions constituting ox-phos to  be given its  proper structure.  For this 
reason,  an  analysis  of  this  case  exhibits  clearly  the  use  of  levels  in  a  relatively 
intradisciplinary  setting,  namely  biochemistry.  More  particularly,  casting  this  historical 
episode  of  biochemical  research  in  terms  of  levels  of  organization  demonstrates  in  an 
effective way the usefulness of the levels concept as the pursuit of the concept's epistemic 
goal, i.e., to structure an explanatory problem. On the one hand, levels of organization are 
used  in  an  expository sense,  which  can  be  seen  in  the  description  of  the  chemiosmostic 
mechanism proposed by Mitchell to explain ox-phos (Section 4.5.1). On the other hand, levels 
also plays a hypothetical role in Mitchell's reasoning concerning the way that the problem of 
ox-phos  should  be  investigated  (Section  4.5.2;  Brooks  2014  discusses  a  case  of 
multidisciplinary case). 
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4.5.1 Ox-phos as a Multi-level Phenomenon
Ox-phos is one of the primary metabolic pathway by which much of life on Earth (at least 
aerobic organisms) produce the energy needed to sustain living processes. By far the most 
important source of energy in living things comes from Adenosine triphosphate (ATP), which 
is  constructed  from Adenosine  diphosphate  (ADP)  and an  additional  inorganic  phosphate 
group.89 The process by which ox-phos produces energy is called chemiosmosis,  and was 
proposed by Peter Mitchell (first in 1961, and later revised in 1966 and 1974, respectively).
Chemiosmosis works by transporting H+ ions (protons) along the inner membrane space of the 
mitochondrion via an electron transport chain (see Figure 4.1). These protons, initially found 
in the matrix of the mitochondrion after being harvested from NADH (i.e. NADH → NAD - + 
H+) provided by other metabolic processes occurring in the mitochondrion (e.g., glycolosis 
and the citric acid cycle), are actively transferred outside of the mitochondrial matrix by large 
enzyme complexes and then moved along the inner membrane of the mitochondrion, where 
the electron transport chain is located. Once outside the matrix, the protons are then guided, 
together  with a  number of electrons,  along the inner  membrane by a series of reduction-
oxidation  (redox)  reactions,  whereby  the  electrons  are  accepted  (reduced),  and  then 
relinquished (oxidized) by the components that make up the outer lining inner membrane. The 
protons are then decoupled from the electrons, and transported back into the mitochondrial 
matrix  by  the  ATP synthase,  where  they  bond  with  waiting  phosphate  groups  to  ADP 
molecules, forming ATP. The transportation of the protons back into the mitochondrial matrix 
by  the  ATP  synthase  is  initiated  by  creation  of  a  proton  gradient  (i.e.  a  differential 
concentration  of  protons)  that  accumulates  along  both  sides  of  the  mitochondrial  inner 
membrane and is built up by the redox reactions occurring in the electron transport chain.
The  significance  of  Mitchell's  chemiosmotic  hypothesis  here  is  encapsulated  in  two 
contributions to the explanation of ox-phos. First was his novel characterization of the role of 
89 Hence the name of oxidative phosphorylation: The phosphorylation refers to addition of an extra inorganic 
phosphate group to an ADP molecule, and is powered by a chain of oxidizing and reducing reactions, from 
which the moniker oxidative comes. See below for details.
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ATP synthase  (Prebble  2001;  Allchin  2002).  In  contrast  to  other  hypotheses  about  the 
workings of ATP synthase (see below), Mitchell conceived of the enzyme in terms of part of 
an  overall  mechanism  (i.e.  chemiosmosis)  that  included  higher-level  structures  of  the 
mitochondrion itself. In particular, the inclusion of the inner mitochondrial membrane as an
Figure 4.1 Oxidative phosphorylation via chemiosmosis. Mitchell's contribution to the explanation of ox-phos, 
called the chemiosmotic hypothesis, comprised two contributions. The first contribution was the postulation of 
an electron transport chain that harvested protons. These are illustrated as (1) and (2) in the image. Moreover, the 
depiction of multiple levels here is elegantly built into the representation of ox-phos. The whole mitochondrion, 
depicted in the upper right-hand corner  as the embedding system of ox-phos, is  connected to the processes  
responsible for producing ATP via an implied size scale (visible by the alignment of colors between it and the 
main image).  This turns out to be more than contextualization, because of the role of higher-level structural  
components constituting these processes (especially the boundary created by the inner mitochondrial membrane). 
Image taken from Reece et al. (2010, 175).
important structure in which ATP synthase (as well as the protein complexes that delivered 
protons from the matrix to the intermembrane space) acts as a part marked the introduction of 
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higher level structures into the explanation of ox-phos. The second important contribution of 
Mitchell's chemiosmotic hypothesis was the postulation of a proton gradient, which guides the 
protons for  the  production  of  ATP from the  donor  NADH coenzymes  along  the  electron 
transport chain and through the ATP synthase to the waiting ADP molecules (and phosphate 
group).  The  significance  of  this  novel  postulation  was  the  overall  organization  that  this 
imposed onto the entire ox-phos process, which was built around the higher-level structures 
introduced  into  the  explanation  of  ox-phos.  Specifically,  ox-phos  (and  more  specifically 
chemiosmosis) is structured around the cellular structures of the mitochondrion. Though the 
origin, and destination, of the protons fueling the production of ATP are within the matrix, the 
path by which they are guided along the steps of ox-phos became woven around structures on 
both sides of the inner mitochondrial membrane (see again Figure 4.1). 
Both of these postulations (the flow of protons through ATP synthase and the proton gradient) 
and  the  novel  developments  that  accompanied  them  (the  introduction  of  higher-level 
structures  and  the  organizational  framing  that  this  imposed  on  the  phenomenon)  had  a 
decisive impact on the study of ox-phos. For one thing, it completely changed the way that 
ox-phos was understood to work, as until that time it was believed that ox-phos occurred 
completely within the mitochondrial matrix. This accounted for several important problems 
that until then posed decisive obstacles to uncovering how ox-phos worked. One of the most 
acute  obstacles  blocking  the  explanation  of  ox-phos  was,  in  fact,  the  tendency  of  other 
hypotheses to ignore higher-level organizational features of the mitochondrion, and model the 
known steps of the reactions constituting ox-phos completely within the mitochondrial matrix. 
However, the constituency of the matrix proved to be a highly unstable medium in which to 
try and replicate the construction of ATP, and other hypotheses for ox-phos were unable to 
show how the production of ATP was regulated. By removing an important part of the ox-
phos reaction – the transport  of protons – from the matrix (where it  was too unstable to 
effectively account for the reactions leading to ATP production), this provided one of the key 
empirical motivations for the chemiosmotic hypothesis, and ultimately allowed it take on its 
full  explanatory significance (Allchin 1998;  Prebble 2012;  see also Mitchell  et  al.  1978). 
Another obstacle that was removed by Mitchell's chemiosmostic hypothesis was the expected 
discovery  of  a  “chemical  intermediate”  that  would  bridge  the  gap  between  the  reactants 
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involved  in  ox-phos  (especially  NADH,  ATP  synthase,  and  ATP/ADP/Phosphate).  The 
significance of this development will be discussed further in Section 4.5.2.
The chemiosmotic hypothesis offered by Mitchell comprises the use of levels to provide new 
insight  into  the  problem  of  explaining  ox-phos.  Specifically,  the  insight  provided  by 
introducing a  higher  level  of  organization  structured  this  problem by adding higher-level 
material  entities  into  the  description  of  the  overall  system.  The chemiosmotic  hypothesis 
“moved to a new level” by adding the boundaries constituted by the ATP synthase and the 
protein complexes through which both the protons and electrons within the mitochondrion 
interact with the inner mitochondrial membrane separating the mitochondrial matrix and the 
intermembrane  space.  As  a  consequence,  the  mechanism  by  which  ox-phos  works  (i.e. 
chemiosmosis) was able to be characterized, and identified as the actual explanation for the 
production  of  ATP  in  living  cells  (Boyer  et  al.  1978).  Before  Mitchell  proposed  his 
chemiosmotic hypothesis, the description of the problem of ox-phos comprised a single level 
of  organization,  constituted  solely  by  chemical  constituents.  However,  in  order  for  the 
importance of the chemiosmotic hypothesis to have its full impact, the problem of ox-phos 
itself  also  had  to  be  changed.  The  significance  of  these  developments  is  for  this  reason 
strongly coupled to another important, and hypothetical, use of levels in the ox-phos debate, 
which will now be discussed.
4.5.2 The Shift from Chemical to Biological Problem
Initially, Mitchell's idea of chemiosmosis received little attention when it was first proposed in 
1961, and indeed experimental evidence was not forthcoming in support for Mitchell's work 
(Allchin  2002,  162;  Prebble  2012,  710-711;  see  also  Weber  2005,  103).  Instead,  when 
Mitchell  first  published his ideas,  several competing hypotheses about  the mechanism for 
oxidative phosphorylation were considered more probable forerunner explanations. Each of 
these  other  hypotheses  enjoyed  varying  degrees  of  empirical  support,  but  this  support 
fluctuated  strongly  from  year  to  year  in  the  1960's  as  new  experimental  findings  were 
produced  and  new  interpretations  of  established  experimental  results  were  considered 
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(Prebble 2012, 710)90. For this reason, none of the hypotheses were able to garner consensus 
in the scientific communities working on oxidative phosphorylation,  leading sometimes to 
acrimonious debate among the main researchers on the issue (Bechtel 2006, 220; Prebble, 
2002).
In contrast to this, what had achieved consensus among researchers before the acceptance of 
Mitchell's  proposal  was  that  the  search  for  the  explanation  of  ox-phos  was  a  thoroughly 
chemical problem. Roughly, this meant that the phenomenon of ox-phos was characterized at 
a single level of organization, one constituted by chemical compounds and their reactions, the 
description  of  which  designated  these  chemical  constituents  as  the  only relevant  material 
entities  required  to  account  for  the  production  of  ATP.  Conversely,  the  expectation  of 
researchers  was  that  the  explanation  of  ox-phos  would  also  encompass  only chemical 
constituents. The commitment of the biochemical research community to this characterization 
of  the  problem  becomes  apparent  in  the  widespread  expectation  at  the  time  that  an 
intermediate reactant would be discovered, by which the mechanism of ox-phos would be 
uncovered.  Specifically,  it  was a completely unknown what  could regulate  the substantial 
amount of energy that involved in harvesting protons from (oxidizing) NADH molecules in a 
sustainable manner so as to fuel the coupling of phosphate to (phosphorylating) ADP. Without 
regulation, the production of ATP occurs very quickly, and produces a vast overproduction of 
energy than is needed for (or capable of) sustaining living processes. The importance of this  
point as an obstacle to explaining ox-phos is appreciated by considering as an analogy the 
combustion  of  gasoline  in  an  automobile:  Simply  igniting  the  gasoline  will  not  fuel  the 
automobile, and is in a very obvious way counterproductive to the functioning of the vehicle. 
Rather, the combustion of the gasoline, like the production of ATP, must be regulated so that 
only enough energy is created as is needed by the car (or the organism) to run. 
In  order  to  fill  this  gap,  the  biochemist  E.C.  Slater  postulated  a  “high-energy  chemical 
intermediate” in 1953 as a way to link the oxidation and phosphorylation reactions that were 
known to occur in the production of ATP (Slater 1953; Mitchell 1961; see also Prebble 2012, 
702-703). The empirical function of this intermediate was to serve as a reservoir for the high 
90 Prebble goes on to document these hypotheses and the major sources of evidence that were used to evaluate  
these different hypotheses (ibid. 707-712). These details will be passed over here for considerations of space.
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amount  of  energy present  in the series  of  reactions,  so that  the production of  ATP could 
proceed in a regulated manner. 
The high anticipation that this chemical intermediate would be soon be discovered, and hence 
the conviction in biochemistry that ox-phos was a 'chemical' problem, is explained by two 
historical features of biochemical research into metabolism in the mid-20th century. First, it 
was already widely believed that metabolism in general was a (purely) chemical phenomenon, 
at least in terms of the task of explaining how it works. This attitude can be seen as a product 
of three historical  phases91 of  biochemical  research in  the early to  mid-twentieth century, 
spanning approximately from the 1930's to the 1970's. (cf. Prebble 2012, 701-702; see also 
Bechtel  2006,  219-220).  The  first  phase  began  with  the  discovery  and  description  of 
glycolosis, which ignited research interest in metabolism, and was central to the formation of 
biochemistry  as  its  own discipline  (Prebble  2012,  702.).  This  culminated  in  biochemists 
laying out a “theoretical vision” for biochemists to construct the basis for a comprehensive 
“metabolic map” for all forms of metabolism in living things. (See Prebble 2010 for an in-
depth analysis) The creation of this metabolic map, starting in the 1930's, was constructed out 
of the main metabolic pathways that had already been discovered or were in the process of 
being discovered. The second phase was constituted by researchers attempting to fill in the 
specific reaction mechanisms that made up the pathways of this map. The key to these first 
two  phases  was  the  strong  interest  among  biochemists  in  accomplishing  the  “theoretical 
vision” encapsulated in the metabolic map in purely chemical terms (Prebble 2012, 702, 718-
719). In particular, it was during this phase that the chemical intermediate for ox-phos was 
proposed  by Slater  in  1953 (Ibid.  702).  Slater's  postulation  of  the  chemical  intermediate 
during this  phase  is  hence,  to  a  large degree,  a  product  of  the  historical  development  of 
biochemistry up until that time, which proceeded in terms of filling out chemical reactions 
using the material entities of only a single level of organization.
Another  historical  factor  complemented  the  influence  of  the  “theoretical  vision”  of 
biochemistry in characterizing ox-phos as a chemical problem. Namely, by the beginning of 
the third phase of biochemical research into metabolism, which encompassed the “ox-phos 
91 The first  two phases  are  especially important  here,  as  the third  phase encompasses  the “ox-phos wars” 
occurring after Mitchell's (1961) publication (Prebble 2002).
140
Chapter Four: A Fragmentary Concept
wars” following the publication of Mitchell's chemiosmotic hypothesis (Prebble 2002), most 
of the (chemical) components constituting ox-phos were already well-described. For instance, 
it was widely known that the synthesis of ATP from ADP was responsible for the creation of 
energy in the cell and ultimately for the whole organism (Weber 2005, 92-93; Bechtel 2006, 
192). It was also well known that the locus of energy creation was within the mitochondrion 
of  the  cell  (or  chloroplast  in  the  case  of  plant  production  of  ATP,  called  photosynthetic 
phosphorylation). Moreover, other mechanisms for metabolism had already been discovered 
by  the  time,  including  glycolosis  (discovered  in  the  1910's  by  Gustav  Embden,  Otto 
Meyerhof,  and  Jakub  Parnas)  and  the  citric  acid  cycle,  also  known  as  the  Krebs  cycle 
(discovered in 1937 by Hans Adolf Krebs), but neither could account for sufficient energy 
needed to power living processes of organisms.92 Indeed it was even known that these other 
processes provided ox-phos with some of its primary reactants (e.g., NADH produced by the 
Krebs  cycle  is  the  source  of  protons  that  are  combined  with  O2 during  chemiosmosis). 
Experimental  evidence  had  also  convincingly  shown  that  the  phosphorylation  reaction 
between  ADP and  ATP was  driven  in  large  part  by  a  series  of  oxidizing  reactions  that 
transported  protons  harvested  from  NADH.  However,  how exactly  this  occurred  in  the 
mitochondrion was not known. Most importantly, it was also known that ATP synthase was 
the primary enzyme responsible for harvesting the  protons from these redox reactions, thereby 
driving ox-phos (Prebble 2012; Allchin 2002). Hence, not only was the consideration of ox-
phos as a chemical problem a product of the historical development of biochemistry at the 
time, the conviction underlying it seemed to be close to empirical consummation. 
These two factors made Slater's proposal93 immensely influential among biochemists not only 
because  of  the  elegance  of  his  empirical  work,  but  for  the  overarching  characterization, 
manifested  in  the  postulation  of  the  high-energy  intermediate,  that  the  search  for  the 
explanation of ox-phos was a thoroughly chemical endeavor. Douglas Allchin characterizes 
92 For perspective, ox-phos produces approximately 7 times the amount of ATP than both glycolosis and the 
Krebs cycle combined. Specifically, per molecule of glucose, glycolosis and the Krebs cycle each produce 2  
molecules of ATP (for a total of four from both sources), while ox-phos produces 26-28 molecules of ATP per 
glucose (Reece et al. 2010, 176).
93 The context for  Slater's  postulation of  the chemical  intermediate was as  part  of  his  own hypothesis  for  
explaining ox-phos, which came to be known as the “chemical hypothesis”. Despite this misleading baptism, 
Slater's chemical hypothesis was only one of the many “chemical” hypotheses that were offered at the time. 
Slater's proposal itself was quickly discarded as insufficient, but other hypotheses about the mechanism for 
ox-phos also actively built in his mysterious chemical intermediate into their own proposals.
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the situation in biochemistry as follows:
“The problem – and it  resisted  being solved for  many years  –  was:  how is  energy 
transferred from the electron transport chain to ATP? In the early 1950's biochemists 
viewed energy as transferred in billiard-ball-like fashion from molecule to molecule, 
like batons in a relay race. The challenge was to trace the path and to isolate and identify 
the intermediate steps and the enzymes along the way. One could thus reconstitute the  
system in vitro. In 1953 E.C. Slater made an analogy between ox-phos and another well-
known reaction and hypothesized an intermediate step or steps. This would involve  a 
yet  unidentified  molecule  or  molecules  with  a  high-energy  chemical  bond...Slater's 
'chemical' hypothesis thus came directly out of and embodied the [perceived] strengths  
of the biochemists' tradition” (Allchin 1998, 6, emphasis added)
Because  of  this,  anticipations  were  high  that  the  chemical  intermediate  would  soon  be 
discovered. However, there was one problem with this proposal: the chemical intermediate 
doesn't exist. The perceived need for this high-energy chemical intermediate represented not 
only a substantial empirical barrier to the explanation of ox-phos, it constituted a theoretical 
barrier  created  by the  biochemical  community  itself  that  barred  further  progress  towards 
constructing this explanation.
Mitchell's chemiosmotic hypothesis instigated a decisive shift in the way that the problem of 
ox-phos itself was characterized. This shift involved the proposal that the problem of ox-phos 
itself required incorporating “biological” features of the embedding system in which the ox-
phos reactions occurred (i.e. specific structural features the mitochondrion). These biological 
features, including the mitochondrial membrane and the creation of the proton gradient, can 
be seen in the description of chemiosmosis given above in Section 4.5.1. Ultimately, it was 
the inclusion of these higher-level features that ox-phos was able to be explained. However, 
the focus by the biochemical community on a chemical characterization of ox-phos, e.g., as 
seen in the search for the phlogistonal94 chemical intermediate, meant that this insight would 
94  With 'phlogistonal'  is meant: of or relating to the non-existence of a hypothetical substance or idea (cf. 
phlogiston), where that substance or idea is postulated to explain or account for a scientific mystery and 
whose existence or discovery is for a time highly anticipated.
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not be captured. 
Mitchell's motivation for his chemiosmotic hypothesis was informed by a completely different 
perspective on how to conceptualize the task of explaining ox-phos. This perspective involved 
positing completely different kinds of properties to biological entities due to his conviction 
that lower levels, alone, are unable to account for the chemical reactions constituting ox-phos 
in a living organism.95 Prebble (2001) identifies the impetus of Mitchell's thinking in this 
regard  to  the  juxtaposition  of  different,  wholly  speculative,  philosophical  concepts  that 
Mitchell  postulated  in  private  writings,  which,  Prebble  convincingly  argues,  motivated 
Mitchell's thinking about scientific phenomena. These “philosophical concepts” included the 
notions of a “statid”,  “fluctid”,  and “fluctoid” (Prebble 2001, 442),  which represent  three 
fundamental  kinds  of  abstract  entities  populating  the  world.  The  notions  correspond, 
respectively,  to  a  static,  component  object,  a  simple  component  process,  and,  most 
importantly, an object constantly involved in a dynamic process. For considerations of space, 
two  summary  considerations96 are  important  for  the  discussion  here:  Firstly,  calling  a 
particular phenomenon a “fluctoid” ostensibly implies ascribing a holistic character to that 
phenomenon,  in  the  sense  that  the  phenomenon  possesses  properties  irreducible,  and  yet 
constituted by, simpler forms of matter that compose it (ibid.; Prebble and Weber 2003, 50; 
see also Section 5.3.1).  In  this  way,  the notions  of  a  statid  and a  fluctid  are,  in  a  sense, 
“simpler” than a fluctoid, but each kind of entity is equally necessary for accounting for all  
the phenomena of  the natural  world.  “Fluctoids” for  Mitchell  comprised,  quintessentially, 
biological phenomena that could only be partially explained using investigative approaches 
that treated them in a static fashion (i.e. as fluctids and statids).97 Secondly, Mitchell's personal 
philosophy was inspired by his interest by a philosophical movement in biological research 
during the first decades of the 20th century called  organicism. In particular, the writings of 
Joseph Woodger and Joseph Needham were directly responsible for Mitchell's thoughts on 
95  That the levels concept captures this insight into Mitchell's thinking is a novel contribution to philosophical 
discussions of oxidative phosphorylation, and will be unpacked in the rest of this chapter.
96  Mitchell's personal philosophy is analyzed at great length in Prebble and Weber's (2003) biography of Peter  
Mitchell, particularly in Chapter 4.
97  For instance, one quintessential property of being a fluctoid was the ability to self-regulate internal processes 
by interacting with the entity's  immediate environment (Prebble and Weber 2003, 49-50).  This property, 
which Mitchell motivated by citing the living cell as an exemplary case,  is one of the central properties 
identified in living things as a means of demarcating them from non-living things.
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fluctoids, and specifically its status as holistic-biological concept by which to (1) differentiate 
life from non-life and (2) articulate the distinct challenges of properly explaining living and 
non-living phenomena (Prebble 2001, 444-446). This point is of substantial importance, as 
will become clear in the next chapter, where the Cambridge organicists efforts to develop the 
levels concept as a scientific concept will be analyzed in their own right.
 
The effect of this  philosophical conviction concerning holistic  (“biological”) properties of 
living systems is palpable in even Mitchell's early writings on chemiosmosis. Here, as in later 
writings, the role of the levels concept (particularly the suggestion to “move to a new level”) 
in his reasoning about ox-phos is undeniable. Indeed, Mitchell's original articulation of his 
chemiosmotic hypothesis is decisively shaped by the use of levels of organization as a tool to 
re-structure  the problem of  ox-phos.  This  becomes astoundingly clear  in  the  way that  he 
relates  his  hypothesis  to  the chemical  conception of  the problem of  ox-phos held by the 
biochemical community at large:
“At  present,  the  orthodox  view of  the  coupling  of  phosphorylation  to  electron  and 
hydrogen  transfer  in  oxidative  and  photosynthetic  phosphorylation  stems  from 
knowledge of substrate-level phosphorylation...There are a number of facts about the 
systems  catalyzing  oxidative  and  photosynthetic  phosphorylation  that  are  generally 
acknowledged to be difficult  to  reconcile  with this  orthodox (chemical)  view of  the 
mechanism of coupling: (a) The hypothetical 'high-energy' intermediates...are elusive to  
identification. (b)  It is not clear why  phosphorylation should be so closely associated 
with membranous structures” (Mitchell 1961, 144-145, emphasis added).”
This passage accomplishes two things, which are illustrated by the highlighted terms: First, it 
expressly  identifies  the  ox-phos  problem,  as  understood  at  the  time  by  the  biochemical 
community, as being located at one level of organization (that of a “substrate”). Mitchell uses 
this as the basis for calling the orthodox characterization of the problem as the “chemical 
view”.  Secondly,  it  identifies  several  difficulties  that  this  characterization  of  the  problem 
creates  for  the  explanation  of  ox-phos,  which,  he  goes  on  to  argue,  his  chemiosmotic 
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hypothesis is capable of solving.98 Specifically, Mitchell points out that by incorporating a 
new  level  of  organization  into  the  characterization  of  the  problem  of  ox-phos,  his 
chemiosmotic  hypothesis  is  capable  of  dealing with both  (a)  the  difficulty in  finding the 
highly-anticipated chemical intermediate (i.e., the intermediates “do not exist” (ibid. 148), and 
(b) accounting for why ox-phos is “so closely associated with membranous structures” (i.e. 
because new types of structures are required to adequately explain ox-phos) (ibid. Mitchell 
1966,  1509).  Here,  again,  the  key  to  understanding  the  changes  that  the  chemiosmotic 
hypothesis would bring to the problem of ox-phos is expressed as a hypothetical level claim. 
In Mitchell's own words:
“The purpose of this article is to suggest that in view of the difficulties confronting the 
orthodox  chemical  conception  of  coupling  in  [ox-phos],  one  might  now  profitably 
consider the basic requirements and potentialities of a type of mechanism that is based 
directly on the group translocation conception [i.e. how H+ protons are transferred and 
regulated in the ox-phos reaction]. This type of mechanism differs fundamentally from 
the orthodox one in that it depends absolutely on a supramolecular organization of the  
enzyme systems concerned. Such supramolecularly organized systems can exhibit what 
I have called chemi-osmotic coupling” (Mitchell 1961, 145, emphasis added).
Recall that in 1961, there was no direct evidence for Mitchell's chemiosmostic mechanisms, 
as he himself admits that the hypothesis exploits already existing research as “circumstantial” 
support for his ideas (ibid.).  Instead, at the time of his first publication on chemiosmosis, 
Mitchell claimed that his real contribution to the investigation of ox-phos was to change the 
way that biochemists conceived of the explanatory task facing them. This would involve, 
Mitchell believed, not only introducing new level-bound resources into the description of the 
ox-phos system, but also an accompanying change in the explanatory significance of these 
resources,  which  he  makes  clear  in  the  conclusion  of  his  (1961)  paper:  “This  simple 
hypothesis also has the merit that it represents the result of carrying to its logical conclusion 
the present trend towards recognizing the equivalent status of supramolecular and molecular  
features in the channelling of chemical processes in living organisms” (Mitchell 1961, 148).
98  Mitchell discusses six difficulties in total, but the two cited have already been established for the discussion,  
and are sufficient for the point being made.
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Other  historians  and  philosophers  of  biology,  in  their  analyses  of  Mitchell's  manifold 
contributions to the explanation of ox-phos, support the contention here that the impact of the 
chemiosmotic hypothesis, at least initially, was not the empirical success it exhibited (this 
would come later), but rather the shift in the kind of problem biochemists saw themselves as  
engaging. For instance, John Prebble writes that:
“When the weaknesses of Slater's  approach began to be apparent around 1960, new 
approaches became desirable if only to widen thinking in the field and new hypotheses 
emerged...The  contribution  of  Mitchell  highlights  the  importance  of  a  biological  
approach to biochemical problems. His approach lack[ed] the skills of a chemist and the 
appreciation  of  proteins  but  exploit[ed]  the  growing  knowledge  of  biological 
membranes.” (Prebble 2012, 707, emphasis added)
Likewise, Allchin (1998) points out the direct empirical relevance of Mitchell's 'biological' 
characterization of the problem would later have on the eventual  explanation of ox-phos, 
despite the counterintuitive changes to approaching how ox-phos needed to be understood, at 
least according to the prevailing wisdom in biochemistry at the time:
“To someone accustomed to picturing chemical reactions in terms of something like the 
bouncing ping pong ball model of gases, the spatial aspect of these processes [such as 
respecting level-bound distinctions between components of the metabolic system] as 
proposed  by  Mitchell  were  strange  indeed.  The  chemiosmotic  formulation  implied 
experimentally, for instance, that one could not – as biochemists like Racker and Slater 
generally did –  simply tear apart the mitochondrion, isolate its essential components,  
throw them back together again in a test tube an expect them to work” (Allchin 1998, 7-
8).
The case of oxidative phosphorylation therefore exemplifies not only the use of the levels 
concept to pursue a very particular epistemic goal in a real (and highly significant) case of  
biological  research,  it  offers  to  shed  new  light  on  why  Peter  Mitchell's  chemiosmostic 
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hypothesis was in fact so influential. 
4.6 Conclusion
According to the account of levels articulated here, the concept of 'levels of organization' is a 
fragmentary  concept  whose  character  exhibits  multiple  distinct,  yet  legitimate,  particular 
forms across different contexts of usage. Simultaneously, this pluralist character of the levels 
concept is complemented by a relatively stable epistemic goal across these different contexts, 
i.e.  to  structure  explanatory  problems.  This  account  was  exemplified  at  length  in  the 
explanation of oxidative phosphorylation, which demonstrates the epistemic goal developed 
in Section 4.4 motivating the use of levels in both a descriptive and hypothetical manners.
The account of levels developed here differs strongly from the other philosophical accounts of 
levels  analyzed  in  Chapter  2.  In  contrast  to  the  layer-cake  account,  levels  are  not  rigid, 
monolithic,  and  comprehensive,  but  rather  encompass  a  broad  range  of  instances  of  the 
concept  whose  overarching  character  is  determined  contextually,  i.e.  from  a  particular 
disciplinary perspective. In this respect, the account offered here nominally agrees with the 
mechanistic account in treating level claims as contextually determined claims. However, the 
account offered here also differs from the mechanistic account in that the character of the 
levels concept as developed here is not hopelessly contextual, i.e. individual uses of levels are 
restricted  to  only a  particular  phenomenon.  Instead,  some degree  of  general  applicability 
holds for the use of the levels concept, though no claim was made to the precise extent of this 
application. Finally, the account offered here differs from both the layer-cake and mechanistic 
accounts  in  that  it  treats  the  levels  concept  independently  from any  specific  embedding 
philosophical projects, such as the Unity of Science, theoretical reductionism, or mechanistic 
explanation. Though there may be an indisputable role for levels in understanding these other 
respective projects, the purpose of the analysis given here is to understand the character and 
significance of levels of organization in science, and in particular the biological sciences. At 
the same time, however, though the account developed here shows that levels may be treated 
independently of  any embedding philosophical  project,  it  also  argues  that  the  concept  of 
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levels can thrive only when the context in which it is applied is well-defined (see also Eronen 
2013). Though the character of a specific use of the concept of levels is determined in a 
contextualized manner,  the significance of the term (embodied by the concept's  epistemic 
goal) shows the concept of levels to be of wide interest to the biological sciences.
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Chapter  Five:  The  Organicist  Roots  of  the  Levels 
Concept
5.1 Introduction
Turning now towards a more sustained analysis of the levels concept, this chapter will turn to 
the historical usage of the concept in biology. In this chapter, the origin of the concept of 
“levels of organization” in contemporary biology will be traced to the organicist movement of 
the 1920's and 1930's.99
At the beginning of the 20th century, a number of interrelated debates concerning the nature of 
life and how best to explain living phenomena were occurring in both philosophy and science. 
These debates included the positions known as mechanism, vitalism,  and emergentism.100 At 
the backdrop of this state of affairs,  organicism was a movement in the biological sciences 
that began to take shape in the 1910's and the 1920's, and was conceived by its proponents as 
an alternative to the other intellectual positions engaged in these debates (Section 5.2). The 
organicist movement produced prescient ideas about the disciplinary structure of biology as a 
whole  and  more  particularly  the  nature  of  biological  phenomena  as  scientific  objects  of 
investigation  and  explanation.  Organicist  writers  forcefully  argued  for  the  autonomy  of 
biology and its phenomena from the physical sciences, and for its acknowledgment as in itself 
a  legitimate  natural  science.  In  this  endeavor,  they  postulated  a  pluralistic  conception  of 
biology,  where  different  biological  disciplines  constitute  distinct,  non-reducible,  and 
independently necessary areas of inquiry.  101 Concurrent to this interest in the structure of 
99 Philosophical interest in the organicist movement is rapidly growing in contemporary philosophy of biology 
(see especially Nicholson 2010, 2012; Gibson 2013; Baedke 2013; Nicholson and Gawne 2014). This chapter 
is hence meant also as a contribution to this growing body of literature, in addition to its contribution the 
overall thesis being developed in this dissertation.
100 The issues  surrounding emergentism were more centered about  the nature of the mind and phenomenal 
consciousness. The emergentists nevertheless took their cue from the vitalists, and argued for a levels-based 
understanding of articulating qualitatively new properties than the physical things out of which they were  
composed. This will be discussed below in Section 5.2.
101 This understanding of pluralism relates both to biology  as a whole and to the  particular disciplines that 
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biology  as  a  branch  of  science,  organicist  writers  also  argued  that  a  new  conception  of 
biological  phenomena  was  necessary in  order  to  construct  adequate  explanations for  the 
phenomena  encountered  by  biologists  (Section  5.3).  This  conception  centered  on  the 
postulation of biological  entities and processes as continuous with,  but ultimately distinct 
from, physical and chemical phenomena.
The linchpin of these ideas, and consequently for the philosophical identity of the organicist 
movement, was a sophisticated conception of levels of organization (Abir-Am 1987, 12; cf. 
Gilbert  and  Sarkar  2000,  3;  see  Sections  5.3  and  5.4).  The  organicist  view of  levels  of 
organization was actively developed by its proponents, after borrowing the term “levels of 
reality”  (alternatively,  “levels  of  being”)  from the concurrent,  but  ultimately independent, 
debate regarding emergentism (Section 5.2; but cf.  Blitz 1992, 151-156). The program of 
organicism, which was unorthodox102 for the time, applied the levels concept to express the 
significance  of  both  the  undeniable  explanatory  and  methodological  successes  of  the 
mechanist  program  in  biology  with  a  more  subtle  and  sophisticated  articulation  of  the 
importance  of  “holistic”  features  of  biological  phenomena,  in  contrast  to  vitalism's  more 
vulgar and problematic claims (Section 5.2). 
The organicists' interest in, and initial development of, the levels concept lay the groundwork 
for a more general account of levels, which later came to be known in biology as “integrative 
levels of organization” (Needham 1937[1943]; Novikoff 1945a; Feibleman 1954; Siqueiros 
and Umerez 2007; see Section 5.4). This account continued to influence biological thought 
well after the decline of organicism. In fact, the levels-mediated view of the world offered by 
organicism, and many of the ideas that the organicists expressed for biological explanation 
using this account, are still widely present today in the biological literature. The integrative  
account of levels represents relatively unknown conception of levels in philosophy, and so 
will be detailed here in Section 5.4.
belong to biology. See Section 5.5 for more.
102 Unorthodox at least, given the official narrative of the history of philosophical interest in biology as given by 
philosophers; i.e. that there was no real philosophy of biology (see, e.g., Matthen and Stephens 2007, xi).
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The historical analysis offered here will develop two arguments in support of the analysis of 
levels developed in the foregoing chapters, and for philosophical interest in the levels concept 
in general. First, the integrative account of levels developed by the organicists undermines the 
status of the layer-cake account  offered by Oppenheim and Putnam (1958) as the default 
conception  of  levels  in  philosophy.  For  one  thing,  the  integrative  account  of  levels  was 
constructed  independently  from Oppenheim and  Putnam's  layer-cake  account  and  overall 
Unity of  Science project,  and the organicists'  principal  work on levels  even precedes  the 
former's (1958) publication by almost thirty years. In fact, Oppenheim and Putnam do not 
seem to have been aware of the organicists' work on levels, and do not cite any of the writers  
or papers that contributed to, or actively advertised, the integrative account. Additionally, the 
integrative account also more accurately reflects  how scientists themselves conceptualized 
levels  of organization.  The principle reason for this  is  that the account  was by and large 
constructed  by  scientists,  though  some  philosophers  (most  notably  Woodger  1929[1967]; 
1930 and Feibleman 1954; cf. Abir-Am 1991, 171) also contributed to the articulation of the 
account. Moreover, a comparison between the organicists' integrative account of levels and 
the depiction of levels of organization in biological literature reveals far more similarity than 
with  the  layer-cake  account  (Section  1.4;  Section  5.5).  A direct  comparison,  conversely, 
between the integrative account and the mechanistic account is more difficult to execute, due 
to  the  mechanistic  conception  of  levels  being  so  thoroughly  tied  to  the  (contemporary 
philosophical) concept of a ‘mechanism’, and more generally with the account of mechanistic 
explanation offered by New Mechanists such as Craver (2007a) and Bechtel (2008).103 Hence, 
this  chapter  will  again  focus  on  the  layer-cake  account,  which,  as  will  be  seen,  is  more 
impacted by the integrative account anyway.
Second,  the  analysis  offered  in  this  chapter  supports  the  claim  that  the  organicists  were 
responsible for establishing the epistemic goal motivating the usage of the levels concept in 
biology,  which  was  developed  in  the  last  chapter.  This  epistemic  goal,  i.e.  to  structure 
explanatory problems in biology, manifested itself in the usage of the levels concept by the 
103  An analysis of the mechanistic account has, furthermore, already been offered by Eronen (2013; 2014) who, 
in agreement with the analysis given in Chapter 2, has concluded that the mechanistic account of levels “is 
too limited as a theory of levels” to be of use for a general analysis of the concept. As also argued in Chapter  
2, the mechanistic conception of levels is best seen as a contrast point to the layer-cake account.
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organicists  while  defending the main  tenets  of  their  program.  Initially,  the levels  concept 
aided the organicists in articulating their conception of biological phenomena as objects of 
explanation, and the autonomous status of biology as a legitimate natural science distinct from 
the physical sciences (Section 5.3). This use of levels was begun by Joseph Woodger in his 
1929 book and a follow-up 1930 article. Soon thereafter 'levels of organization' was actively 
used, and advocated (especially by Joseph Needham), as a means to elucidate the structure of 
biological phenomena for the purposes of explanation. After doing this, Needham later took 
the levels concept and began developing the concept into a more encompassing account that 
transformed  the  levels  concept  from a  specialized  notion  used  in  the  construction  of  the 
organicist program to a full-fledged account of its own. For these reasons, the organicists’ 
work in developing the levels concept, and its direct uptake into the integrative account of 
levels  by other biologists  of the time,  not  only support the arguments  made in foregoing 
chapters, it also explains the programmatic character that imbued the organicists' own usage 
of the levels concept (Section 5.3.1).
One tentative bridge between the contemporary and historical usage of ‘levels’ developed in 
the last chapter and the historical usage of ‘levels’ that will be developed in this chapter is the  
influence of organicism on the personal philosophy of Peter Mitchell, who, as seen in the last 
chapter, implemented the levels concept into his chemiosmotic hypothesis. In Section 4.5, the 
role of the levels concept, and particularly its role in structuring the explanatory problem of 
ox-phos, was discussed at length. That analysis, it should now be said, was provided with the 
aid  of  hindsight;  i.e.  it  now  known  (i)  how  ox-phos  works,  and  (ii)  that  Mitchell’s 
chemiosmotic  hypothesis  turned  out  to  be  the  correct  explanation.  Why  Mitchell  himself 
looked to levels-tinged language to develop his chemiosmotic  hypothesis  can partially  be 
answered by looking to the inspiration that Mitchell himself found in looking at particular 
organicist  writers  (especially  Joseph  Needham and  Joseph  Woodger)  during  his  doctoral 
training at Cambridge (Section 5.6)
The movement called organicism (alternatively “organismal” or “organismic” biology) does 
not designate a clearly-defined group of people, but rather a loosely-knitted group of scientists 
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and  philosophers  distributed  among  many  disciplines.  These  included  biochemistry  and 
embryology  (Needham  1936),  genetics  (Waddington,  1940),  physiology  (Woodger  1929 
[1966]; Needham 1934; 1936), cell and molecular biology (Novikoff 1945a), ecology (Rowe 
1961), and even psychology and sociology (Needham 1943, Redfield 1942).  Furthermore, 
though this “movement” extended approximately from the mid-1910's to (approximately) the 
early 1960's, with early roots in the late 19th century, it designates only a very rough continuity 
in the issues that it treated, and the arguments articulated for these issues. During this time, 
organicist ideas were continuously associated, dissociated, and re-associated with vitalism, the 
school of thought it was originally explicitly formulated to reject.
For this reason, an implicit distinction will be observed in what follows between different 
“groups”  of  organicist  thought.  Specifically,  “organicism”  will  refer  here  to  a  group  of 
researchers  based  primarily  in  Cambridge,  i.e.  Cambridge  organicism,104 consisting 
particularly of C.W. Waddington, Joseph Needham, and Joseph Henry Woodger, who formed 
the core of the Theoretical  Biology Club,  a  circle  of friends  and colleagues  interested in 
developing a novel scientific program for the study of biological phenomena (Abir-Am 1987; 
Senechal  2013,  Ch.  12).  The  work  of  this  small  but  influential  group  of  scientists  and 
philosophers,  and especially that  of  Needham, will  form the basis  of  the analysis  in  this 
chapter. Though other scientists also actively, and independently, contributed to developing 
organicist  thought  writ  large (e.g.  Haldane  1916;  Ritter  1919;  cf.  Mayr  1981,  66-67),  a 
comprehensive treatment of organicism's history will be far beyond the scope of this chapter.
105 Some  deviations  from  the  Cambridge  organicists'  vision  of  organicism  will  later  be 
considered in connection to contrastive interpretations of certain elements of the organicism 
program, many of which were problematic for the “movement” at large.
104 Unless otherwise noted, ‘organicism’ will refer to ‘Cambridge organicism’. Where the latter  is explicitly 
mentioned, it is meant to contextualize the respective passage within the organicist movement at large.
105 Several authors have recently offered summaries of organicism and its main tenets. Gilbert and Sarkar (2000) 
give a short summary of organicism, and reintroduce its basic tenets as a live program for developmental 
biology. Allen (2005) offers a historically informed analysis of the organicist program vis-á-vis the New 
Mechanism.
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5.2 The Historical Context of the Levels Concept
By  the  1910's  an  influential  debate  had  emerged  concerning  the  nature  of  biological 
phenomena and what comprised their explanation. One side of the debate held that biological 
phenomena were “nothing over and above” their physico-chemical components; that e.g., the 
phenomena that comprise life and living things, like physical non-living phenomena, posed no 
special problems to constructing a scientific explanation for them. In other words, biological 
phenomena can, in principle, eventually be exhaustively accounted for in only chemical or 
physical terms. This position, called mechanism,106 hinged strongly on the premise that living 
phenomena, though complex, are structured in a way fundamentally similar to machines, and 
that  understanding  them  would  be  an  inevitability  of  scientific  progress  (Bechtel  and 
Richardson 1993[2010], 17; Allen 2005, 264; Loeb 1912, 1916; cf. Nicholson 2012, 160). The 
mechanist  approach to  conceptualizing  and explaining  biological  phenomena in  the  early 
decades  of  the  20th century  can  for  this  reason  be  seen  as  being  a  strongly  reductionist 
position.
The other side of the debate rejected both of these mechanistic claims, i.e. that biological 
phenomena are “nothing over and above” their physical constituents and the machine analogy 
between  life  and  non-life.  This  broadly  anti-reductionist position,  known  as  vitalism, 
postulated a qualitative distinctiveness possessed by life and living things. In this endeavor, 
the vitalists argued that living things and the processes that constitute them are in some way 
qualitatively  distinct  from  their  physico-chemical  components,  and  that  new,  hitherto 
unformulated ways of conceptualizing and explaining living things were necessary to account 
for biological phenomena. The vitalists made two particularly strong claims concerning how 
to  conceptualize  the  study  of  biological  phenomena.  Firstly,  and  most  importantly,  they 
imposed a strong dualistic status to biological phenomena; i.e. that life occupies a completely 
different  ontological  category  than  physical,  non-living  phenomena.  For  the  vitalists, 
explaining living phenomena in terms of their constituent parts was incapable, in principle, of 
106  This use of ‘mechanism’ differs starkly from that of the New Mechanism philosophy that is responsible for  
the mechanistic account of levels discussed in Chapter 2. Rather, it will refer here to a program for scientific  
for scientific research from the early 20th century. For a basic history of this program, see Allen (1975, ch. 4), 
and Nicholson (2012).
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capturing phenomena as biological for scientific purposes. Secondly, the vitalists also argued 
for distinguishing between the proper areas of inquiry constituting, respectively, the physical 
and the biological sciences. Both of these claims, in significantly modified form, would be 
taken up as issues by the organicists (see especially Section 5.3).
The  mechanist-vitalist  dispute  comprised  several  dimensions  of  disagreement  in  their 
respective  claims.  Broadly  speaking,  these  disagreements  can  be  divided  between 
metaphysical and epistemological issues. Metaphysically, both sides disagreed starkly with 
the  other  concerning  the  ontological  status  of  biological  phenomena.  The  mechanists,  in 
claiming that biological entities and processes were “nothing over and above” physical and 
chemical entities, defended a materialist position, i.e. the thesis that the world consists solely 
of the fundamental constituents of physical world, e.g., matter and energy. The vitalists, on the 
other hand, rejected materialism, and held that the physical universe simply does not exhaust 
the basic ontology of the natural universe (Allen 2008, 51-4). Instead, some kind of “vital 
force” was said to imbue life with an extra quality, which could account for the distinctness 
between living and non-living matter. Of these, Henri Bergson's notion of élan vital and Hans 
Driesch's related notion of entelechy are perhaps the most famous attempts at articulating this 
vital  force (Allen 2008).  The reliance on these notions ultimately doomed vitalism to the 
status  of  a  speculative,  phlogistonal  metaphysics  (ibid.).  These  vital  forces  were  widely 
deemed to be blatantly pseudoscientific concepts that served only to make any vitalist claims 
empirically unverifiable and scientifically questionable.
The dispute between the mechanists and the vitalists also had an epistemological dimension, 
which has not been addressed in philosophy as effectively as their metaphysical disagreement. 
This, upon initial reflection, is not entirely surprising. This disagreement centered on how to 
propose new approaches to explaining biological phenomena in a way that captured what was 
distinct  about  living  phenomena.107 In  pursuit  of  their  epistemological  claims,  vitalist 
researchers eventually ran into a wall when trying to articulate more concretely what their 
position  amounted  to.  In  particular,  vitalists  were  incapable  of  coherently expressing  the 
meaning of, or even further developing, key terms in their anti-mechanist position, such as the 
107 This issue has also received increased attention recently, seen especially in a new and insightful (2015) paper 
by Doug Russell, and also the recent (2013) anthology on vitalism edited by Normandin and Wolfe. 
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“qualitatively  distinctiveness”  of  living  things  from  physico-chemical  things,  and  the 
“autonomy”  of  biological  phenomena  from  other  materialistic  phenomena  found  in  the 
physical sciences. In order to account for these ideas, and the anti-reductionist arguments that 
they were meant to support, vitalists referred back to their intangible and non-existent “vital 
forces” to give their  program scientific substance.  Since neither an account for biological 
explanation nor a viable research program could be concretely offered by the vitalists, the 
epistemological disagreement between the mechanists and the vitalists is often quickly passed 
over  or  ignored  by philosophers.  These questions  would later  be capitalized upon by the 
organicists (see below). 
The decisive reliance of the vitalists on this postulation guaranteed that the dispute would 
remain by and large a metaphysical one. The vitalist movement quickly faded away, as they 
sought  also  to  demonstrate  the  inability  of  the  mechanist  program to  adequately  explain 
biological phenomena (Allen 2008). The mechanist program, in stark contrast, survived and 
proliferated because of the success it demonstrated in producing successful explanations for 
the phenomena the vitalists claimed were fundamentally impossible for the program (Bechtel 
and  Richardson  1993[2010];  see  also  Nicholson  2012).  The  success  attributed  to  the 
mechanist program (i.e. its robust track record of producing reliable explanation) seems hence 
to be a result not only of marshaling evidence from a wide array of cases of explanation 
across  biology  that  demonstrated  the  explanatory  usefulness  of  the  mechanist  approach. 
Rather,  with  the  failure  of  vitalism  as  an  instructive  historical  backdrop,  the  mechanist 
program also seems to have simply better  fit  scientist's own thinking about their  work as 
concerns explaining biological phenomena.
Though the  popularity of  vitalism would  not  last  long into  the  20th century,  a  variety of 
interrelated successor debates surrounding the issues of the mechanist-vitalist dispute quickly 
coalesced in the aftermath of the mechanist-vitalist dispute. These debates would go on to 
strongly influence various areas of philosophical discussion even well into the 21st century. 
This  splintering  of  debates  approximately  followed  the  metaphysical  and  epistemological 
lines of disagreement in the original mechanist-vitalist dispute concerning the reducibility of 
biological  phenomena  to  physical  phenomena.  One  of  these  debates,  that  concerning 
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emergentism,  was taken up by philosophers and focused on the metaphysical issue of the 
reducibility of “special” phenomena108 such as certain mental and biological properties, and 
the physical properties with which they are associated.109 The emergentists, especially Samuel 
Alexander  (1920),  C.  Lloyd  Morgan  (1923),  and  C.  D.  Broad  (1925),  defended  the 
irreducibility  of  certain  mental  properties,  especially  those  associated  with  phenomenal 
consciousness  (McLaughlin  1992;  Stephan  1999a).  However,  unlike  the  vitalists,  who 
postulated awkward and conceptually problematic vital forces to account for their notion of 
irreducibility,  the  emergentists  rejected  these  vital  forces  (see,  e.g.,  Alexander  1920,  64; 
Morgan 1923, 35), and introduced the notion of emergence, which proved to be more tractable 
to philosophical analysis than vitalist notions like  entelechy  et al.110 Emergence was instead 
articulated as a relation between the non-fundamental properties in question and the physical 
properties on which they  supervene, rather than a question regarding the substances of the 
world. In its strongest form, emergence refers to properties that are not, even in principle, 
reducible111 from the properties of their physical constituents. The opponents of emergentism, 
who again identified their position as “mechanism”, but perhaps better designated here as 
physicalism or metaphysical reductionism,112 argued that cases appearing to be non-reducible, 
i.e. emergent, vis-á-vis their physical components were actually nothing more than unfinished 
or immature projects of science, which, once properly understood, would comport with the 
108 Implicit  in the choice of the word “special” here is  the claim that  the emergentists followed the vitalist 
program in claiming a “special status” for the respective phenomena they chose to analyze. For the vitalists,  
these  included  “life”  and  living processes,  while  for  the  emergentists  it  was  the  mind and phenomenal 
consciousness.
109 The main difference between emergentism and vitalism was that the irreducibility ascribed by emergence 
concerned the relation between properties or sets of  properties,  whereas the irreducibility of vital  forces 
concerned the substances that nominally competed directly with materialistic (i.e. physical) matter to make  
up the fabric of the universe.
110 This does not mean that articulating the notion of emergence is without controversy. In fact, the coherence of 
emergence in the philosophy of mind is hotly debated even today, with a sprawl of positions ranging from flat 
denial of its meaningfulness (Kim 1999), affirmation of the concept (Chalmers 2006, in Clayton and Davies 
2006), and a slew of intermediate positions that differentiate between many possible forms the concept can 
take (Stephan 1999b). In the philosophy of science, emergence is also a prominent topic with a rather distinct  
line of discussion surrounding it (see, e.g., Clayton and Davies 2006; Mitchell 2009). The range of positions 
that one can take concerning emergence has even led some to denounce emergence and emergentism as  
vitalism in disguise. (Beckner 1969b).
111 Of course, understanding strong theses of emergence of this variety depend on which notion of “reduction” 
one entertains. In the debate surrounding emergentism (particularly in the philosophy of mind), reduction is 
understood as the ability to deduce the properties of the higher-level phenomenon from the properties of the 
lower-level phenomenon.
112 Following modern designations of the mechanist position (see McLaughlin 1992; Beckermann 1992; Kim 
1999; 2005)
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materialist view of the world. That is, emergent properties, like the biological phenomena that 
preoccupied the vitalists, would eventually be accounted for by the ontology of physics and 
chemistry (see, e.g., McLaughlin, 1992). 
This  debate  survives  even today as  a  topic  of  active research in  the philosophy of  mind 
regarding  the  reducibility  of  the  mind  to  the  physical  world,  where  reductionism  and 
emergentism  are  still  widely  analyzed  and  continue  to  constitute  viable  philosophical 
positions that are actively defended (Beckermann et al. 1992; Stephan 1999a; MacDonald and 
MacDonald 2010). Contemporary literature on emergence and physicalism of the mind indeed 
continues  to  cite  these  historical  predecessors  that  emerged  in  the  aftermath  of  the 
mechanism-vitalist dispute (ibid). The debate between the emergentists and the mechanists is 
also particularly noteworthy here because it is where the term “levels” was both coined and 
first  addressed as  a  significant  theoretical  concept  (Needham 1943,  234;  see also Section 
5.3.1). 
Concurrent  to  the  debate  surrounding  emergentism,  another  successor  debate  to  the 
mechanist-vitalist dispute also began to take shape in the 1920's: that between (once again) 
the  program of  mechanism and  what  came  to  be  known  as  organicism.  The  mechanist-
organicist dispute differed in several important respects from the debates mentioned above. 
For  one  thing,  this  debate,  in  contrast  to  those  involving  vitalism and emergentism,  was 
broadly  epistemological in that  it  did not  dabble deeply into the metaphysical  issues that 
occupied the other non-mechanist positions like emergentism and vitalism. The metaphysical 
dimension of disagreement between the mechanists and the emergentists and vitalists was 
essentially a non-issue for mechanism and organicism, since the organicists were in broad 
agreement  with  the  mechanist  position  concerning  the  materialist  status  of  biological 
phenomena.113 Indeed,  the  outright  rejection  of  vitalism,  and  affirmation  of  a  materialist 
ontology, constituted common ground to both organicist and mechanist arguments (Needham 
1928a, 34; 1941, 18; Woodger 1930, 6-7; Beckner 1969b, 550). Instead, the issues that the 
113 Some organicist writers did provoke a metaphysical dispute with the materialist ontology of the mechanists, 
particularly J.S.  Haldane  and  Alfred  North  Whitehead,  whose  respective  conceptions  of  holism directly 
postulated conceptions of qualitative distinctiveness that were deemed to be obscurantist by their mechanist  
and organicist contemporaries alike. This issue will be revisited below. 
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organicists engaged concerned the nature and status of biological phenomena as objects of 
legitimate scientific study, and how best to investigate them as such. Organicism can for this 
reason  be  distinguished  from vitalism,  and emergentism,  in  virtue  of  advocating  a  non-
reductionist rather than an  anti-reductionist position. The central criticism of the mechanist 
program expressed by the organicists was not the categorical failure of the mechanists  in 
capturing the qualitative essence of life, but rather the adequacy of the program for explaining 
and conceptualizing all of life's phenomena (see Section 5.3 below). 
More generally, another aspect of the mechanist-organicist dispute was the organicists' interest 
in  establishing  the  autonomy  of  the  biological  sciences  from  the  physical  sciences. 
Interestingly,  even  here  this  did  not  entail  demarcating  themselves  completely  from  the 
mechanist  program with idle criticisms of the ontological inadequacy of their  reductionist 
approach, as occurred with the vitalists. Rather, it entailed the construction of a framework in 
which  a  conception  of  biological  problems could  be  constructed,  which  the  organicists 
deemed  to  be  more  adequate  explanatory  framework  for  working  biologists.  For  the 
organicists, the autonomy of the biological sciences from the physical sciences can be seen as 
a claim made to offer a productive alternative for how to express the tasks that lay before 
scientists  in  explaining  biological  phenomena,  which  the  mechanist  program  did  not 
adequately appreciate (see Section 5.3). This alternative, the organicists said, was superior to 
the reductionist option offered by the mechanists in that it complemented the framework laid 
out by the mechanists (Needham 1928a, 34-35, 39).
A key premise to the organicists' program was their use of the levels concept to articulate their 
specific claims. The organicists developed the levels-based hierarchical view of the world that 
had already begun to take shape in the mechanist-vitalist dispute (Hoernlé 1918, 465), and 
received particular attention in the discussion concerning emergentism (McLaughlin 1992, 50; 
Alexander 1920, 3; Morgan 1923, 5-6). The organicist program used the levels concept to 
construct an image of nature in which the major constituents of the natural world could be 
divided in terms of their organization. In particular, this view of the world postulated that the 
way that the components and processes of a particular phenomenon are arranged captures the 
differentiation of kinds of things (see Section 5.3 “Holism and Organization”). This was then 
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in  turn used to  (1)  articulate  the  difference  between life  and non-life,  and (2)  ascribe  an 
ordered rendering of structure-related behavior in biological phenomena. To accomplish these 
tasks, the organicists took up the original “levels of reality” concept of the emergentists, and 
further developed the concept into levels of organization (see Section 5.3.1). 
Organicism for this reason presents a fertile but largely forgotten historical episode in the 
philosophy of biology (cf. Gilbert and Sarkar 2000; Nicholson and Gawne 2014). Its program 
was prescient in the nuance and subtlety with which it expressed its view of the study of 
biology.114 Nevertheless, much of the substance that made up organicist thought, expressed 
through its conception of levels of organization, survives today in contemporary biological 
thought.  The depictions  of  levels in  introductory textbooks and educational  commentaries 
(Section 1.4) often reproduce organicist theses wholesale as now basic knowledge concerning 
how to conceptualize the study of biological phenomena in general. The initial controversy 
that  spurned both the vitalists  and the  organicists  concerning how to fit  biology into  the 
natural  sciences  has  now long  since  dissipated,  and  the  life  sciences  are  now seen  as  a 
complementary partner to the physical sciences in the study of nature.
While the metaphysical dimensions of the debate between vitalism and mechanism is well 
established and has received wide attention in the philosophical and historical literature, the 
epistemological issues of the mechanist-vitalist dispute that were addressed by the organicists 
have received relatively little recognition in the philosophy of biology. In fact, the legacy of 
organicist thought has been less than well-received by philosophical audiences (cf. Nicholson 
and Gawne 2014, 246-248). This points holds as well for the organicists' work on the levels 
concept  For  this  reason,  it  will  be  necessary  to  quickly  re-examine  the  content  of  the 
organicists’ scientific program, vis-á-vis it's contrast with mechanism and vitalism, in order to 
properly reconstruct their impact on contemporary issues in the science and philosophy of 
biology. Though a comprehensive treatment of this will be impossible here, its relevance to 
highlighting  the  importance  of  the  hitherto,  and  likewise,  neglected  account  of  levels  of 
114 The contributions of organicism are more clearly acknowledged in theoretical discussions within biology 
than in philosophy. In fact, organicist ideas of levels of organization have become so embedded in biology,  
their intellectual heritage is rarely linked explicitly back to their historical sources. This point was recently 
emphasized in Nicholson and Gawne's (2014) extended defense of Joseph Woodger's work as a progenitor to 
contemporary philosophy of biology. 
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organization that was constructed within the organicist movement will be directly noticeable.
5.3 The Organicist Program and the Levels Concept
The beginnings of organicist thought is generally claimed by later scholars to have been first 
articulated in the work of William Emerson Ritter, particularly his (1919) book The Unity of  
the  Organism (Beckner  1959,  185;  1967,  549;  Mayr  1982,  66).  The  members  of  the 
Theoretical Biological Club of the 1930's, who constituted Cambridge organicism, preferred a 
wider  base  of  historical  association,  citing  in  particular  J.S.  Haldane's  (1916)  Silliman 
Memorial lecture Organism and Environment as Illustrated by the Physiology of Breathing as 
their most relevant predecessor (and later contemporary, see Needham 1932b).115 In order to 
outline more specifically the content  of  the organicist  program and the role  of the levels 
concept within that program, the first part of this section will articulate the major tenets of the 
organicist program, while the latter two parts of this section will deal with the use of the 
levels concept by the organicists to defend these tenets as part of their program. 
5.3.1 The Tenets of the Organicist Program
Though vitalism turned out to be an empty promise due to the deficient arguments developed 
by its  proponents  (in  particular  the  postulation  of  the  life's  phlogistonal  vital  force),  the 
organicist program would go on to construct a robust alternative to the mechanist program. In 
stark contrast to the vitalists, the proponents of organicism actively worked to give their ideas 
a solid basis in scientific practice (see below). Nonetheless, the extent to which the organicists 
would succeed in their stated goals would later be debated through the middle of the 20th 
century (Beckner 1959, Ch. 9; Hein 1968; 1969, 1972; Hull 1974, Ch. 5; Roll-Hansen 1984). 
The organicist program was, in contrast to the vitalist program, largely epistemic in nature 
115 Needham  (1928a)  cites  even  earlier  writers  as  instigating  the  organicist  movement,  in  particular  Yves  
Delage's (1903) l'heredite et les grands problemes de la biologie generale.
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because of the organicists’ broad agreement with the materialist basis of existence.116 Indeed, 
the Cambridge organicists were careful to point this out in their arguments, since interpreting 
these tenets in a metaphysical way threatened to place organicism too close to vitalism. The 
disagreement between the mechanists and the organicists, instead, focused on how to best 
capture the difficulties of approaching biological phenomena as scientific (and materialistic) 
objects of inquiry.
In this endeavor the organicist program comprised several tenets that will be of particular 
interest in this chapter. These tenets present general claims concerning the overall view of the 
organicists  concerning both the nature of biological  phenomena and the autonomy of  the 
biological  sciences.  A centerpiece of the organicist  program, as mentioned above, was its 
surprisingly advanced conception of levels of organization, which they specifically developed 
in order to effectively articulate the tenets of their program (Section 5.3.1). The major tenets 
of  the  organicist  program important  for  this  discussion  include:  holism and organization, 
autonomy of the biological sciences from the physical sciences, and practical relevance to 
biological research. 
(1) Holism and Organization
Biological  phenomena  are  significantly  different  from  physical  phenomena  due  to  the 
presence  of  organization  in  living  things,  which  exhibits  a  degree  of  complexity  that  is 
unknown to non-living things (Needham 1928b, 79; 1936, viii;  1943, 18; 1945; Woodger 
1929 [1966], xviii-xix; Waddington 1940; 1957, 5).117 Due to the presence of organization, the 
organicists argued, one kind of phenomenon or phenomena (say cells) result in another kind 
of phenomenon or phenomena that manifest completely different features than those of which 
116 This commitment is captured by Needham, when he specifies that “[t]he mechanist, after all, never asserted 
that there was no difference between a stone dog and a real live dog; he only insisted that the processes going 
on in  the living dog were extremely complicated  special  cases  of  the processes  known to occur  in  the  
inorganic world” (Needham 1928a, 34).
117 The  presence  of  complexity was  offered  as  an  important  condition  with  which  to  distinguish  between 
biological and physical phenomena, as part-whole relationships can be found in both branches of science 
(Needham 1928a, 35).  This contention is supported, at least historically,  by Warren Weaver’s (1948) use 
“organized  complexity”  as  an  important  criterion  for  distinguishing  between  the  kinds  of  problems 
encountered in biology, as opposed to the “unorganized complexity” manifested by problems encountered in 
physical science.
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it is made (for instance, tissue). In effect, the organicists claimed that biological phenomena 
exhibit  holistic features that can only be adequately characterized by attributing to them a 
status  of  being  distinct  from  the  physical  and  chemical  constituents  of  which  they  are 
composed.  That  is,  the  wholes  to  which  physical  and  chemical  parts  belong  designate 
biological  entities  that  biologists  seek  to  investigate  and  study.  Due  to  the  presence  of 
organization  by their  parts,  these  entities  exhibit  behaviors  that  their  parts  cannot.  These 
phenomena are biological insofar as the wholes that exhibit these holistic features designate 
units that biologists typically investigate in their empirical work. Needham summarizes this 
idea in the following way:
“Thus,  on the organic  theory of  nature [i.e.  organicism],  all  the universe  is  seen to 
consist of wholes, or organisms, whose parts, as Lloyd Morgan would say, go together 
in substantial unity, or in other words, are only themselves so long as they remain in 
their  natural  places  within  the  whole  to  which  they  belong.  For  the  constitutive 
relationships or parts are not entities having an existence in their own right [i.e. they do 
not manifest the phenomenon to which they belong], but only in virtue of their position 
and function in the organism [i.e. organized whole] of which they form parts” (Needham 
1928a, 34. 118
The “substantial  unity”  to which Needham refers here is  meant  to express the thesis  that 
organized wholes that exhibit behaviors or properties that are not found in their constituent 
parts necessitate a differentiation of kind between those wholes and their constituent parts. 
That is, biological phenomena retain their identity, as scientific objects of study, only insofar 
as the problems that they pose to scientists are characterized (at least initially) in terms of the 
wholes to which they belong: Wholes are not  only their parts. In this way, the “constitutive 
relationships” of biological wholes to their parts is, in agreement with mechanism, sufficient 
to account for their  status as material entities (contra vitalism). At the same time,  contra 
118 This mention of Lloyd Morgan represents an interesting nod to the emergentists by a younger Needham in 
expressing  the  difference  between  biological  and  physico-chemical  phenomena.  The  exact  relationship 
between emergentism and organicism would allow more insight to be produced regarding the levels concept,  
which, for considerations of space, cannot be entered into at this time. For one thing, as will be seen below, 
an older Needham (1943) would later repudiate the contributions of the emergentists' to the understanding of  
the levels concept as being completely out of contact with scientific practice.
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mechanism,  the  whole  was  deemed  by  the  organicists  to  be,  at  least  sometimes,  “quite  
inadequate  for  the  problems  which  it  [mechanism]  was  required  to  answer  in  biology” 
(Needham 1928a, 31; emphasis added).
It  should  be  noted  that  the  holism  the  Cambridge  organicists  ascribed  to  biological 
phenomena  was  relatively  innocuous  in  comparison  to  other  meanings  that  'holism'  can 
connote. For the Cambridge organicists, the holism they attributed to organized wholes (i.e. 
“organisms”,  see  Nicholson  2010)  merely  captured  the  fact  that  biological  wholes  are 
different from their physical parts, and that, because of this, the way that we characterize the 
tasks involved in explaining such phenomena should reflect approaches that are appropriate 
for adequately capturing those features. This stands in stark contrast to not only the vitalist 
position, but also to stronger notions of differentiating physical and non-physical phenomena 
associated with, e.g., emergence, and even to other interpretations of holism given by other 
organicists  (like  J.S.  Haldane  and  Alfred  North  Whitehead).  Each  of  these  alternative 
positions attributed a special status to holistic features that went beyond merely postulating an 
important basic difference between biological and physical phenomena. The holism of the 
Cambridge  organicists  is  for  this  reason much  closer  to  what  Carl  Craver  (2007,  Ch.  6) 
defends as part and parcel to “nonfundamental explanation” in the biological sciences today.119
Conrad H. Waddington (1957), speaking to the same point as Needham above, includes a 
similar  clarification  of  the  organicist  interest  in  organized  wholes,  though  he  avoids 
problematic terms like “holism” or “emergence”, and speaks directly to systemic properties:
“The  problem  is  therefore  the  investigation  of  systems,  i.e.  components  related  or 
organised  in  a  specific  way.  The  properties  of  a  system are  in  fact  'more'  than  (or 
different from) the sum of the properties of its components, a fact often overlooked in 
zealous  attempts  to  demonstrate  'additivity'  of  certain  phenomena.  It  is  with  these 
'systemic properties' that we shall be mainly concerned. These only arise as a result of a 
119 In a nutshell, Craver argues that higher levels of organization are explanatory relevant (against reductionist 
and  causal  exclusion  arguments  to  the  contrary)  due  to  higher-level  properties  eliciting  appropriate  or 
proportional explanatory generalizations under causal interventions. This, he claims, demonstrates that “[t]he 
ability of organization to elicit novel causal  powers (that is,  nonaggregative behaviors and properties) is 
unmysterious both in scientific common sense and common sense proper” (Craver 2007, 217).
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particular  type  of  organisation,  i.e.  particular  functional  relationships  between  the 
components,  and  these  properties,  of  course,  'disappear'  when  that  organisation  is 
destroyed or altered. This is the reason why the physical sciences, often dealing with the  
same  components  as  those  in  organisms,  in  many  cases  fail  to  say  something  of  
relevance to the biologist” (Kacser, in Waddington 1957,120 191, emphasis modified; see 
also Waddington 1940, 142-143)
Due  to  the  relative  innocuous  character  of  the  Cambridge  organicists'  understanding  of 
holism, this tenet of the organicist program has often been criticized as “trivial” (Beckner 
1969b, 551) or otherwise unsurprising and exaggerated (Nagel 1961, ch. 12; David Hull 1974, 
ch.  5).121 From a  contemporary  perspective,  this  tenet  of  organicism can  indeed  now be 
considered basic knowledge in biology (see for instance Reece et al. 2010, 3; Solomon et al.  
2010; Section 1.4). However, what is interesting about the Cambridge organicists' stance on 
holistic features in biological phenomena is their emphasis on such features as a means of 
framing the issue in terms of explanatory adequacy, which was unique for its time (but see 
Russel 2015). It is hence a testament to the insights produced by the (Cambridge) organicists 
that the claims underlying this tenet are now considered common knowledge in contemporary 
biology.
(2) The Autonomy of Biology from the Physical Sciences
The organicists  saw at  the core of  the mechanist-vitalist  dispute regarding the distinction 
between  physico-chemical  phenomena,  and  biological  phenomena  a  deeper  disagreement 
regarding the status of biology as a natural science. Specifically, proponents of the mechanist 
program  in  biology  often  defended  the  (perhaps  exaggerated)  claim  that  an  adequate 
description of a biological system was only possible if one examined the parts of that system 
120 Kacser's essay appears an appendix in Waddington's book, which the latter found necessary to publish with 
the rest of the book's content.
121 Conversely,  others have criticized organicism as a whole for what is perceived as a dramatic vacillation 
between  different  meanings,  and  interpretations  for  the  significance  of,  holistic  features  in  biological  
phenomena presented by different factions of organicists (see especially Hull 1974, 125-127; Gilbert and 
Sarkar 2000, 4-5).
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in isolation of the whole (Hull 1974, 129; Allen 1975, 106). Implicit in these mechanistic 
claims was the further implication that the physical sciences were in themselves generally 
more adequate for explaining the problems that biological phenomena exhibited to scientists. 
Needham identifies  this  aspect  of  the  debate  as  the  introduction  of  a  “wall  of  partition” 
between the respective objects of study in the physical and the biological sciences:
“At this point no one who has examined the history of biological thought can fail to be 
impressed by the fact that here122 in a most striking manner a wall of partition has gone 
down between, not the organic and the inorganic, as might have been said ten years ago, 
but between the living and the non-living” (Needham 1928a, 34).
For  the  organicists,  the  biological  sciences  did  not  constitute  a  homogeneous  branch  of 
science  seeking  centralized  unity,  but  rather  a  cluster  of  distinct  scientific  fields  that 
investigate  different  aspects  of  nature,  as  revealed  by  the  diversity  of  different  kinds  of 
biological phenomena (see especially Abir-Am 1987, 10; Woodger 1929, 273, 288). These 
aspects of nature are not reducible to,  nor reproducible by,  other disciplines: Rather, each 
individual discipline in biology embodies different interests regarding, and different epistemic 
access to, natural phenomena (Needham 1936, 19-23; cf. Nicholson and Gawne 2014, 260, 
273123). 
It was therefore foolhardy, according to the organicists, to claim that, as a matter of principle, 
the problems of the biological sciences could be adequately solved by explanatory approaches 
and resources provided by the physical sciences. Needham (1928a) went on to point out that 
this disagreement originated neither in the debates of the mechanism-organicism dispute, nor 
in the mechanist-vitalist dispute, but rather was a reiteration of a debate with deep roots in the 
history of science. Hence, the mechanist “wall of partition” blocking the acknowledgment of 
the biological sciences as a legitimate and autonomous branch of natural science was argued 
122 See the above quote from the same text.  By “here” is  meant,  i.e.,  the dispute between the demarcation 
between physical phenomena and proper biological phenomena via the manifestation of holistic properties by 
the latter.
123 Nicholson and Gawne (2014) compellingly demonstrate the presence of this conviction in the writings of 
Joseph Woodger (ibid.).
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on the grounds that the physical sciences were explanatorily more fundamental:
 
“[I]t would be well to indicate that this question of the primacy as between physiology 
and  physics  is  not  so  barren  as  it  might  at  first  appear  [i.e.,  as  it  appeared  in  the 
mechanist-vitalist dispute, and in “obstructionist” or obscurantist organicist writers]. It 
has an importance for the practice of science as well as in philosophy. Very little study 
of the history of scientific thought is required to show that the tacit background of a 
great experimentalist's mental operations exercises a profound influence on the line of 
progress which knowledge takes. The instance which here specially concerns us is the 
difference  in  opinion  between  Louis  Pasteur  and  Justus  von  Liebig  over  the 
fermentation question...Pasteur adopted a physiological view, and insisted on looking at 
the metabolic activity of the yeast-cell as the important factor; but Liebig made every 
effort to disregard it for fear of a possible surrender to vitalism. To [Liebig], chemistry  
was much more fundamental than physiology, and he felt that any explanation which  
involved living organisms was a backward step. The effects of this dichotomy of opinion 
on the history of biology were very far-reaching, and even after the demonstration that 
the yeast-cell was an essential element in fermentation there remained two trends of 
though, one considering the yeast-cell only as the carrier of the essential enzyme, and 
the other thinking it as a physiological entity with a metabolism of its own” (Needham 
1928a, 32-33, emphasis added; see also Hein 1969, 239).
Against this claim of the fundamentality of the physical sciences, the organicists once again 
responded  on  the  grounds  of  a  more  nuanced  understanding  of  explanatory  adequacy. 
Woodger speaks to this effect, arguing from the organicist stance on biological phenomena to 
the autonomy of biology:
“The laws of mechanics provided by physics do not enable us to predict the course 
taken by a ball in a game of tennis. This is because a game of tennis involves persons, 
their  aims, temperaments and skills,  and all  these are completely abstracted from in 
physics.  Chemistry,  as  such,  abstracts  from organisms as  viewed  by biologists,  and 
hence  from  [problems  arising  with  drug  interactions  with  an  unborn  fetus  during] 
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pregnancy. Consequently in the testing of drugs from a chemical standpoint there is a 
possibility  of  the  pregnancy of  the  patient  being  overlooked,  together  with  possible 
effects  on  the  foetus.  Owing  to  the  complexity of  organization  encountered  among 
living  things,  and  the  occurrences  between  them  of  parts  which  are  existentially 
dependent  upon  other  parts,  constituting  the  whole,  we  have  the  possibility  to  be 
reckoned  with  of  the  occurrence  of  so-called  internal  relations  between  such 
parts...Similar considerations may apply to the parts of  organisms at many different  
levels, and if this is the case it will mean that the chemical outlook will not always  
suffice but  will  require  supplementing  and checking from the biological  standpoint” 
(Woodger 1929 [1966], xviii-xix, emphasis added).
These extended quotations not only show how intimately the organicists' understanding of 
biological phenomena is connected to thinking about the status of biology as an autonomous 
science, it also introduces for the first time in this discussion the organicists' use of the levels 
concept as a means to articulate their program.124 
(3) Practical Relevance to Biological Research
For the organicists, drawing inferences about the structure of both science and nature should 
follow  from case-based  studies,  and  emphasize  principles  that  allow  for  context-specific 
details of the particular cases being treated to be filled in (see especially Waddington 1940, 
143-144).125 This complements both of the foregoing tenets in that despite the generalized 
character of the claims regarding, respectively, biological phenomena and the autonomy of 
biology, the inferences from which these claims are drawn should be informed by detailed 
acquaintance  with  scientific  research.  This  highlights  another  underlying  purpose  of  the 
organicist  project  in  offering  constructive  contributions  that  were  relevant  to  scientific 
practice, rather than merely theory (cf. Nicholson and Gawne 2014, 274-275; Russell 2015 
124 This will be further discussed below in Section 5.3.1.
125 This is a methodological point regarding the style of argument that the individual organicists employed to  
construct their arguments. It nonetheless remains true that the organicists were interested in establishing a 
novel program for the whole of biology.
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37-40).
This tenet of the organicist program is important to consider in regards to the attempts the 
program’s advocates to distance themselves from vitalism while offering a viable alternative 
to the mechanist program. Firstly, though the presence of complex organization is something 
that the organicists took to be widespread in, and even generally designative of, biological 
phenomena, it was by no means a vague or unanalyzable principle to which biologists should 
hold  themselves  accountable.  Rather,  discovering  and characterizing  the  organizational 
features of particular biological phenomena  on a case-to-case basis  constituted the “central 
problem” of biological explanation for the organicists (Needham 1932, 88-89, 92; 1934; 276; 
1936[1973], viii). This cannot be underemphasized as an exegetical point of the organicist 
program, and would be brought up again and again during the heyday of organicist thought in 
the 1930's (particularly by Needham) as the ultimate point of contrast between the Cambridge 
form of (i.e. “legitimate”) organicism, and the pseudoscientific extravagances of both vitalism 
and more obscurantist attempts at articulating the organicist program (see especially Needham 
1932, 89; 1932b, 525). These other positions, for the Cambridge organicists, were extremely 
problematic  precisely  because their  specialized notions  offered no practical  application in 
biological research. Take for instance the following comments from Needham:
“If  we take biological  organisation as  axiomatic,  that  is,  as  an essential  part  of  the 
impenetrable alogical core126, we at once remove it from the realm of experiment. We 
are  adopting  a  course  as  fruitless  as  it  would  be  to  take  the  chemical  elements  as 
axiomatic in physics and to make no attempt to go behind the periodic table into the 
realm of the electronic structure of atoms...The sublime expression 'I am that I am' is 
well suited to the manifestation of a deity, but when applied to the immediate problems  
confronting scientific workers, its use becomes nothing more than the frank confession  
of intellectual bankruptcy” (Needham 1936, 16, emphasis added; cf. Needham 1934 and 
1943, Ch. 1 for similar comments).
Despite  the  clarity  in  which  this  point  was  expressed  by the  Cambridge  organicists,  the 
126 By “alogical  core”,  Needham  is  specifically  referring  to  the  “arbitrary”  and  ultimately  unsubstantiated 
conviction informing vitalism's life force and to Haldane's notion of “organization” in organicism.
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emphasis on organization by the organicist movement at large would also become a point of 
criticism that later commentators would continue heap on the organicist program in general 
(Beckner  1969a,  1969b;  Heine  1969;  Roll-Hansen  1984).  For  now,  though,  this  point  is 
important to note as an important tenet of organicism as it not only presented their program as 
one oriented towards practical relevance to working scientists (in direct contrast to especially 
vitalism), it strengthened the two foregoing tenets. Specifically, it gives the first tenet above 
(holism and organization) a more justifiable grounding; namely, in experiment and practice, 
rather  than  theory  and  principle.  Similarly,  it  also  implied  that  biology,  in  being  an 
autonomous science, is simply more adequate for grasping and answering the problems that 
biological  phenomena  present  to  scientific  explanation.  For,  if  organization  in  biological 
systems is  a  problem that  practicing scientists  actively engage in  explaining,  this  in  turn 
vindicates its other claims that biological phenomena are different from physical phenomena, 
and the acknowledgment of the autonomy of biology.
The organicist  program served to both distinguish it  from vitalism's virtually non-existent 
epistemological program, which never progressed beyond  calls  for a dramatic shift  in the 
conception of life and how it was investigated (Allen 2008), and also to improve upon the 
epistemological issues articulated that, at one time, inspired the anti-mechanist sentiment of a 
physics-  and  chemistry-centered  conception  of  science.  The  resulting  program,  i.e. 
organicism, was rather unique for biology at the time (Allen, 1975, ch. 5; Gilbert and Sarkar 
2000; cf. Nicholson and Gawne 2014; Russell 2015127). The difference between vitalist claims 
of  the  qualitative  difference  between  living  and  non-living  phenomena,  and  organicist 
postulation of holistic, yet material, features is that the organicists took such organized wholes 
to  not  only  be  wholly  consistent  with  materialism,  but  most  importantly,  accessible  by 
experiment.  Because  of  this,  to  adequately identify  biological  phenomena  as  biological, 
scientists must characterize the phenomena that they wish to investigate and explain in a way 
127 Russell's recent (2015) analysis of the exchange between Arthur Lovejoy and Herbert Spencer Jennings from 
1909-1914 offers a poignant contrast to this point that the organicists were the first to compile this novel  
program. Russell argues compellingly that Lovejoy and Jennings constructed an especially potent scientific  
epistemology that (a) was based on the rejection of the excesses of vitalism, while being simultaneously 
inspired by the vitalists' call to distinguish between physical and life sciences as very different enterprises,  
and (b) connects very well with contemporary thinking about scientific knowledge. I readily acknowledge 
Russell's point, and wish that I had heard of the paper before this dissertation was submitted for review.
170
Chapter Five: Organicist Roots of the Levels Concept 
that (i) captures the features of the phenomenon in question, such that this characterization (ii) 
permits empirical investigation without relenting to obscurantist notions like those offered by 
the vitalists and by some organicist writers (Needham 1928a, 35; 1936, 15-16). It is at this 
juncture that organicists introduced the concept of levels as a novel theoretical term.
5.3.2 The Organicists' Use of the Levels Concept 
The  concept  of  levels  of  organization  was  central  to  the  organicist  program.  In  it  the 
Cambridge organicists found a conceptual device that served both to represent their view of 
the natural world's non-reductionistic-yet-materialist ontology, and also to elaborate the tenets 
of their  program, which detailed the unique explanatory problems facing biologists  as an 
endeavor  distinct  from  those  pursued  by  the  physical  sciences.  The  term  “levels  [of 
existence]” actually seems to have been introduced into the philosophical literature by the 
emergentists128 (cf. McLaughlin 1992, 50-51), but was at the same time widely observed to be 
an unanalyzed term in need of active development (Conger 1925; Brown 1926).129 Hence, 
though the organicists did not  invent the concept of “levels” or the hierarchical view of the 
world with which it  had already become associated,  they were responsible for adding the 
qualifier “levels  of organization”, and quickly became interested in the problematic task of 
articulating its meaning and significance for science. As this section will show, the organicists' 
development of 'levels of organization' imbued the concept with a  programmatic character, 
meaning  that  the  levels  concept  came  to  be  generally  expressive  for  the  content  of  the 
128 Needham attributes the first use of the “levels” concept to Samuel Alexander (1920), and also acknowledges  
Auguste  Comte's  thoughts  on  the  hierarchical  view  of  scientific  disciplines  (Needham  1943;  234,  269 
respectively). The specific term that Alexander coined was “level of existence” (Alexander 1920, 3). Other 
references to the term “level”, with and without a particular “of” qualifier, were also intermittently used by 
the various mechanist, vitalist, and organicist publications. Haldane used the term without further qualifier in  
his rejection of the “reduction of the organic to the level of the inorganic” (1919, 105, emphasis added), while 
the philosopher R.F.A. Hoernlé actually mentioned the term “levels of organization” in a (1918) conference 
report regarding the mechanist-vitalist dispute. However, neither Hoernlé nor the authors summarized in the 
report exhibited any commitment to the term or its development. 
129 George P. Conger was forthcoming in an astute observation of the challenges posed by the trend towards the  
“doctrine of levels” in philosophy at the time, saying: “Phrases denoting differences of level are familiar, and  
I think are becoming increasingly frequent, in the literature of several sciences...As used in metaphysics, it is  
evident  that  such  phrases  have  the  fascination  of  great  generalizations,  but  also  the  dangers  of  loose  
metaphors” (Conger 1925, 309, emphasis added). 
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organicist program.
The members of the Cambridge organicist  group, the Theoretical  Biological Club (TBC), 
applied the levels concept both in their individual writings and privately.130 The analysis of the 
concept “levels of organization” by the organicists was catalyzed by Joseph Woodger, who 
modified  the  term  from  Alexander's  original  term  “levels  of  existence”  (Woodger  1929 
[1966], xvii;  298-299; 321; cf.  Roll-Hansen 1984, 404).131 In particular,  Woodger's  (1929) 
book  Biological Principles, along with a follow-up (1930) paper, introduces the term as a 
concept  of  substantial  significance,  and  should  therefore  be  recognized  as  the  historical 
sources  most  responsible  for  initially  injecting  the  term into  scientific  thought,  and  into 
philosophical  analysis  of  scientific  thought.  In  these  sources,  one can  see that  Woodger's 
primary  interest  in  the  levels  concept  was  directed  towards  offering  a  more  clear  and 
unambiguous  explication  of  what  organized  wholes  (i.e.  “organisms”)  in  biology  are 
(Woodger 1930, 8-10). These organized wholes, as seen above, were a central element for the 
new  emerging  approach  to  explaining  biological  phenomena  offered  by  the  organicist 
program. Woodger also promoted the levels concept as a means of arguing for the autonomy 
of biology,  the second major tenet discussed above (see especially the extended quote by 
Woodger given above in Section 5.3).
Joseph Needham, in his (1930) review of  Biological Principles,132 quickly picked up on the 
concept,  and  identified  Woodger's  discussion  of  levels  of  organization  as  “the  major 
innovation of Woodger's book” (Abir-Am 1991, 171; see also Needham 1930, 222-223).133 
130 The collaborative efforts of the Theoretical Biological Club are more visible in the personal correspondence 
of its members, which Pnina Abir-Am (1987) details at impressive depth and length. 
131 ##Woodger eventually shifted his focus away from the levels concept as his overall philosophical approach  
moved towards a more formalized approach focusing on analyzing the language used to articulate biological 
claims (Nicholson and Gawne 2014, 262-269).
132 Needham's review, coincidentally, appeared one month after the publication of Woodger's (1930) paper on 
the “organism” concept, and re-sparked a flurry of exchanges between the two that had begun earlier that  
year (Abir-Am 1991; 169-172). 
133 Indeed, his encounter with the levels concept in Woodger's work led Needham to quickly take up the concept.  
In Needham's earlier, pre-1930 writings on organicism, one can see the difficulty with which he fumbled to 
balance  his  defense  of  organicist  ideas  against  both mechanism and vitalism.  In  his  (1928b)  paper,  for 
instance, Needham grasps towards something like the levels concept when he writes: “Thus to the scientific 
mind the living and the non-living form one continuous series of systems of differing degrees of complexity, 
all  of which consist  of parts that  can be understood as parts when separated from their wholes and are 
therefore  interpretable  in  terms  of  'metrical  macroscopic  mechanism'”  (Needham  1928b,  79,  emphasis 
added). Needham's excited endorsement for the levels concept becomes apparent when one notes Needham's 
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Simultaneously, though, he did express reservations about the relevance of Woodger's formal 
approach for practicing scientists, saying: 
##“But it is perhaps rather characteristic of his book that immediately following his 
section which deals with the hierarchies of levels in the animal body, there is not a 
section devoted to the practical applications of this (new?) mode of thought...Research 
workers, therefore, get little help from Mr. Woodger here, and this holds true throughout 
the book” (Needham 1930, 223).134
Needham himself would nonetheless take up the levels concept as a central motif in his own 
writings,  and  would  frequently  use  the  term to  propagate  organicism's  ideas  concerning 
explanation in biology. The emphasis of his approach, as will be seen below, focused on a 
more open-ended, empirical characterization of levels. The reason for this lies in Needham's 
interest in analyzing biological phenomena in a more case-based manner.
As it  turns  out,  the  organicist  conception of  levels  was a  product  of  intense negotiations 
among the members of the TBC, in particular Needham and Woodger.  These negotiations 
occurred  in  both  academic  and  personal  settings  in  the  form of  publications  and  letters, 
respectively, and concerned the philosophical platform that their group would represent. The 
discussions between Woodger and Needham directly resulted in the creation of the Cambridge 
organicists' philosophical and scientific program, the tenets of which were discussed above 
(cf. Abir-Am 1987, 10-11). 
It  was  during  these  negotiations,  Pnina  Abir-Am (1987)  reports,  that  the  levels  concept 
acquired its distinct importance for the organicists, as it specifically emerged as a product of 
compromise made between the philosophical differences held respectively by Needham and 
Woodger.  The  two  differed  from each  other  on  a  range  of  issues,  including  who  would 
enthusiastic, and frequent, use of the concept in his post-1930 works.
134 This review, it would turn out, would begin a cascade of interactions between Needham and Woodger that  
resulted in the construction of the Theoretical Biology Club (Abir-Am 1987, 11). Abir-Am (1991) goes into 
exceptional detail  regarding  the  process  of  rapprochement  between  Woodger  and  Needham  and  its 
significance  for  the  development  of  Needham's  own  thought  specifically,  and  more  generally  for  the 
development of the Theoretical Biological Club. The role of the levels concept for these exchanges will be 
considered below.
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participate in the TBC discussions (ibid. 12-13), the topics that the group should dedicate their 
time analyzing (ibid. 13-14), and how to balance the interests and goals of the other members 
they chose to include in the group (ibid. 14-15). However, the principle difference between 
Needham and Woodger concerned the nature of how to analyze, and propose solutions to, the 
problems  in  biology  that  both  were  interested  in  engaging.  Woodger,  who  had  recently 
become interested in formalized methods reminiscent of the logical positivists, emphasized 
focusing the group's efforts towards “exploring the potential of a new symbolic logic” (ibid. 
14)135. Needham, on the other hand, was more interested in an empirically-informed approach 
that  sought  to  analyze the interconnections  of knowledge between different  disciplines  in 
biology, especially discipline-bound concepts (ibid. 13).
The compromises hammered out in the organization of the Cambridge organicists' group by 
Needham and Woodger was directly subsidized by their shared interest in Woodger's (1929; 
1930) introduction of the levels concept:
“The rapprochement between Woodger and Needham pertained to their complementary 
strategies in a theoretical biology revolving around the non-classical concept of levels  
of organization. While Woodger remained primarily concerned with erecting a logical 
skeleton for embryological facts, the latter to be supplied by experimental scientists, 
Needham's preoccupation with the synthesis between presumably contradictory systems  
of knowledge such as biochemistry and embryology required access to philosophical  
bridging devices.” (Abir-Am 1987, 12, emphasis added)
The members of the Theoretical Biology Club at Cambridge thus resolved to undertake in 
their organicist program an analysis of the concept to elucidate what was scientifically viable 
in the collection of intuitions that were being expressed in the increasingly frequent references 
to the levels notion. These efforts, and particularly those of Needham, resulted in a general 
account of levels that was surprisingly sophisticated for its time. This account came to be 
135 This corresponds to what Nicholson and Gawne (2014, 262-269) refer to as Woodger's “Formal Period”, in  
which Woodger became interested in constructing an axiomatized system that would offer “a rigorous means  
of expressing and relating propositions of the kind afforded by propositional logic” (ibid, 262-263). It should 
be noted though, that Woodger himself was not a logical positivist (ibid.).
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known as the “integrative levels” account, which also received its namesake from Needham in 
his later writings (see Section 5.4).
Looking at this point in more detail, the organicists' use of the levels concept focused initially 
on effectively expressing the tenets of their program. Consider first how the levels concept 
was used to articulate the tenet of holistic features exhibited by biological phenomena (due to 
the complexity of the organization of their parts). Here, the levels concept conferred a means 
by which holism and organization in biological phenomena could be expressed without the 
“spooky” connotations  that  haunted the vitalists,  emergentists,  and even other  organicists. 
Woodger (1930) elaborates:
“The  concept  of  organism  [i.e.  organized  whole]  requires  a  number  of  subsidiary 
notions such as 'organic whole,' 'organic part,' and 'organic relation.' Also an organism 
exhibits what I call 'hierarchical order.'  It  is easy enough to see 'intuitively'  what is 
meant by these terms; there has been a good deal of vague talk from time to time about 
'the whole being more than the sum of its parts,' etc.; the difficulty is to make these 
notions  precise  in  order  to  enable  us  to  see  how  we  can  use  them  for  scientific  
purposes...In  hierarchical  order  we  begin  with  a  single  individual  which  will  be 
symbolized by W. This is analysable into individuals called members (m or  M) which 
fall into classes of two kinds called  levels  (L), and  assemblages (A). There is also a 
fundamental relation (Rh) in which the members stand to one another, and upon which 
the whole hierarchical type of order depends” (Woodger 1930, 8, emphasis modified).
The  formal  perspective  of  Woodger  can  already be  clearly  seen  taking  its  shape  in  this 
passage. In fact, Woodger's attempt to clarify the term “levels” closely follows the definition 
of a formal hierarchy, which was discussed in Chapter 1:
“We proceed to the following definitions: 
Level: A level is a class of members of W and is such that no member of the class stands 
in the relation Rh to another member of the class. In any hierarchy there are at least two 
levels.
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Highest Level: One level is such that none of its members stand in relation  Rh to any 
other member, but each stands in the relation  Rh to W. This may be called the highest 
level.
Lowest Level: if  there is  any level  which is  such that  its  members are  incapable of 
further analysis this constitutes the lowest level.
Next Highest Level: if m is any member of a given level L then there is one and only one 
level (other than L) containing one and only one member M such that  m stands in the 
relation Rh to M. This is the next highest level above L” (ibid., see also Woodger 1952 
for a restatement and refinement of Woodger's thinking on levels)
Needham's use of the levels concept deviated from this formalized approach,136 and instead 
emphasized the ability of the concept to aid in (i) producing an accurate depiction of the 
relations between particular wholes and their parts for specific empirical cases and (ii) how to 
understand relations between the knowledge produced by different scientific disciplines.137 
Abir-Am also acknowledges this difference in the two researchers' understanding of levels, 
saying that “[i]n contrast [to Woodger], Needham exemplified what Woodger called 'thinking 
for use', a thinking affected by the pragmatic aspect of laboratory life, or rather by the need to  
account for concrete facts rather than for abstract patterns of logic” (Abir-Am 1987, 60 fn. 
39).
The concept  of  levels  of  organization  hence  presented  a  significant  notion  by which  the 
organicists could effectively express the program regarding how to frame the impact of the 
organicists'  new philosophy of  biological  explanation.  The  final  part  of  this  section  will 
demonstrate that the organicists' use of the levels concept was also motivated by the same 
epistemic goal that informs the levels concept today.
136 At the same time, Needham frequently referenced Woodger as the one most responsible for drawing attention 
to the issue of articulating the specific details of organization within a particular system, and in particular  
those designative of biology (see, e.g., Needham 1934, 275; 1936, 7,  18, 107-111; 1943, 182-183, 192, 242-
243).
137 Needham's use of levels will be looked at in more detail in Section 5.3.3, as his use of the levels concept is 
more prudently examined in connection to the epistemic goal of the levels concept, which Needham actively  
worked to build into the concept.
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5.3.3 The Epistemic Goal behind the Organicists' Use of Levels 
As  the  rest  of  this  section  will  show,  the  use  of  the  levels  concept  by  the  Cambridge 
organicists to express the particular claims of their program was unambiguously motivated 
towards structuring the problems facing biologists in constructing explanations for biological 
phenomena. This is a significant observation, as it offers a major justification for the ideas 
developed in the foregoing chapters. For one thing, it establishes an historical precedent for 
the epistemic goal of the levels concept discussed at length in Chapter 4: In effect, it was the 
organicists that conceived, and applied, the epistemic goal motivating the use of the levels 
concept in biology. Moreover, this observation will serve as an additional point of justification 
in drawing parallels between the organicist conception of levels and the pluralistic treatment 
of levels also given in the foregoing chapter. These parallels will be discussed further in the 
next section (5.4), where the organicists' initial development of the levels concept attracted the 
attention of other biologists, and was further developed into its own full-fledged account.
Recall from Chapter 4 that the epistemic goal of the levels concept is recognizable in two 
kinds of claims, i.e. descriptive level claims and hypothetical level claims. In descriptive level 
claims, the levels concept appears as a descriptive term applied to provide a characterization 
of a phenomenon for which an explanation is sought, while in hypothetical level claims the 
levels concept appears as an operationalized term with which to direct research efforts in 
solving a particular explanatory problem.
The epistemic goal of the levels concept, in both of these forms, is especially identifiable in  
Needham's advocacy of the tenets of organicism. In the opening sentence of a (1934) paper in 
Nature, Needham again makes it clear that the ultimate target of the organicist program is to 
come to grips with the nature of biological problems: “Those who are accustomed to ponder 
the  ultimate  problems  of  biology are  aware  that  though  the  need  for  a  comprehensive 
[understanding  of]  biological  science  is  great,  the  difficulties  in  obtaining  it  are  equally 
considerable” (1934, 275). This statement comprises two parts. The first part concerns the 
explanatory problems of biology, which, not surprisingly now, center around the discovery 
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and characterization of organization in biological phenomena. This, as seen in other quotes 
from Needham above,  proceeds  in  a  contextualized  manner,  as  the  different  explanatory 
problems  that  are  treated  in  biology  vary  from case  to  case.138 The  second  part  of  this 
statement  concerns  the  difficulties  in  solving  these  particular  problems  (i.e.  constructing 
explanations) in an adequate manner. Interestingly, Needham states that the “main difficulty” 
(ibid.)  hindering  scientists  from  accomplishing  this  concerns  figuring  out  how  to  relate 
knowledge associated with one discipline, treating one object of study, to the knowledge of 
another discipline that treats another object of study, both of which are related by a part-whole 
relation (the examples he discusses, plainly seen in the paper's title, stem from “Morphology 
and Biochemistry”).  In other writings, Needham was even more explicit  in his use of the 
levels concept, saying:
“Whatever the nature of [organizing] relations may be, they form the central enigma of 
biology,  and  biology  will  only  be  fruitful  in  the  future  if  this  is  recognized...The 
hierarchy of relationships, from the molecular structure of the carbon compounds to the  
equilibrium of species in ecological wholes at the other,  will probably be the  guiding 
idea of the future” (Needham 1932, 92).
As was typical of Needham, he did not prescribe a generalized account with which to go 
about dealing with this difficulty. Rather, it is his diagnosis of the issues facing biology that is  
noteworthy.  Specifically:  The  explanatory  problems  of  biology  can  be  adequately 
characterized only when it is acknowledged that biological phenomena are often distributed 
across different levels of organization. This is significant in that Needham was effectively 
claiming that the hierarchical descriptions made possible by descriptive level claims allow for 
the features or behaviors exhibited by biological phenomena (for which an explanation is 
sought)  to  be  captured  in  a  manner  that  is  amenable  to  scientific  investigation.  This 
exemplifies  the  descriptive  goal  motivating  the  levels  concept  in  constructing  adequate 
descriptions of nature. 
138 This is visible in the text of this (1934) paper. Specifically, Needham develops this point of the importance of  
organization by discussing  particular experimental findings, and also  particular methods, in biochemistry 
made by contemporary scientists of the time on, e.g., the study of protein structure in biological systems,  
such as the echinoderm egg, or muscle and yeast extractions (ibid.). 
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At the same time, Needham and the other organicists also drew consequences for constructing 
biological explanations from hypothetical claims involving the levels concept. This followed 
as a corollary to the above thesis concerning descriptive level claims in biology. Particularly,  
Needham claimed  that  once  we acknowledge  that  nature  is  structured  hierarchically  into 
levels  of  organization  (and  that  many  biological  phenomena  are  often  distributed  across 
several levels), we also see that different scientific disciplines often treat different aspects of a 
particular problem for which they are best suited, i.e. by investigating the entities that follow 
part-whole  distinctions  given  by  the  levels  at  which  they  located.  Given  this,  solving 
biological problems often involve suggestions to move to a different level, where not only the 
relevant  entity,  but  also  the  relevant  investigative  means  for  adequately  grasping  that 
phenomenon in the first  place are  located.  The ability of  such an  open levels  concept  to 
structure the explanatory problems of biology, rather than a particular analytic definition of 
the  levels  concept,  is  what  Needham identifies  as  biology's  “guiding  idea  of  the  future” 
(ibid.).
The organicist  use of levels hence also became an operationalized term under Needham's 
development, and became a means by which biologists of different disciplinary perspectives 
could gain insight into a particular explanatory problem: To wit, by suggesting where to find 
insight for how a given biological phenomenon should be studied in order to construct an 
adequate explanation for that phenomenon. This way of using the levels concept added a 
distinct element of “heuristic push and go” (Needham 1932, 88) to the organicist program that 
gave it a decisive legitimacy over vitalism and obscurantist organicism as an alternative to the 
reductionist-mechanist program. In his discussion of the “hierarchical continuity of biological 
order”, Needham (1936) discusses the several case studies (particularly metabolic activity in 
muscles)  as  exemplars  of  phenomena  with  features  that  can  only  be  accounted  for 
explanatorily  in  an  interplay  between  several  levels  of  organization.  This  interplay  is 
mediated,  furthermore,  by  distinct  scientific  disciplines.  Beginning  generally,  Needham 
details the implicit descriptive hierarchical layout in which he discusses this case, and the 
status  of  the  ontological  and  epistemic  items  at  the  distinctive  levels  therein  as  possible 
sources  of  explanatory insight  to  which one can turn.  At  the same time,  he prepared the 
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hypothetical form of particular level claims that arise out of this backdrop, saying: 
“The  term 'living'  applies  to  all  the  components  [of  a  multi-level  system]  in  their 
organising relations. If this is so, then we should expect to find that at levels which are 
well within the sphere of physico-chemical analysis, there are phenomena which give us 
glimpses of the rudiments of wholeness. And it should follow that a contribution to the 
unification  of  biochemistry  and  morphology  can  be  made  by  a  study  of  such  
phenomena” (Needham 1936, 117-118, emphasis added). 
In effect, Needham claimed that different levels of organization, and the epistemic resources 
associated  with  these  levels,  are  not  only  important  for  adequately  describing  biological 
phenomena, but also represent sources of insight to which scientists may turn their efforts 
when  confronted  with  specific  obstacles  to  explaining  the  phenomenon  in  question  (cf. 
Section  4.4.1.2).  Speaking  to  the  investigation  of  metabolic  activity  in  muscle  cells,  he 
discusses at length the role of both biochemical entities and their morphological (higher-level) 
context, saying that: 
“In elucidating the finer [i.e. lower] levels of biological organisation it is important to 
discover precisely how much of the normal working of the cell's metabolic changes goes 
on when the organisation [imposed by higher levels]  is to a greater or lesser extent 
destroyed...[On the one hand,] [t]he more work is done of muscle chemistry, especially 
in the study of extracts, the more it appears that the phosphate esters of carbohydrates 
found in the extracts may not be physiological...[At the same time, however,]  [i]t is 
difficult to picture an integrative mechanism except in the distinctively morphological  
terms of contiguous situation of the two enzymes at an intracellular surface” (Needham 
1936, 120-121; emphasis added).
Needham reiterated the use of the levels concept  as a  validation of organicism's program 
many times in his career, citing specifically the level concept's ability to guide scientists in 
structuring the explanatory problems of biology,  both as a  descriptive term in descriptive 
claims,  and  as  an  operationalized  term in  hypothetical  claims.  In  a  retrospective  of  the 
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mechanist-vitalist dispute, he again directly cites the levels concept in this capacity:
“This deadlock [between mechanism and vitalism],  which in  various forms had run 
through the whole history of human thought, was overcome when it was realised that 
every level  of  organisation has  its  own regularities  and principles,  not  reducible  to  
those appropriate to lower levels of organisation, nor applicable to higher levels, but at  
the  same  time  in  no  way  inscrutable  or  immune  from  scientific  analysis  and 
comprehension.  Thus  the  rules  which  are  followed  in  experimental  morphology  or  
genetics  are  perfectly  valid  in  their  own  right,  but  comprehension  will  never  be  
complete until what is going on at the other levels, both above and below, is analysed  
and compared with the level in question. Biological organisation is the basic problem of 
biology;  it  is  not  an  axiom  from  which  biology  must  start.”  (Needham  1943,  18; 
emphasis added)
The epistemic goal of the levels concept is also identifiable in the organicists' advocacy of the 
autonomy of biology. This comprises a more general context of usage for the levels concept, 
and more particularly the organicists' overall conception of biological explanation, namely in 
the institutional organization of biological research.139 The organicists used the levels concept 
to promote their program as the basis for redistribution of scientific authority in biological 
research. This redistribution concerned which researchers could be considered competent in 
characterizing the problems of biology (see especially Abir-Am 1987, 9-10, 18-28; but cf. 
Roll-Hansen 1984). 
After Needham had abandoned active research in the biological sciences for his studies of the 
history of science and technology in China (the career for which he is best known), he later 
reiterated  his  support  for  organicist  program  by  once  again  directly  citing  'levels  of 
organization' in an updated (1967) forward to his book Order and Life:
139 The identity of the Cambridge organicist movement in an institutional context of science, rather than research 
and philosophical contexts, is one dimension of significance of the organicist movement that, due to space 
considerations, cannot be entered into here. A summary of this context, and specifically the organicists efforts 
to more establish their program in an institutional setting, can be found in Abir-Am's (1987) analysis of the  
TBC. The role of the levels concept in this endeavor is analyzed in more depth in Mertens and Brooks ( in  
preparation).
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“I still think that the organizational patterns and relations in living things,  integrative  
hierarchies never exhibited in non-living material collocations, are the proper subject-
matter of biological enquiry, and that the recognition of their existence is in no sense a 
disguised form of vitalism. I still think biological order and organization are not just 
axiomatic either, but constitute  a fundamental challenge to scientific explanation, and 
that meaning can only be brought into the natural world when we understand how the  
successive 'envelopes' or 'integrative levels' are connected together, not 'reducing' the 
coarser  to  the  fine,  the  higher  to  the  lower,  nor  resorting  to  unscientific  quasi-
philosophical concepts” (Needham 1936[1967], viii, emphasis added)
Thus, the usefulness of 'levels of organization' for the organicists is that it aids scientists to 
structure  the  unique  kinds  of  problems  faced  by biological  researchers.  These  problems, 
furthermore,  though  similar  in  kind  insofar  as  they  are  'biological',  necessitate  a 
contextualized treatment for their  particular solution,  i.e.  their  explanation.  The value that 
informs this epistemic goal that the organicists infused into their use of the levels concept 
pertains, like the use of the levels concept today, to explanatory adequacy.
To be clear, the other Cambridge organicists also advocated the value of the levels concept in 
imposing structure onto a biological phenomenon delivered by descriptive and hypothetical 
level claims. For instance,  Waddington (1940) also used the levels concept in this regard, 
saying that:
“When we speak of the dependence of the parts on the whole we must always have in 
mind some particular context; thus the parts of an entity can be said to be dependent on 
the whole, in a particular context, if, in order to express the properties of the parts in that 
context, some reference to the whole is necessary...This is often expressed by saying 
that the tissue  can no longer be adequately regarded as a mere mass of cells, but has 
attained a higher level of organization, in which the relevance of the whole organ to the 
constituent  cells  can  no  longer  be  disregarded....The  statement  made  earlier  that 
organisation  must  be  defined  with  reference  to  some  context  provides  the  clue  [to 
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explaining what is meant by 'level of organization'].  A new level of organisation is in  
fact nothing more than140 a new relevant context. When it is said that an organ rudiment 
has a higher level of organisation, as a developing entity, than a mere mass of cells, what 
is meant is that some organ is relevant to the former, while the latter has nothing to do 
with an organ, either because it is not yet competent [i.e. viable] or because it has passed 
the regulative stage and reached a point at which its development is completely mosaic, 
each  fragment  differentiating  on  its  own  without  any  reference  to  the  whole.” 
(Waddington 1940, 143-144, emphasis added)
This passage is noteworthy for two reasons. First, Waddington's use of the levels concept here 
reflects both forms that the epistemic goal of the levels concept can exhibit. The descriptive 
use of levels is visible in Waddington's statement that an entity under investigation, described 
at one (here the lower) level can at times “no longer be adequately regarded”, i.e. adequately 
characterized, at that level. Instead, adequately characterizing that entity necessitates being 
characterized at other levels, i.e. as another kind of entity possessing new, holistic features. 
The hypothetical use of levels as an operationalized term informing scientists 'where to go' is 
also visible here, specifically in that (new) levels of organization are, in relation to a particular 
phenomenon, a “new relevant context” in which an aspect of that phenomenon needs to be 
considered in order for its explanation to be constructed.
Secondly, this passage is also noteworthy in that it contains an important footnote (appearing 
at  the end of  the sentence “...can no longer  be disregarded”)  that  directly cites  two texts 
support of the claim made about levels in that sentence.  These two texts were Woodger's 
(1929) book and Needham's (1937) Herbert Spencer Lecture called “Integrative Levels: A 
Revaluation of Idea of Progress”. The importance of Woodger’s (1929) book has already been 
discussed. Needham’s (1937) lecture, however, marks a significant change in the development 
of the organicists’ conception of levels into a general account, which became known as the 
integrative account of levels.
140 The phrase “nothing more than” here seems to be a prophylactic expression meant to avoid any connection  
back to, e.g., vitalism.
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5.4 The Integrative Account of Levels of Organization
Beginning at the end of the 1930's, the organicist conception of levels transitioned into a more 
generalized account that came to be known as “integrative levels of organization” (Needham 
1937[1943]; Novikoff 1945a). The 'integrative account', as it will be called here, was a direct 
descendant of the organicists' work on levels, though its development as an account of levels 
was perpetrated rather outside of the Cambridge organicist milieu. Instead, it  was actively 
developed  and  used  by a  small  number  of  scientists  (and at  least  one  philosopher)  who 
claimed affinity with a number of organicist theses, and who saw promise in the organicist  
conception of levels as, in itself, a major contribution to biology (Novikoff 1945a, 1945b; 
Feibleman 1954, 1965; Rowe 1961). The main thesis that the integrative account is meant to 
support  is  that  the  natural  world  is  divided  into  successive  orders  of  complexity  and 
increasingly integrated organization (Novikoff 1945, 209; Feibleman 1954, 60), meaning that 
the holistic features that scientific phenomena acquire (as a result of the complexity of their 
organization) allows quasi-systematic differences  between kinds of phenomena to become 
apparent (Novikoff 1945, ibid.; Rowe 1961, 421). This account of levels has received only 
minimal attention from contemporary philosophical analysis (e.g. Blitz 1992), and even where 
the account or its  developers  are mentioned it  is  almost invariably cited in connection to 
different ideas such as emergence or emergent evolution.141 For this reason, and unlike the 
layer-cake  account  of  levels,  the  integrative  account  is  virtually  unencumbered  by  the 
complications  that  plague  the  former,  at  least  as  concerns  the  account's  presence  in  the 
philosophical literature. 
Before moving to the characteristic features that make up the integrative account, one further 
note  concerning  the  account's  inception  is  necessary.  The  transition  of  the  organicist 
conception  of  levels  to  the  integrative  levels  account  was  instigated  by  Needham,  who 
141 Though Potochnik and McGill (2012) do refer to one of the central texts that articulated a number of the  
accounts features (i.e. Feibleman 1954), their analysis of levels will not be counted as having acknowledged 
the existence of the integrative levels account. The reason for this is that they identify Feibleman (1954) as  
exemplifying everything that is wrong with the levels concept in contemporary philosophy of science (see  
Chapter 3). This is a mistake, as the integrative account of levels, including Feibleman's attempt to articulate  
the account's central features, is markedly different from the layer-cake account of levels that, as argued in 
earlier chapters, currently claims the status of the default conception of levels of organization in philosophy.
184
Chapter Five: Organicist Roots of the Levels Concept 
simultaneously bestowed the account its namesake in the title of his 1937 Herbert Spencer 
Lecture “Integrative Levels: A Revaluation of the Idea of Progress” (Needham 1937[1943], 
233).142 The integrative account proved to be a motley creation during its inception, as can be 
seen  in  Needham's  inceptive  (1937[1943])  articulation  of  the  account.  In  particular,  the 
integrative account was originally meant by Needham to extend far beyond the biological and 
theoretical biological work he devoted to the concept of levels of organization in the early- to 
mid-1930's. Instead of dealing primarily with the nature of biological phenomena and their 
explanation, the account of “Integrative Levels” was initially meant to encompass a grand 
overarching theory of the nature of the world and the evolutionary processes that led to its 
creation  (Needham 1937[1943],  233).  In  this  regard  Needham (1937[1943])  was  keen  to 
manufacture a connection between the physical world and the biological world with the socio-
cultural  world  of  human  society,  and  in  doing  so  introduced  a  number  of  questionable 
elements into the Needham's understanding of levels of organization.143 Nonetheless, despite 
these questionable elements, the basic thesis expressed by the account remained focused on 
the concept of levels of organization, and the usefulness of the concept as more than simply a 
technical term connected to expressing the tenets of the organicist program. For, although the 
target of “Integrative Levels” comprised “no less than the whole nature of the world, and the 
142 Historically speaking, this marked the end of the Cambridge organicists' (and specifically Needham's) active 
development of the levels concept. The period between which the levels concept emerged as a substantive 
concept and eventually transitioned into a general account of how to organize nature can be marked with the 
respective  publications  of  Woodger  (1929)  and  Needham  (1937[1943]).  The  passage  cited  above  from 
Waddington (1940) above offers indirect support for this. Needham (1937[1943]) is hence important as an 
impetus for further interest in the organicist conception of levels, which, as will be seen in this section, was  
taken up by other scientists interested in this contribution of the organicists to theoretical biology. 
143 Specifically, Needham intended the account to become a model with which to analyze trends in 1930's world  
politics in a cultural evolutionary framework. Two features of Needham's initial articulation of the integrative 
levels  account  are  noteworthy here,  as  they comprise  wild,  unsubstantiated  claims  that  depart  from his  
previous  work  in  biology  and  philosophy.  These  features  include  (i)  a  vulgar  extrapolation  from  the 
organizational  patterns  in  nature  to  human society as  a  means  of  establishing a  continuity between the 
physical, biological, and cultural, and (ii) the attribution of an innate drive towards perfection to evolutionary 
processes in nature as a means of justifying explanations of society. Both of these features are expressed in  
the  lecture  as  an  extension  of  Herbert  Spencer's  analogy  of  society-as-an-organism  (ibid.  235-237). 
Needham's (1937[1943]) lecture hence exhibits a dramatic break from the organicist work he had engaged in  
during the  1920's  and  1930's.  The difference between Needham's  earlier  (pre-China)  career  is  markedly 
noticeable in both tone and substance in the lecture, in particular because of the radical Marxist undertones 
that crudely intrude into the lecture's content, e.g., in claiming that the inevitability of a socialist paradise is 
guaranteed because of the “authority of evolution” (ibid. 272) driving change in human society. The line of 
thought here begun by Needham was later taken up and further advocated in a symposium at the University  
of Chicago organized by the anthropologist Robert Redfield (later published in Redfield 1942). This (1942)  
collection  of  essays  (and  particularly  the  contributed  papers  of  two  scientists,  Gerard  and  Emerson, 
respectively) instigated Novikoff's (1945a) defense of the account of integrative levels against this frivolity.
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way in  which it  has  come into being”  (ibid.),  Needham was quick to  specify that  “[t]he 
subject, then, to which our attention is to be given is the existence of levels of organisation in 
the universe, successive forms of order in a scale of complexity and organisation” (ibid. 233-
234, emphasis added).
Isolating the characteristic features of the integrative account of levels therefore is a doubly 
delicate  matter,  as  the  account  (1)  is  divided into  two very separate  theses  regarding the 
structure of the world and its significance for science (i.e. one following the sense of 'levels of 
organization' developed above by the Cambridge organicists, and another sense introduced by 
Needham 1937[1943] concerning trends in evolutionary processes extending from biology to 
human society144), and more importantly (2) the account never reached a critical boundary of 
attention,  particularly  by  the  philosophical  community,  where  the  account's  characteristic 
features  would  be  critically  analyzed  and  expressed  authoritatively.  The  analysis  of  the 
account  given  here  will  be  a  product  of  analyzing in  particular  three  texts  in  which  the 
integrative  account  received  treatment  as  a  “programmatic  call”  (Allchin  2008,  284)  to 
reorient biological research in a manner strongly influenced by the organicist program of the 
1930's.145 From these sources, the following  characteristic features can be identified for the 
integrative account of levels:
1.) Global scope and contextual character
The scope of the integrative account is global, at least in its ultimate aspiration, but is not 
comprehensive  in  its  character.  Instead,  the  character  of  particular  level  claims  exhibit  a 
144 The latter of these will not be relevant for the discussion here, and is only mentioned here an exegetical point 
with which to better demarcate the contribution of the integrative account to an understanding of levels of 
organization being pursued in this dissertation.
145 These texts include an (1945a) article in Science by the cell biologist Alexander Novikoff, a (1954) paper by 
the philosopher James K. Feibleman, and another (1961) article by the ecologist James. S. Rowe. Each one of  
these texts  contained slightly different emphases  in  regards  to their  articulation of the integrative levels 
account.  For  instance,  Novikoff  (1945a;  1945b)  focuses  on recouping some of  the  damage  done to  the 
reputation of the integrative account done by Needham (1937[1943]) and the authors in Redfield (1942), and 
sought  to  return  attention to  the  levels  concept  back  to  understanding how it  could  be  used  for  aiding 
biological  research.  His  advocacy of  levels  strongly resembled the uses  of  the levels  concept  originally 
developed by Needham and the organicists in the early- to mid-1930's. Feibleman (1954; 1965), on the other 
hand, sought to summarize what levels of organization are according to the integrative account in a more 
systematic manner, detailing a number of features of defines a “level”, and how levels are generally used to  
aid in constructing explanations.  Rowe (1961),  finally,  focuses on the complementary uses of the levels 
concept  in  ordering  epistemic  resources  of  disciplinary  perspectives  in  the  investigation  of  different 
phenomena as well as the more ontological ordering of entities in nature that are used in those perspectives.
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contextual  approach. That is,  the account  only claims that different levels of organization 
(globally) exist,  but insists at the same time that the character of different particular level 
claims is an open question that should be investigated contextually. 
2.) ‘Incomplete’ epistemic continuity 
Like  other  conceptions  of  levels,  the  integrative  account  claims  that  there  is  a  material 
continuity between  the  things  that  make up the  natural  world,  wherein  those  objects  are 
connected via part-whole relations. The integrative account, however, is completely open as to 
the precise character of this continuity, instead preferring to emphasize that exactly this issue 
designates something to be discovered in the process of scientific research (hence the label 
“incomplete”). Studying these parts and wholes can proceed by means of different criteria by 
which to separate levels, to wit: compositional relations and distinctions of scale. For this 
reason, there is no single,  uniformly describable continuity between all  the objects of the 
natural world, because levels-based descriptions of a given system or phenomenon will be 
given contextually by the scientists directly involved in its investigation.
3.) Weak association between levels and scientific disciplines
The integrative account also postulates a weak, but definite, association between scientific 
disciplines  and  the  things  that  populate  the  natural  world.  Though  a  broad  trend  in  the 
partitioning of the natural objects according to particular scientific disciplines is mentioned by 
the  account's  authors  (e.g.,  cells-cell  biology;  molecules-molecular  biology),  the  account 
readily  admits  for  many  different  disciplines,  and  especially  different  disciplinary 
perspectives, having their own working definitions or conceptions of a particular entity in 
nature  (molecular  biology  also  investigates  cells;  physical  chemistry  also  investigates 
ecosystems).  As such,  no rigid  ordering  of  sciences  follows from the  ordering  of  natural 
entities,  though  local  reconstructions  of  what  scientific  disciplines  are  involved  in  the 
investigation of what are parts of a particular phenomenon are possible.
5.4.1 Global Scope and Contextualized Character
The scope of the integrative account, at least initially, appears to be unabashedly global, i.e. it 
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expresses levels of organization as extending through the entirety of the natural world, and all 
of the entities within it  (Needham 1937[1943],  233;  Novikoff  1945, 209).  In application, 
however, levels of organization in the integrative account are characterized in a contextualized 
fashion.  That  is,  levels  are  used  for  specific  systems  studied  by  scientists  interested  in 
explaining a particular phenomenon. The reason for this is that uncovering the specific details 
of the part-whole relations that compose a particular phenomenon is one of the major tasks 
that scientists face in their construction of explanations (see also the comments on “context 
sensitivity” in Section 5.3). Making claims about the entirety of the world does not fall under 
pressing issues engaged in the explanatory work of typical scientists.
This  dual  interpretation of  levels (global  yet  contextualized)  in  the integrative account  as 
global in scope but contextual in application results in a quandary regarding how many levels 
of organization are postulated to exist. The proponents of the integrative account indeed offer 
simultaneous but distinct answers to this question. Whenever 'global' levels are the topic of 
discussion, only an exceedingly small number of 'levels' are enumerated, which are extremely 
coarse grained concerning their particular membership (i.e. what particular entities belong to 
them) yet designative of vastly different categories of entity-types. More specifically, 'levels 
of  organization'  in  this  sense  include  the  physical,  chemical,  biological,  psychological  or 
mental,  and  sociological  levels (Novikoff 1945, 209, Rowe 1961, 421; see also Needham 
1937[1943],  233-235).146 At  the  same  time,  advocates  of  the  integrative  account  also 
consciously point  out  that  a  more  relevant  series  of  levels  are  what  exhibit  relevance  to 
biological research. Novikoff, for instance, clearly states that the foregoing coarse-grained 
'super-levels'  do  not  exhaust  the  descriptive  layout  of  biology,  saying  that  “[w]ithin  the 
biological level, there are a series of other integrative levels[:] In multicellular organisms147 
there is a hierarchy of levels – cells, tissues, organs, organ-systems and organism” (Novikoff 
1945, 210). James K. Feibleman (1954) echoes these comments, admitting that:
“We have been talking about the integrative levels of the scientific fields as if only five 
146 Sometimes even the cosmological level is also mentioned in the interest of completeness (see Needham (ibid. 
234) and Novikoff (ibid.).
147 This use of the term “organism” refers to the standard biological entity, rather than the specialized organicist  
term that interested Woodger and Needham.
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[i.e. the 'super-levels' given above] were involved. This was necessary in order to see 
clearly some of the relations [between different levels and scientific disciplines]. But the 
situation  is  more  complex  than  that.  For  each  [super-]level  is  the  name  for  a 
considerable group of sub-levels. As our investigations continue, the complexity of the 
levels is  increasingly revealed.  The picture will  therefore have to  undergo continual 
improvement (Feibleman 1954, 64-65). 
Rowe (1961) goes even further, pointing out the inherent difficulty in giving an exhaustive, or 
even precise,  list  of levels of organization.  “That there are differences in opinion”,  Rowe 
writes,  “as  to  how different  levels  of  organization  are  constituted,  and inconsistencies  in 
within  many of  the  proposed  hierarchies  of  levels,  is  apparent  from [surveying  different 
authors' attempts to construct different lists]” (Rowe 1961, 421). Rowe goes on to cite several 
authors' lists of levels (including Novikoff's, (ibid.)), and eventually proposes “population”, 
“community”, and “ecosystem” as relatively stable levels whose exact status and qualities 
also deserve attention.148
One  motivation  for  the  distinct  interpretations  of  levels  given  by the  proponents  of  the 
integrative account is that they expected the account to offer solutions to distinct theoretical 
questions in biology. The global scope in which the integrative account is initially advertised 
is meant to reiterate support for the thesis that the different main branches of science (physics, 
chemistry, biology, etc.) designate distinct natural sciences that do not reduce to one another. 
Support  for  this  interpretation  is  found  in  various  references  to  the  organicists'  earlier 
contributions  to  the  mechanist-vitalist  dispute,  and  specifically  the  organicist  tenet  that 
biology is an autonomous science. Novikoff cites the organicists’ efforts in this regard when 
contrasting the levels concept in biology and in physics: 
“[L]iving cells present problems not to be encountered in the test tube or the flask...It 
has been a great contribution of the 'organicists' that they have demonstrated the error of 
148 Notably, combining Novikoff's and Rowe's respective level layouts results in the list of organizational levels  
(molecular, cellular, tissue, organ, organ-system, organism, population, community, ecosystem) that are now 
ubiquitously  seen  in  biological  texts  (Section  1.4).  These  'super  levels'  are  closer  to  what  the  British  
emergentists of the 1920's postulated with their notion of 'levels of being'-
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the  mechanistic  reduction  of  the  biological  organism  to  the  physico-chemical...No 
matter how complete our knowledge of living systems becomes in the future, living 
substance  must  still  be  recognized  as  matter  on  a  higher  level,  with  new,  unique 
properties which have emerged on [sic] combination of the lower-level units” (Novikoff 
1945a, 210; similar comments can also be found in Feibleman 1954, 64 and Rowe 1961, 
421, 426).
Correspondingly, the localized interpretation of levels sees the layout given by global 'super-
levels' is not adequate for scientists' investigations of biological phenomena. This agrees with 
the organicists' earlier development of the levels concept in their own usage, and can also be 
seen in the advocates of the integrative account. For instance, Novikoff again presents another 
major motivation for the levels concept, which strongly resembles earlier advocates of 'levels 
of organization' like Needham et al:
“A full understanding of the organism is [e.g.] not possible without complete knowledge 
of the activities of its cells. But knowledge of 'the individual cells' does not exhaust the 
problems of organism physiology; the activity of the individual cell is greatly influenced 
by  the  products  of  activity  of  other  cells  in  tissue,  organ,  organ-system  and 
organism...Just as cells do not exist in isolation in the organism, neither do organs or 
organ-systems” (Novikoff 1945a, 210-211).
So,  the  dual  interpretation  of  levels  of  organization  given  by  the  integrative  account  is 
consciously postulated by its advocates as a means of serving distinct theoretical purposes, 
both of which were imported from the organicists' development of the levels concept, and the 
original debates for which the concept was developed. The global interpretation is a broad 
thesis  concerning the nature of the world,  which serves  as  a  means of understanding the 
autonomy of biology as a natural science. The local interpretation is a thesis concerning the 
how biological phenomena are best treated with the levels concept.
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5.4.2 Incomplete Epistemic Continuity in Levels of Organization
Following  its  global  scope,  the  integrative  account  postulates  a  compositional  continuity 
extending through the natural phenomena of the world. The way in which this continuity is 
understood differs starkly from that of the layer-cake account. For one thing, the integrative 
account offers no general answer to how this continuity is structured; i.e., the account does 
not offer an analysis of inter-level relations or a precise articulation of the criterion by which 
levels are identified or differentiated.  In other words,  here there is  no stepwise condition. 
Instead,  the  integrative  account  describes  this  continuity  in  a  neutral  fashion,  and  posits 
simply “part-whole relations” as the relation connecting different levels. The precise nature of 
these relations are treated on a case-by-case basis by different authors, who describe the way 
that different levels become related to each other by referring to specific experimental results 
done on different level-bound structures.
Looking at  the passages  where particular,  case-based relations  between distinct  levels  are 
discussed,  proponents  of  the  integrative  account  move  between  criteria  of  scale  and 
composition to clarify what is meant by “part whole relations” in the case being discussed. 
Needham,  for  instance,  introduces  the basic  idea of  levels  of  organization  as  “successive 
forms of order in a scale of complexity and organization” (1937[1943], 234, emphasis added), 
but then quickly shifts to a compositional criterion of differentiating levels when applying the 
levels concept to particular cases, saying: “A sharp change in organisational level often means 
that  what were wholes  on the lower level  become parts  on the new, e.g. protein crystals in 
cells, cells in metazoan organisms, and metazoan organisms in social units” (ibid. emphasis 
added; see also Feibleman 1954, 59-63;). The highlighted terms in this statement emphasize 
an openness to how levels of organization are related, one which falls drastically short of 
prescribing a universal or comprehensive characterization of the material continuity of the 
world. 
Like the dual interpretations of the account's scope,  the open manner in which levels are 
distinguished by the integrative account is a resulting consequence of the account serving as 
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an  answer  to  a  still  open  discussion  in  biology occurring  at  that  time.  In  this  case,  the 
discussion  concerns  the  organicist  thesis  that  phenomena  in  biology,  in  general,  exhibit 
properties that are distinct not only from those in the physical sciences, but also those in other 
biological  disciplines.  This  distinctiveness  is  a  result  of  the  role  that  complexity  and 
organization  play  in  determining  how  the  behaviors  of  biological  entities  manifest  as 
phenomena to explain (see above Section 5.3 “Holism and Organization”). However, recall 
also that establishing this thesis was an issue of considerable debate during the time of the 
Cambridge organicists. In the context of their articulation of this tenet to their program, the 
“qualitative distinctiveness” of biological phenomena was a buzzword largely because of the 
efforts  of  the  vitalists  (and  other,  more  obscurantist  organicists).  The  familiarity  of  the 
scientific and philosophical community with this idea at that time was largely the result of the 
rejection of the pseudoscientific efforts of, e.g., the vitalists in elucidating what exactly this 
distinctiveness  could  entail.  Since  the  manner  in  which  biological  phenomena  are 
characterized by levels is bound to the explanatory problems that are posed, and investigated, 
by scientists, the specific way in which levels are related to one another in a given case will 
also be bound to what is deemed effective for constructing an explanation. 
This  understanding  of  the  material  continuity  of  levels  in  the  world  results  in  three 
consequences of note concerning how levels are conceptualized by the integrative account. 
Firstly,  it  preserves  the  spirit  of  the  organicists'  original  understanding  of  levels,  which 
emphasized that the organizing relations in biological phenomena (something designative of 
them as scientific objects of study, see Section 5.3) are not given  a priori  (Novikoff 1945, 
209). Rather these relations themselves must be discovered and characterized by scientists on 
a case-to-case basis in the explanations of particular phenomena. Novikoff explains:
“By stressing  the  material  interrelationships  of  parts  and  whole  and  the  qualitative 
uniqueness  of  each  level  of  integration,  the  [levels]  concept  is  of  genuine  help  to 
biologists.  Its  dialectical  approach  avoids  'organicism,'  'fatalism'  [i.e.  vitalism]  and 
mechanical 'atomism,' and helps attain a fuller understanding of such problems as the 
interrelations of cellular structures and metabolism [etc.]...By avoiding teleology, the 
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concept aids the search for causes of biological phenomena” (Novikoff 1945, 215).149
This directly reflects the insight Needham attempted to infuse into the levels concept's role in 
dealing  with  organizing  relations  as  “the  central  problem  of  biology”  (see  Section  5.3 
“Context Sensitivity”; and Section 5.4).  Hence,  though the integrative account takes upon 
itself the commitment to a material continuity extending through the entirety of nature, the 
precise character of this continuity is highly incomplete, and designates a feature of levels as 
things waiting to be discovered.
Secondly, the “stepwise” fashion in which the layer-cake account structures compositional 
continuity is lacking in the integrative account. Instead, the things located at a given level can 
be related to one  or more levels below or above them (see especially Feibleman 1954, 59; 
Novikoff 1945, 214-215 and Rowe 1961, 422, 423-424 make similar points). This, again, 
makes sense in light of the context-sensitive way in which biological phenomena are treated 
by the integrative account. To wit: The levels of organization that are considered relevant for 
best  investigating  or  explaining  a  given  phenomenon  is  often  decided  with  a  pragmatic 
element to it, because the (contextually-chosen) criteria by which levels are understood, and 
what stands in need of explanation will be selected on the basis of how the phenomenon itself  
is characterized. Rowe (1961), for instance, observes that the objects that are included in a 
layout of levels connected to a given phenomenon are actually dependent on what objects are 
“perceived”  to  be of  use to  studying that  phenomenon,  and that  these  “perceptions”  (see 
Section 5.4.3) may quickly change. He says that “[e]ach successive level is not formed by 
aggregation  of  only one kind of  lower level  organization;  the relation between successive 
levels is not symmetrical. The object [of study] at each level is heterogeneous; it organizes a 
variety of spatially located systems” (Rowe 1961, 421, emphasis added).
In other words, adjacently located levels (higher or lower) do not carry any inherent primacy 
in  describing  hierarchical  layouts  for  biological  phenomena.  This,  Rowe  continues,  is 
149 Novikoff's dismissal of “organicism” here is not directed at Cambridge organicism, rather at the obscurantist 
variants of organicism mentioned above. It is also conceivable that Novikoff mentioned “organicism” here as  
an observation of the differences between his and Needham’s (1937[1943]) and Redfield’s (1942) original 
biologistic presentation of the integrative account.
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especially the case with the study of ecosystems, saying:
“Recognition  of  the  pragmatic  element  in  the  definition  of  ecosystems is  a  healthy 
reminder that there may be merit in various approaches to their selection [as objects of 
study]...The terrestrial ecosystem is not always presented in so neat a package; usually it 
must be carved out of the living landscape by use of the appropriate criteria. To some 
people this subjectivity of boundary delineation is a stumbling block to acceptance of 
the ecosystem as an object of study, yet it need not be...The criteria by means of which 
ecosystems can be defined and bounded are many...[I]n the context of an hierarchy of 
organizations, ecology becomes [the] study of the contingencies of objects at any level  
on the more inclusive [i.e. lower] levels of organization” (ibid. 423) (Rowe 1961, 422-3, 
emphasis added).
Finally,  a  third  consequence  of  the  incomplete  material  continuity  postulated  by  the 
integrative account is that levels are not necessarily clearly demarcated from one another. 
Though the identity of some general, relatively stable levels of organization may be agreed 
upon among scientists (such as molecule-cell-tissue-organ-organism-population-community-
ecosystem series), the integrative account explicitly acknowledges that boundaries between 
even the most widely accepted levels can be vague. Needham (1937[1943], 255) was the first 
to make this observation, citing the existence of “mesoforms” that do not clearly belong at  
any one particular level.  Novikoff imports this observation into the integrative account of 
levels, saying: “The different levels of matter, while distinct, are not completely delimited 
from each other.  No boundary in nature is fixed and no category air-tight. 'Mesoforms' are 
found at the transition point of one level of organization to the next.” (Novikoff 1945, 209).  
Significant examples of mesoforms include things such as viruses, which possess properties 
of both living and non-living matter (Needham, ibid. Novikoff, ibid.), and even the different 
notions of biological 'organisms', which may appear in single-cell, colonial, and multicellular 
varieties  (Novikoff,  ibid.).  “Yet”,  Novikoff  continues,  “the  absence  of  rigid  demarcation 
between  [different  levels]  does  not  make  the  difference  between  them any  less  clear  or 
fundamental.  Mesoforms, 'the more clearly we understand them, will  all  the more clearly 
serve to bring out the essentially new elements of (the) higher order'” (Novikoff, ibid.).
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5.4.3 Weak Association Between Science and Nature
The integrative account also postulates that some connection exists between different levels of 
organization and the scientific disciplines that investigate the entities populating those levels. 
In stark contrast to the correspondence thesis of the layer-cake account (see Section 2.2.4), 
however,  the integrative  account  postulates  only a  weak association between science and 
nature. Using the distinction established in Section 5.4.1, understanding this weak association 
is  best  understood in  terms  of  the  shift  between global  and local  scopes  with  which  the 
account conceptualizes levels. 
Rowe  (1961)  envisioned  the  typical,  global  levels  of  organization  (molecule-cell-...-
ecosystem)150 as increasingly inclusive sets of “objects of study” composed of the entities that 
typify each respective level (see also Feibleman 1954, 62). The designation of these “objects 
of study”, however, does not belong to some static “universe of discourse”, but rather are 
constructed from discipline-bound “points of view” (Rowe 1961, 423). This is illustrated in 
Figure 5.1.
Here nature and science already become decoupled from any strict  correspondence in the 
integrative account. The reason for this is that scientific “objects of study” (ibid. 421) located 
at  different  levels  are  only  identified  as  such  in  terms  of  the  manner  in  which  they  are 
“perceived” (ibid.) by scientists. In other words, scientific characterizations of its explanatory 
phenomena  are  in  fact  a  consequence  of  the  disciplinary  training  that  one  receives  in 
becoming a scientist. In his words: “Perception is not simply a registry by a receptive mind of 
150 Here the reader will notice a switch in what is considered “global” levels given by the integrative level  
(above, the five “super-levels” were given as the stand-in series for 'global levels'). The difference is merely 
expository, for, as was seen in the discussions of locality in Section 2.3 and Section 4.2, the local character of 
levels in actual scientific application are contrasted with both of the foregoing candidates for understanding  
levels as global in scope.
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Figure 5.1 Rowe's depiction of the association between science and nature, according to the integrative account.  
Rowe envisioned the general relation between science and nature as one that could only be vaguely captured, as 
this image makes clear (Rowe's expression of “corresponding” here notwithstanding). The column “objects of  
study” represents the entities of the world, ordered into levels of organization depicted as increasingly inclusive 
sets. The size of these sets, however, are meant to depict the relative number of different perspectives that can be 
constructed regarding the phenomena that are perched at a given level, which may include reference to any 
number of other entities perched at the same or different levels. The column “fields of study” are strategically 
placed to  not  correspond directly to any  one level, but rather to show association with what kinds of entities 
certain branches of science typically investigate. Image taken from Rowe 1961, 422). 
what lies 'out there'; rather it is an active intellectual process which provides consciousness 
with 'objects' as vehicles of meaning for the world as sensed”151 (ibid.; cf.  Section 5.4.1). The 
context of perceiving scientific objects of study in this way constitutes a disciplinary-bound 
151 One interesting topic for further analysis here is whether the 'levels of organization' concept expresses purely  
abstract, rational things or objective, real structure of reality. Here is not the place for such an analysis. For  
now, though, it is important to note that Rowe's position on this question is a deeply dialectical one that 
postulates levels of organization as both an ontological reality (albeit hidden from direct, simple observation) 
of which the human intellect actively works to interpret and refine its understanding.
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perspective that informs a particular scientist on how to differentiate a particular phenomenon 
from  nature.  These  perspectives,  furthermore,  attain  a  downward-  or  upward-looking 
orientation in the context of explaining a particular phenomenon, depending on what level is 
being investigated, and whether other disciplinary perspectives are involved in constructing 
that  explanation (see especially Figure 5.2 below).  This  in itself  is  yet  another  surprising 
feature of the integrative account levels, as it specifically allows multiple disciplines to be 
brought to bear on a particular phenomenon.152
At the same time, Rowe argues that it is a grievous error to conflate a scientific discipline 
(“field  of  study”)  with  a  particular  perspective  (“point  of  view”) (ibid.  424).  Though the 
perspective  from which  one  will  approach the  study of  a  particular  phenomenon will  be 
grounded from the particular disciplinary embedding in which one works, this in itself is not 
sufficient for knowing (i) what criteria this perspective utilizes to identify the phenomenon in 
question and characterize the task of explaining it,  and (ii) how this perspective relates to 
other  perspectives  (both  within  and  between  disciplines)  that  investigate  the  same 
phenomenon. Both of these aspects of a given perspective will be specified locally for the 
case at hand. Consequently, “[a]s points of view that can be focussed on various objects or 
levels  of organization,  neither [e.g.]  physiology nor ecology need imply a  field of study” 
(ibid. 423). This extended layout of the association between science and nature is illustrated in 
Figure 5.2.
Importantly,  the  integrative  account  regarded  such  opportunities  for  multi-disciplinary 
investigations as an important condition for constructing adequate explanations for biological 
phenomena. The interspersal of different disciplinary perspectives that can be brought to bear 
on a particular explanatory endeavor for this reason exploits the weak association between 
levels  of  organization  and  scientific  disciplines  to  create  a  better  means  of  grasping  the 
phenomenon for which an explanation is sought, or, as Rowe calls it, “catching the rabbit” 
(Rowe 1961, 425). Moreover, this occurs not only because there are more perspectives (both 
152 Rowe explicitly endorses this as a valuable feature of the integrative account of levels, which is implied in  
the following quote: “If the two modes of comprehension – the inward [i.e. downward-]looking and the  
outward [upward-]looking – are applied to the objects in an hierarchy of integrative levels, an overlapping of  
viewpoints must result” (ibid. 423).
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Figure 5.2 Rowe's  pluralistic conception of disciplinary-bound perspectives  and levels of organization. This 
image clearly exhibits the weak association between scientific disciplines and the entities of nature ordered by 
the levels concept under the integrative account. In particular, any ordering of scientific disciplines is mediated  
through a particular  perspective  from within that  discipline,  which is in turn contextualized in terms of  the 
explanatory  interests  of  that  perspective  and  the  criteria  with  which  the  object  of  study  in  question  is 
investigated. Rowe summarizes this thusly:  “All the viewpoints are inter-related through the objects on which 
they are focussed; they bring mutual support to scientific studies,  particularly within a level-of-organization  
scheme” (ibid. 424). Figure taken from Rowe (1961, 425).
within and between disciplines) that could be brought to bear on a particular phenomenon. 
Rather,  the more different kinds of discipline-bound perspectives are able to investigate a 
single level of organization, the more likely it is that the resulting scientific work produced in 
that constellation will be able to provide knowledge about other level-bound parts of that 
system (see Figure 5.2).
One  of  the  main  stumbling  blocks  of  the  layer-cake  account  of  levels  was  the  rigid 
correspondence it postulated between scientific disciplines and levels of organization. Recall 
from Chapter  2  that  Oppenheim and Putnam (1958)  postulated  that  a  branch of  science 
“essentially  corresponds” to  a  universe  of  discourse representing  the  total  set  of  entities 
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investigated by that science (Oppenheim and Putnam 1958, 6; see Section 2.2.4). This levels-
mediated understanding of the relation between nature and science served their reductionist 
vision of the Unity of Science. This, as seen in Chapter 3, is extremely problematic. In fact,  
the proponents of the integrative account condemn just such simplistic characterizations of the 
relation  between  science  and  nature.  Rowe  (1961)  warns  against  just  such  strong 
correspondence  when  he  says:  “However,  there  has  been a  tendency for  physiologists  to 
arrogate  the  individual  organism  as  their  own  field,  calling...their  study  'environmental 
physiology'” (Rowe 1961, 423). The approach of the integrative account, hence, effectively 
avoids the stultifying layer-cake understanding of the relation between science and nature. 
5.5 Integrative Levels & Layer-cake Levels
The integrative account represents a prescient conception of levels of organization that has 
received little to no attention in contemporary philosophy of science. The reasons for this lack 
of attention can at this time only be speculated, but two plausible initial explanations offer 
themselves. Firstly, it is conceivable that the integrative account failed to achieve notoriety 
because of its affinity with organicism. Beyond the efforts of the Cambridge organicists, the 
organicist  movement  at  large  was  largely  met  with  skepticism that  often  comprised  flat 
dismissal of its program (Beckner 1969b; Hein 1967; 1969; Hull 1974, Ch. 5; Roll-Hansen 
1984).  Consequently,  any  grievances  that  were  brought  against  organicism  would  hold, 
mutatis mutandis, for the integrative account. Secondly, it is also possible that the general 
skepticism surrounding  the  levels  concept  (Ch.  3)  insulates  the  integrative  account  from 
attracting philosophical  interest.  More particularly,  the status  of the layer-cake account of 
levels as  the  default conception of levels of organization in philosophy, which is the root 
cause of this levels skepticism, may have simply grabbed the spotlight and never let go. 
As the analysis in Chapter 3 showed, the status of the layer-cake is highly questionable, if 
only  because  it  imposes  a  highly  problematic  conception  of  levels  onto  philosophical 
discussion that critically misses the fragmentary character of the levels concept in scientific 
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usage.  The  rest  of  this  section  will  contrast  the  integrative  account  with  the  layer-cake 
account. As will be seen, the former account avoids almost all of the pitfalls for which the 
latter has now become notorious.
One  principle  difference  between  the  integrative  and  the  layer-cake  accounts  is  the 
philosophical discussions in which they were embedded. The layer-cake account, to recall, 
was originally conceived as part of Oppenheim and Putnam's overall Unity of Science project. 
This project was reductionist  in character,  and aimed to reduce the sciences down to one 
fundamental  branch,  namely physics.  Later,  the  account  acquired  an  association  with  the 
debate surrounding theoretical reductionism and anti-reductionism during the latter half of the 
twentieth century, which, at least in the case of philosophy of biology, has largely run its 
course (Brigandt and Love 2010; Waters 2010; see also Chapter 3).
The integrative account, on the other hand, was conceived and developed in the context of 
organicist biology of the 1920's-1940's, and remains a largely underappreciated, yet relevant 
area of study for contemporary philosophy of biology. In particular, as the discussion in this 
chapter  has  broached,  the  organicist  program  exhibits  a  strong  affinity  to  pluralistic 
approaches to understanding scientific explanation and the entities of nature153. This agrees 
with Abir-Am's characterization of the Cambridge organicists, who had the following to say 
about their program:
“The Biotheoretical Gathering...became a vehicle for transforming personal alienation 
from  both  the  social  and  scientific  orders  into  a  springboard  for  collective 
creativity...They  viewed  isomorphism  between  organized  entities  in  all  disciplines, 
pluralistic lawfulness and epistemological parity as the new themes of scientific unity, to 
supplant the classical, atomistic and reductionistic view which had been discredited at 
that time by the combined impact of the relativity and quantum theories [of theoretical 
physics]” (Abir-Am 1987, 10).
153 If the integrative account is associated with a contemporary philosophical account of explanation, it is with 
the “New Mechanism” account. However, it was already seen that the (New) mechanists actively defend a  
different conception of levels, which was discussed in Chapter 2.
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One consequence of this affinity is that the organicists' conception of levels of organization 
was unabashedly applied to both the disciplinary structure of science, especially biology, as 
well  as  the  hierarchical  layout  of  biological  phenomena.  Unlike  the layer-cake  model, 
however,  the  association  between  the  ontological  objects  of  biological  study  and  the 
disciplines that constitute biology were not related by anything like the strict correspondence 
that Oppenheim and Putnam's account envisaged. One of the reasons for this was that levels, 
to the organicist, were not conceptualized as a monolithic scaffolding with which to blueprint 
the ultimate unification of science and nature, respectively, but rather a theoretical device that 
expressed the complexity of a world in which such a grand unified, and reductionist, image of 
the world was impossible. Instead, the organicists' view of levels supports a fractured view of 
biology wherein its constituent disciplines could orient themselves toward each other while 
preserving their individual disciplinary identity. 
Interestingly,  this  also  resulted  in  a  conception  of  levels  that  had  both  global  and local 
applications (see Section 5.4.1). On the one hand, the organicists needed the levels concept to 
express a  global  image of the world in  which the biological  sciences,  i.e.  the disciplines 
constituting biology, could be represented as independent disciplines, non-reducible to one 
another, and engaged in perfectly legitimate, and parallel,  scientific pursuits. On the other 
hand, the levels concept was only empirically useful if it was capable of supplying specific 
contributions  to  particular  explanatory  problems,  which  are  identified,  investigated,  and 
solved in a local manner.
Finally,  the  organicist  conception  of  levels  imported  into  the  integrative  account  also 
preserved the epistemic goal of the levels concept (see Chapter 4). This is not surprising, as 
the organicists appear to be the ones who are responsible for constructing this epistemic goal 
during their original development of the levels concept. Later proponents of the integrative 
account appreciated both the usefulness of the epistemic goal of levels, and the fragmentary 
character that it carries with it. Indeed, this was ultimately one of the most attractive features 
of the organicist levels concept, as Novikoff makes clear:
“The concept of integrative levels indicates to research biologists the crucial aspects of  
201
Chapter Five: Organicist Roots of the Levels Concept 
their problems, the solution of which puts the known facts into perspective by revealing 
the decisive element,  the element imparting the uniqueness to the phenomena under 
study...As biologists  become more  familiar  with  the  concept,  a  greater  number  will 
recognize  its  value  both  as  an  aid  in  the  understanding of  biological  data  already  
accumulated and as  a reliable  guide  for  research”  (Novikoff  1945a,  215,  emphasis 
added).
The existence of the integrative account of levels now puts the entrenched status of the layer-
cake account as the default  conception of levels directly into question.  The efforts of the 
organicists  in  developing  the  concept  of  levels  of  organization  introduces  wholly  new 
dimensions  to  the  philosophical  understanding  of  the  concept  that  promises  to  be  fertile 
material for a discussion that, until now, has not yet occurred. 
5.6 Organicist Influence on Mitchell’s Chemiosmotic Hypothesis
One final thought will serve to better connect the fragmentary account of levels developed in 
the last  chapter  with the historical  analysis  given in this  chapter.  Though the organicists’ 
development  on  the  levels  concept,  and  the  subsequent  (integrative)  account  that  was 
constructed out of the organicists’ work, have largely escaped explicit attention in philosophy, 
it has continued to influence biological research even to today. One important bridge between 
the historical context of the development of the levels concept in the organicist movement and 
in the biological textbooks of today (see again Section 1.4, Section 4.4-5) can be seen by 
looking  again  at  the  construction  of  the  explanation  of  ox-phos.  This  point  was  quickly 
touched upon in Section 4.5.2,  in  the analysis  of  Mitchell’s  exemplification of  the levels 
concept,  and  in  particular  its  epistemic  goal,  in  his  construction  of  the  chemiosmotic 
hypothesis. 
Recall  that  Mitchell  privately  developed  his  own  philosophical  notions  with  which  to 
conceptualize problems in biology (Section 4.5.2). These notions, i.e. fluctoids, statids, and 
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fluctids, represent qualitatively different types of things that can be manifested by different 
phenomena. Of particular interest is Mitchell’s  notion of a “fluctoid”, which, as was seen 
above, constituted a stand-in term for a kind of organized whole whose workings could not be 
explained solely with reference to the processes (fluctids) or objects (statids) of which it is 
composed. A “fluctoid”, in other words, bears resemblance to a phenomenon that manifests 
holistic features of the kind discussed in Section 5.3.1. As it turns out, this aspect Mitchell’s 
private  philosophy was directly  influenced by the Cambridge organicists  and their  levels-
inspired  program.  Prebble  (2001)  makes  this  connection  explicit,  saying  that:  “With  the 
intention of defining and developing his philosophy, Mitchell identified the fluctoid idea in 
the writing of such early twentieth century biological thinkers as D’Arcy Thompson, Rudolph 
Höber, Joseph Needham and particularly Joseph Woodger. A number of the characteristics of 
the fluctoid were illustrated in this way” (2001, 444, emphasis added).
Though  the  manner,  and  precise  depth,  in  which  Mitchell  became  influenced  by  the 
organicists is, for now, an open question,154 that Mitchell was influenced by their program is 
at least arguable, even if not yet compelling. Isolating the precise influence on Mitchell of the 
organicists’ advocacy of the  levels concept is also tentative, but it appears at least initially 
plausible that his levels-mediated treatment of the problem of ox-phos was at least indirectly  
inspired by the organicists’  ideas involving levels.  Prebble (2001) again provides a bit  of 
substantiation for this point when he writes that:
“A further characteristic of [Mitchell’s] fluctoid philosophy is its dynamic aspect and 
its reference to physical forces. Mitchell found various comments on the nature of life 
which  he  enlisted  to  elaborate  the  fluctoid  concept.  The  structural  and  flowing 
elements  are  combined  in  a  single  entity.  In  Joseph Needham’s  work  he  found a 
quotation from Woodger. “It is to be noted that a molecule, an atom, or an electron, if  
it belongs to the spatial hierarchy of a living organism, will be just as much ‘alive’ as  
a cell, and one which does not belong to such a spatial hierarchy will be ‘dead’… The 
154  One initial, but for now speculative, hypothesis that could substantiate this influence is the fact that Mitchell  
pursued his PhD studies at Cambridge University, which coincided with the final years of Needham’s tenure 
at Cambridge before moving to China. If Mitchell did not have direct contact with Needham himself, the 
geographical and disciplinary proximity of the two surely warrants closer analysis. This question presents 
itself as an excellent issue for further research, but for now is far beyond the scope of the present analysis. 
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ideas discussed here give a view of Mitchell’s approach to cell structure in the late 
1940s and give some meaning to the concept of the fluctoid.” (ibid. 444-446, emphasis 
added).
The quote from Woodger that Prebble here cites as an impetus for his fluctoid philosophy is 
actually embedded in Needham’s (1936) book, where Needham presented his ideas of the 
“hierarchical continuity of biological order”. As seen above in Section 5.3, Needham’s Order 
and Life represented one of the most mature expressions by Needham’s work on the levels 
concept  (particularly  via  the  epistemic  goal  that  he  developed  into  the  concept)  and  its 
usefulness for treating explanatory problems in biological research. Further allusion to the 
influence  of  the  organicists’ work  on  levels  on  Mitchell  can  be  seen  in  a  passage  that  
Needham  provides,  which  strongly  recalls  the  two  ways  that  Mitchell’s  chemiosmotic 
hypothesis was said to implement the levels concept into the explanation of ox-phos:
“The ordinary division of a living organism into parts of cells, cells themselves, and 
atoms, has been brought by Woodger under the notion of ‘hierarchical order.’ From the 
present point of view we are mainly interested in ‘spatial hierarchy.’ The higher or 
coarser  levels  correspond of course to  the domain of morphology and anatomy as 
ordinarily understood,  the intermediate  levels  to  histology and cytology,  the  lower 
levels to biochemistry. On this view, structure, even, if you like, morphology, should be  
found fully within the sphere of biochemistry,  and that this is so, the whole realm of 
permutations and combinations of the carbon atom illustrates…The contribution of  
biochemistry to biology is too often thought of as it were primarily concerned with the  
reactions of simple substances in homogeneous media, and the complexity of chemical  
structure  is  forgotten.  Unfortunately,  not  only  do  we  have  to  deal  with  them  in 
extremely  complicated  molecules,  we  also  have  to  deal  with  them  in  extremely  
complicated  situations,  that  is  to  say,  in  the  colloidal  milieu  of  the  living  cell.” 
(Needham 1936, 110)
The  three  highlighted  parts  of  this  passage  line  up  remarkably  to  the  contributions  of 
Mitchell’s level-mediated contributions to the explanation of ox-phos in Section 4.5. The first 
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highlighted part concerning morphology being “within the sphere of biochemistry” resembles 
the conviction described in Section 4.5.2 concerning the shift of ox-phos from a chemical to a 
biological  problem. This resemblance finds  justification in  the rest  of  the passage,  where 
something  like  the  attitude  observed  in  the  biochemistry  community’s  expectation  the 
phlogistonal ‘chemical intermediate’ is criticized. It was, to recall, exactly Mitchell’s proof 
that ox-phos does not occur in a “homogeneous” medium (i.e. in the mitochondrial matrix). 
Rather,  the “milieu of  the  living  cell”,  i.e.  the role  of  the  mitochondrial  matrix  and ATP 
synthase  (both  higher-level,  ‘living’ features  of  the  cell)  were  central  to  uncovering  the 
explanation for ox-phos. If, as Prebble (2001) claims, Mitchell was directly influenced by the 
organicist program (and particularly Needham and Woodger), and one locus of this influence 
was Needham’s (1936) book155, the idea that Mitchell’s work on chemiosmosis can serve as a 
bridge  between  the  historical  and  contemporary  uses  of  the  levels  concept  in  biological 
research has earned the status of working hypothesis.
All the same, these allusions must remain tentative for now, but this hypothesized connection 
between  history  and  contemporary  usage  of  levels  centering  on  the  work  of  Mitchell’s 
research  shows  there  is  still  much  work  to  be  done  on  the  impact  of  organicism,  and 
especially its development of the levels concept, on contemporary biology. 
5.7 Conclusion 
The centrality of the levels concept to the organicist program was a byproduct of compromise 
between  the  members  of  the  BTC.  The  group's  members  came  from  highly  diverse 
backgrounds, and this diversity was exhibited in the particular interests pursued within the 
group. Though the “integrative” account  of  levels  would receive its  namesake late  in  the 
organicist movement,156 the enduring ideas it would come to represent were developed much 
155  Especially, in particular, the foregoing passages above, which just happen to be one of the main sources of 
the organicists’ development of the levels concept)
156 By 1943 the organicist movement, at least in its Cambridge form, had largely dissipated. The Theoretical  
Biology Club that constituted Cambridge organicism had by that time disbanded and its members had gone 
their own ways after their application for funding was rejected by the Rockefeller Foundation (Senechal  
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earlier  in  the  late  1920's  and  early  1930's.  Though  not  then  known  under  the  moniker 
“integrative levels”, the initial work on “levels of organization” by Needham and Woodger 
would be the most substantial contributions of the Cambridge organicists of the TBC to the 
account, before bequeathing the account to later thinkers and scientists upon the dissolution of 
the organicist movement.
Almost a century later, the task of elucidating the levels concept remains unfinished in both 
philosophy and science, particularly as the term “levels of organization” appears to be an 
unavoidably fragmentary scientific concept (see Chapter 4). It has already been seen that the 
fragmentary  character  of  the  levels  concept  in  biology  does  not  detract  from the  term's 
usefulness or validity, and rather weakly unites a plurality of possible meanings the term can 
have in a particular instance of usage. 
The  roots  of  this  usefulness  are  present  in  the  organicists'  integrative  account.  The 
“integrative” account of levels developed out of the Cambridge organicist work on the levels 
concept is, arguably, the direct historical predecessor of the concept of levels of organization 
as it is used in biology today. This is particularly visible in the 'package deal' of modes in 
which the levels concept was applied by the organicists themselves (cf. Section 4.2.1), which 
imported  many  of  the  insights  of  organicist  thought  into  a  single  framework.  This 
simultaneously led to the creation of the epistemic goal of the levels concept discussed in 
Chapter 4, which guides how scientists view, investigate, and explain biological phenomena. 
For this reason, the integrative account of levels exhibited a strongly programmatic character. 
The programmatic character of the levels concept,  as it was developed by the Cambridge 
organicists,  is  still  visible  in  contemporary  biology.  Firstly,  the  organicist  account  of 
integrative levels strongly resembles the view of levels depicted in contemporary textbooks in 
biology.  This  resemblance  is  much  more  than  passing:  the  account  of  integrative  levels 
arguably  is the  levels  concept  used  in  contemporary  biological  sciences.  Supplementary 
literature in biology on the levels concept often cite directly some of the key organicist and 
post-organicist texts in which the main ideas expressed by the integrative levels account were 
2013, 131-2). 
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originally articulated (see, e.g., Lobo 2008). Secondly, the allusions in Section 5.6 to the work 
of Peter Mitchell as (possibly) being able to serve as a bridge between the historical usage of 
the  levels  concept  by the  organicists  and  the  use  of  the  levels  concept  in  contemporary 
biology also serves as a significant hypothesis, and deserves more attention in future research.
The concept of levels of organization is nowadays so embedded in the biological sciences, its 
significance is largely presumed in virtue of the legitimacy of the myriad ideas it is expected 
to depict. This significance, until now purchased on intuitive appeal, now has a solid basis in 
contemporary and historical biological research.
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General Conclusion
This dissertation has provided an analysis of the character and significance of the concept of 
‘levels of organization’ in biological research. It was found that despite the fact that ‘levels’ 
possesses  a  fragmentary  character,  i.e.  that  there  many  distinct  possible  yet  legitimate 
meanings  for  the  concept,  the  concept  is  nonetheless  minimally  unified  due  a  general 
significance attributed to  the concept  across  its  instances  of  usage.  This  significance was 
substantiated by the presence of a remarkably conserved epistemic goal that motivates the 
usage of the levels concept. Furthermore, this analysis traced the historical development of the 
levels  concept  back  to  the  work  of  the  organicist  movement,  under  the  auspices  of  the 
Theoretical  Biological  Club  who  worked  together  at  Cambridge  during  the  1930’s.  The 
organicist development of the levels concept still strongly resembles the way that the concept 
is used today in contemporary biology.
This  analysis  began in  the  first  chapter  with  an  elucidation  of  the  ubiquity of  the  levels 
concept in biological science. For this, a survey of how the concept is depicted in well-known 
textbooks  in  biology  was  provided.  This  survey  revealed  that  ‘levels  of  organization’ is 
presented in an exceedingly open fashion in biology, with many different possible meanings, 
and facets of importance, possible to attribute to the concept. Additionally, it was noted that 
although  all  conceptions  of  ‘levels  of  organization’ probably  share  a  basic  hierarchical 
structure, the formal notion of a ‘hierarchy’ was not sufficient to exhaustively account for 
these different elements comprising the usage of levels in biological science. The analysis of 
‘levels’ continued in the second chapter with an exegetical analysis of the two most prominent 
accounts of levels in philosophy, namely the layer-cake account and the mechanistic account. 
The  first  of  these,  the  layer-cake  account,  designates  the  default  conception  of  levels  in 
philosophy, and was first constructed by Oppenheim and Putnam in 1958 as part of a larger 
project arguing for a reductionistic unity of science. As such, many of the features of the 
account  were  seen  to  be  tailored  to  expressing  a  number  of  components  to  their  overall 
argument for this project, in particular the microreduction relations they took to hold between 
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different  branches  of  science.  Moreover,  this  association  of  ‘levels’  with  theoretical 
reductionism and anti-reductionism was seen to persist even after interest in the ‘unity of 
science’ declined in philosophy. The second philosophical account of levels, the mechanistic 
account, is a recent attempt to explicate the meaning of ‘levels’. The features of this account 
of  levels,  it  was  seen,  were  largely postulated  as  an  antipodal  reaction  to  the  layer-cake 
account. Moreover, the mechanistic conception of levels is deeply embedded in the project of 
elucidating  what  a  ‘mechanism’ is,  as  well  as  what  a  ‘mechanistic  explanation’ is,  and 
eschewed any generalizations regarding the levels concept from particular instances of the 
concept’s usage. For these reasons, the mechanistic account was found lacking as a viable 
approach to analyzing the character and significance of levels.
Next, the analysis of this dissertation turned in the third chapter to the recent development of a 
‘levels skepticism’, which has argued for the elimination, or at least minimization, of usage of 
the  levels  concept.  The reasoning for  this  was that  the  levels  concept  apparently is  only 
capable of producing false or misleading statements about nature and science. Moreover, it 
was also argued by levels skeptics that the levels concept is in fact irrelevant to biological 
research, owing to its exaggerated importance attributed to it by philosophers. This skepticism 
was found to be guilty of attacking a straw man, as the conception of levels against which 
their skeptical arguments were applied is actually one or another variant of the layer-cake 
conception of levels. This was substantiated with an analysis of the influence of the layer-cake 
account’s status as the default  conception of levels in philosophy, which has unjustifiably 
associated the levels concept with a number of questionable and unpopular ideas.
In the fourth chapter, a pluralistic account of the levels concept was offered. This account 
argued that the levels concept exhibits a fragmentary character due to the presence of a strong 
semantic  incommensurability  between  different  instances  of  the  concept’s  usage.  That  is, 
different  instances  of  use  of  the  levels  concept  manifest  different  fragments  of  semantic 
content,  which  draw  from  a  plethora  of  possible  particular  meanings  pertaining  to  the 
referents, scope, definitional criteria, and mode of application that comprise any particular use 
of  the  levels  concept.  The  account  was  for  this  reason  pluralistic,  because  the  different 
209
possible meanings of different instances, though legitimate in isolation, were irreconcilable 
with one another. Though the levels account is not unifiable via its semantic content, it was 
also  found  that  different  instances  of  the  levels  concept  nonetheless  instantiate  the  same 
epistemic goal, which is to structure explanatory problems in biology. This was substantiated 
with an elaborate case study focusing on the construction of the explanation for ox-phos by 
Peter  Mitchell’s  chemiosmotic  hypothesis.  The  chemiosmotic  hypothesis  instantiated  the 
epistemic  goal  of  levels  in  both  a  descriptive  way  and  a  hypothetical  way,  which 
complemented each other in regards to constructing the final details of the mechanism by 
which ox-phos is now known to work.
The final, fifth chapter turned to the historical roots of the levels concept, which were found 
in the organicist movement in biology during the first decades of the 20 th century. It was seen 
that the Cambridge organicists, and particularly Joseph Needham and Joseph Woodger, were 
responsible  for  constructing  and developing the  levels  concept  as  it  is  seen  nowadays  in 
contemporary biology. Needham was especially interested in the concept after encountering it 
in  the  work  of  Woodger,  and  developed  the  concept  into  the  form  in  which  it  is  now 
recognizable by implementing both an open context-dependent character, and the epistemic 
goal of structuring explanatory problems, into usage of the concept. Moreover, it was seen 
that the organicists’ efforts were later taken up by a small number of biologists and further 
developed  into  a  proper  account  of  levels,  called  the  integrative  account.  Though  the 
integrative  account  of  levels  has  received  little  attention  in  philosophy,  its  features  were 
largely in  agreement  with  the  survey of  levels  given in  the  first  chapter.  The integrative 
account,  represents  a  direct  historical  counterpoint  to  the  layer-cake  account,  and  even 
preceded the latter’s existence by almost thirty years. 
The purpose of this analysis has been to instigate new interest in the concept of ‘levels of 
organization’ in scientific usage by, as it were, presenting a case for a ‘re-boot’ in the way that 
the concept is seen and treated in philosophy. For too long, the concept of levels has been 
associated  with  questionable  ideas  of  theses  that  have  only  served  to  hide  its  tangible 
influence in biological research. This influence is only beginning to be appreciated.
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